The Punjab Papers: Difference between revisions

ELLENBOROUGH PAPERS, official and private correspondence and papers of Lord Ellenborough, Governor General of India (1842-44), preserved in the Public Records Office, London. Some of these papers were used by Lord Colchester in his History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough in His Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington and the Queen (London, 1874). Similarly, Sir Algernon Law published some selected papers in his India under Lord Ellenborough (London, 1926) containing references to the Punjab, particularly the dissensions in the State and the intentions of British government about its future. Among others, the Papers contain letters to and from the GovernorGeneral's Agent, NorthWest Frontier (January 1844-June 1844) PRO 30/12 (60) and PRO 30/12 (106). Also included are files containing correspondence and papers relative to the Punjab (1839-44) PRO 30/12 Part II (i); Lord Ellenborough's private correspondence, with Sir Henry and Lady Hardinge (184247), providing information about Hardinge's policy towards the Punjab before and after the AngloSikh war of 1845-46, and the British military movement towards the Sutlej frontier, and about his deals with Gulab Singh (PRO 30/12, 21/7); and about Ellenborough's military policy and bellicosity towards the Sikhs (PRO 30/12 (72).

The Ellenborough Papers contain some of the most revealing documents relevant to AngloSikh relations. Soon after the disaster of the first Afghan War, Ellenborough abruptly terminated the Tripartite Treaty, and decided to reestablish British "military character" by the collection of a large British force on the Company's "weakest frontier," i.e. the Sutlej (PRO 30/1328/12). He conceived the idea of extending the Dogra power at the expense of the Lahore Darbar by separating theJammu hills from the plains of the Punjab. His letter to Queen Victoria (October 1843) unravels his designs "to bring plains first, and ai a later period hills, under our direct protection and control." Consequently, the Company's relations witli the Stale of Lahore were viewed by him as that of "an armed truce:" and to repeat, "Let our policy [towards tlic Sikhs] be what it may, the contest must come at last, and the intervening time thai may be given to us should be employed in unostentatious but vigilant preparation."