The Sikhs Under the British, Book Three, Sangat Singh

The loss of political power in 1849 had its concomitant impact on the Sikh faith and ecclesiastical polity. Sikhism was greatly weakened by the exodus of a large body of people who had adopted the Sikh form during the period of Sikh ascendancy for worldly gains, and whose allegiance to its principles and traditions was tenuous. Also, Brahminism had reasserted itself by the rise of Dogras and Brahmins during the last days of Ranjit Singh. Under the cloak of amity, they had surreptitiously pushed idols into the holy precincts of some of the Sikh shrines, overtaking the monotheism of the Sikh Gurus’. The Udasis who controlled these shrines served as Trojan horses; they even otherwise regarded Sikhism as no different from Hinduism in its social milieu. This affected Sikhism in two ways. One, there was a sharp decrease in Sikh population in Punjab, and their slunking back to Hinduism at an alarming scale. Two, the attendance at Sikh shrines and participation at annual functions fell sharply. The British worked out in 1855 that the Sikhs, who constituted 10 million during Ranjit Singh’s time, accounted for only 200,000 in a population of 3 million in the Lahore Division of Punjab. According to 1868 census, they numbered 1.14 million for the whole of Punjab including the cis-Sutlej princely states. Sikhism, in the words of Census Commissioner, Denzil Ibbetson, was “on the decline”. Not unnaturally, a cry went up in the 1850s that Sikhism was on its way out; it fast being absorbed into Hinduism.2 It was suppressed heavily by the English who unleashed a reign of terror on the Sikhs.3 This was one of the principal causes of the massive exit of people from Sikhism. It was further weakened by imprisonments and deportations.4 The Sikhs found themselves leaderless and in a grim crisis of identity. They were in a moral crisis - marked by a state of confusion - politically, religiously, socially and culturally. The Sikhs seemed to be losing their sense of community. Even their religious leaders were not sure about interpretation of their scriptures, their past, and the central question, “What does it mean to be a Sikh?”5 With no defined boundaries in terms of religious worship, beliefs and every day life, Sikhism and Hinduism seemed overlapping. The Punjab Administration Report of 1851-52 surmised that of the old Khalsa, the followers of Guru Nanak would hold their ground while those of Guru Gobind Singh styled “the Singhs or lions” would lose it. That seemed an oversimplification of the situation in the Punjab. However, the conversion into Christianity of the deposed minor Maharaja Daleep Singh in 1853 sent shock waves to an already enfeebled community. Lord Dalhousie who annexed Punjab, and had at one time opined about the extinction of Sikhism in a short time, assured its assertion of self-identity by making the observance of Khalsa tradition (long hair and beard with baptism) compulsory for every Sikh unit, and making attendance at Gurdwara compulsory. The British officers also stood solemnly and saluted when the holy Granth was ceremoniously taken past them.6 That really reinforced the sense of allegiance to Sikhism. The English did so not as a matter of favour to Sikhism but in pursuance of their policy “to extend equal rights to all native religions and to align with none”, or in other words, in pursuance of the policy of “religious impartiality.” This made them to treat Sikhism as a religion distinct from Hinduism.7 The maryada (rituals) followed in Sikh regiments -provided the correct definition of orthodox Sikhism, and served as a loadstar later to the Sikh revivalists. The English right from the annexation of Punjab regarded the Sikh shrines as fulcrums of power and authority. They used Gurdwaras apart from Sikh aristocracy as channels of communication and individual control of the Sikhs. They continued their dharmarths (grants) and in some cases virtually controlled their administration. This legitimised the position of managers, leading families and other groups or organisations. The British followed the precedent of Ranjit Singh since 1815 in appointing a manager for the Golden Temple, Amritsar, to justify their appointing a manager of the shrine.8 The Government through Jodh Singh, Extra Assistant Commissioner, effectively maintained direct management of the temple. It, in the process controlled the Pujaris, Ragis, Rababis, and a miscellany of employees. This invited some criticism within a few years. The British modified the arrangement in 1859 by drawing up a dastur ul amal (regulations of administration) which provided them a more informal and covert connection with the Golden Temple administration. It provided for appointment of a Sarbrah, or manager who was to be assisted by an advisory committee of nine baptised Sikhs.9 There was a spirited but lone voice asking, “Khalsaji, can’t we carry on the management of the Darbar Sahib without the help of the Sirkar (government)?” The temple functionaries themselves were major contributors for continued British involvement in the affairs of the shrine. The dastur ul-amal, however, had one progressive feature. It provided that “the sole proprietor of this sacred institution forever is the Guru Ramdas: no person else has any title to proprietorship. The claim to the novitiate, or chelaship, belongs to the whole ‘Khalsa’ body.”10 This paved the way for taking over of the shrine eventually by the Panth under its direct management. Generally, the British confirmed the management of the existing Pujaris/Mahants/others who in course of time got the mutations of grants transferred to their names; they emerged as proprietors, thereby complicating the position at the time of Gurdwara reforms. The dastur for Darbar Sahib Amritsar, however, reiterated the correct position applicable to all the Sikh shrines appropriating sole proprietorship to the Gurus and chelaship or administration to the entire Sikh Panth or community. Forces were already at work for rejuvenation of Sikhism. Mention must be made here of the Nirankari and Namdhari movements which started during the Sikh rule and persisted with social and religious reforms. The Nirankari Conference in Rawalpindi in March 1855 introduced Anand marriage according to the Sikh rites. Two years later, Baba Darbara Singh codified the Sikh ceremonies from birth to death.” The Namdhari movement, however, got a spurt with Baba Ram Singh’s succession in 1862 when the centre of the movement was shifted from Hazro to Bhaini Sahib, Ludhiana. Baba Ram Singh launched a crusade for religious reform and revival. He exhorted his followers to be strict in following the Khalsa rehat (code of conduct). He administered amrit to both the sexes together, introduced a number of social reforms and set up an elaborate missionary work. He believed that the Adi Granth is the real Guru, and condemned Sodhis, Bedis, Mahants, Brahmins as impostors. Baba Ram Singh had seen how by deception the English had annexed the Punjab. He sought to consolidate the Sikh power for political ends. He was ahead of his times in advocating Swadeshi, and boycott of western goods and ideals. The opening of Muslim butcher shops in the holy city of Amritsar selling kine flesh in early 1860s had caused deep resentment in the Sikh community both against butchers and the Christian overlords. In mid-1860s, some followers of Baba Ram Singh, under misdirected zeal for protection of cows under age old Brahminical precepts, were involved in the murder of Muslim butchers. This was taken as a challenge to the administration. Baba Ram Singh’s socio-religious reform movement clearly had its concomitant political backlash. Because of political overtones, and that too, so shortly after the 1857 revolt, the local authorities over-reacted. They at first interned him and later kept him under surveillance. Later in 1872, when some of his followers, against his express advice, attacked Malaud and Malerkotla, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana, in disregard of the orders of his superiors, and without a fair trial, blew 49 of the arrested Namdharis by guns. Baba Ram Singh was deported to Rangoon, where he died in 1884. This caused a setback to the Namdhari movement, which politically was an expression of pent up feelings against the English machinations in the annexation of the Punjab. Religiously, the Namdhari movement, even under Baba Ram Singh, had developed certain peculiarities, and despite his protestations in his letters from Rangoon jail that he was not a Guru, his over-enthusiastic followers raised him to that level.12 Overall, the Namdhari movement under Baba Ram Singh was like a whirlwind which affected certain pockets only, and had limited impact on the general body of the Sikhs. The Christian missionaries spread their network to Lahore, Amritsar and other parts of the Punjab after its annexation. They saw hopeful signs of conversion of the Sikhs and made them a special target. The conversion of Maharaja Daleep Singh in 1853 and the invitation extended to the missionaries by the Sikh Raja of Kapurthala in 1862, the first ever such invitation by an Indian ruler to the missionaries, gave them a promising start. Not surprisingly, the census of 1855 in the Punjab enumerated the Sikhs as a sect of the Hindus. The rectification of the position in the 1871 census, which enumerated the Sikhs as a separate community, constituted a small but welcome step, though it did not mean much doctrinally. It, however, reflected the British appreciation of Sikhism in its proper perspective. The revolt of 1857 by certain Sections of Bengal Army (with Bombay and Madras Armies keeping aloof), was a serious move to restore antiquated forces. If successful, it would have balkanised India and broken the Indian unity so assiduously brought about by the English. The general body of the Sikhs in Punjab dreamt of restoration of the Khalsa Commonwealth, but lack of leadership proved a decisive factor in thwarting a forceful move. The Sikh rulers in cis-Sutlej states (as also a large body of Indian rulers including Scindia, Nizam and a host of others) sided with the English and played a significant role in the fall of Delhi which broke the backbone of the revolt. In the post-1857 milieu, the Sikhs were right on the top, and gradually emerged as a major factor in the Indian army. This made the British to renew their interest in an understanding of the new members of the Raj. The various research studies sponsored, as well as the reports of the Christian missionaries, helped to pinpoint the distinctive characters of the Khalsa. The Army Regulations laying emphasis on baptism for the Sikh soldiers greatly helped to buttress the position of Sikhism. By 1870, a new educated class had arisen in the Punjab. This meant a readjustment in inter- communal relations between the major communities - Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. The Sikhs were still in a confused state, with divisions over the basic issue whether it was separate from Hinduism or a part of it. Some contended that Sikhism had been an attempt to rid Hinduism of idolatrous practices and restore it to its pristine purity. Another section claimed that Sikhism had come into being for the sole purpose of protection of cows and Brahmins, i.e. the Hindu society from Muslim oppression. Since the necessity no longer existed, there was no need for continuation of Sikhism.13 There were others who emphasised the spiritual side of their faith, but contended that symbols and baptism instituted by Guru Gobind Singh were not essential to be a true and faithful Sikh. Commissioned by India Office to undertake a translation of the Sikh scriptures, Dr. Ernest Trumpp, the German linguist, arrived in Lahore in 1870. He found that Sikhism was a house divided against itself. With contours of the religion still not clear and the fundamentals still being debated, he thought Giants and Granthis were not in a position to materially assist him in translation. His attempt to seek help from the Sikhs associated with the administration of the Golden Temple at Amritsar, came to naught as he alienated them by blowing cigar smoke across the pages of the holy Granth Sahib in their presence. Because of his egotism as a missionary and rigorous training as a linguist, he thought he knew much more the meaning of the Sikh scripture than the people who revered it. For 18 months, he worked in association with the Hindu collaborators, who were dead set against Sikhism, and occasionally with the Oriental Society, the Anjuman-i-Punjab, and translated one-third of Adi Granth, which was later published in 1877. Influenced by the Hindu collaborators, and his disdain for Granthis and Gianis, Dr. Trumpp made caustic and derogatory comments on the Sikhs. He worked on two assumptions. One, that the Sikhs were Hindus, and even if they were not, Sikhism was a dying religion, in the mortal grip of Hinduism, soon to be engulfed. He wrote, “Sikhism is a waning religion that will soon belong to history.”14 His first assumption influenced him in his second one, that Adi Granth had nothing of value as a religious work. He made only a literal translation and failed to see its underlying theology. In his linguistic egotism, he saw only its linguistic value. In his introduction, Dr. Trumpp made provocative assessment that later stirred the Sikh revivalists. For instance, he rejected Janam Sakhi literature as mythology and argued that Guru Gobind Singh worshiped Durga, that the Guru accepted caste, and employed Brahmins in ceremonies. In short, Dr. Trumpp provided all the ammunition that was immediately used by Hindu and Arya Samaj literature on Sikhism for about three decades.15 In 1872, the publication of Trumpp’s translation was five years away, but his activity had emboldened his Hindu collaborators to openly attack Sikhism and castigate the Sikh Gurus. It were partly these unbecoming attacks on Guru Nanak by Sharda Ram Phillauri in his lectures at Guru ka Bagh in Amritsar, and partly the onslaught of Christian missionaries in securing converts from the Sikh youth, especially students from the Amritsar Mission School, that made some of the prominent Sikhs to convene a historic meeting at Guru ka Bagh, Amritsar, when it was decided to form a society under the name of Sri Guru Singh Sabha with Sardar Thakar Singh Sandhanwalia as President and Giani Gian Singh as Secretary. That marked the birth of the Singh Sabha movement. Other prominent persons who participated in the initial meeting were Kanwar Bikram Singh of Kapurthala, Baba Khem Singh Bedi, and Giani Sardul Singh from Amritsar. The inaugural meeting held on Dussehra (October 1, 1873) at Manji Sahib, Amritsar, and attended by Pujaris, Mahants, Gianis, Nirmalas and prominent Sikh Sardars, was significant. Hukamnamahs were obtained from the four Takhts and other historical Gurdwaras in support of the organisation and pointed to a wider ramification.16 The objectives of Singh Sabha, Amritsar, were to inculcate the principles of Sikh religion as preached by the Sikh Gurus among the Sikhs with a view to restoring Sikhism to its pristine purity, preach the principles of Sikh religion by word of mouth, by publication of historical and religious books, and through magazines and newspapers, encourage propagation of Punjabi, reclaim apostates and attract the sympathies of those highly placed in public administration to the educational progress of the Sikhs. The Singh Sabha was to shun politics.17 The Singh Sabha was essentially a revivalist movement though the authorities later used the words reformists, neo-Sikhs or Tat Khalsa interchangeably for the members of the Singh Sabhas. The word reformists or neo-Sikhs in the context of Singh Sabhas always meant revivalists as the Singh Sabhas only sought to revive the Sikhism of the Guru period, without making any deviations. The Singh Sabha instantly caught the imagination of the literate sections of the community. The majority of its members, however, belonged to upper classes, and its three prominent founders had acute personal differences. Kanwar Bikram Singh was a pure reformer. Sardar Thakar Singh Sandhanwalia dreamt of driving the English out and re-establish the Khalsa Raj.18 The zeal of Amritsar Singh Sabha lasted about two years when it showed signs of being dormant. The Singh Sabha became a movement with Bhai Gurmukh Singh, Professor of Mathematics and Punjabi, Oriental College, Lahore, as its moving spirit. He did yeoman’s job in propagating Singh Sabha ideals and establishing Singh Sabha, Amritsar. Later in l879, he helped in forming Singh Sabha, Lahore, with Diwan Buta Singh as its President and himself as its Secretary. The Lahore Singh Sabha, as against that in Amritsar, was more democratic in character. It had members from all sections of the Sikh society. The Lt. Governor of Punjab, Sir Robert Egerton, agreed to become its patron and the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, lent his support to the Sabha. A Punjabi weekly, Gurmukhi Akhbar, to popularise the Sikh ideals was started. Prof. Gurmukh Singh had a clear perception of Sikhism as enunciated by the Sikh Gurus, and was determined to restore it to its original shape, without any compromise with Hinduism. A number of Singh Sabhas were established and affiliated to the Singh Sabha, Lahore.19 His amrit prachar (administration of baptism) to all, including Muslims and lower classes, was an effective movement which, however, brought him in conflict with certain Pujaris of the Sikh shrines. Gradually, the Singh Sabhas constructed their own gurdwaras, with granthis, ragis, and updeshaks, and they became centres of new revivalism. The Lahore Singh Sabha under the leadership of Prof. Gurmukh Singh constituted the radical wing and represented the wave of the future. Prof. Gurmukh Singh was a clear-headed person. He would neither let unchallenged Baba Khem Singh Bedi’s claim to be the Baba of the Sikhs , nor did he have any sentiments for Sardar Thakar Singh Sandhanwalia’s dreams for restoration of Sikh Raj. He had a clear perception that, in the present circumstances, seeking cooperation of the government was in the best interests of the Sikh community. The warming up of the Singh Sabha activity was discernible by a decision to establish a Khalsa Diwan at Amritsar. This came into being in 1883 to oversee the functioning of over three dozen Singh Sabhas. There were, however, differences over the provisions of the constitution of the Khalsa Diwan. These resulted in a break, with the Lahore Singh Sabha spearheading a Khalsa DiwanatLahorewithamembershipofallexceptthreeoftheSinghSabhasaffiliatedtoit.20 Suffice it to say that the Singh Sabha, Lahore, became the focal point of the Sikh reform movement. Prof. Gurmukh Singh earned the hostility of the Pujaris of Amritsar by his writings in July and August 1886 against idol worship and other Brahminical practices at Golden Temple, Amritsar. The death in 1887 of Kanwar Bikaram Singh of Kapurthala who offered unswerving and unfailing support to Prof. Gurmukh Singh, made his opponents to gang up against him. Baba Khem Singh and his other Bedi, Bawa, Bhalla and Sodhi protege’s, and Pujaris at various Sikhs shrines, conducted a persistent campaign against his opposition to “un-Sikh” practices in Sikh places of worship. They framed the following charges against him and his close associates (the accuracy of this cannot be depended upon): 1. That Professor Gurmukh Singh showed disrespect towards Guru-Ansh (descendents of the Gurus) - Bedis, Bhalls, Bawas and Sodhis; 2. That utter disrespect was exhibited towards the picture of 24 Avatars of the Hindu pantheonism by them in one of the Singh Sabha diwans in Lahore; 3. That the Lahore Singh Sabha assimilated a Muslim into the Sikh sangat (congregation) after amrit (baptism) administration; 4. That the low caste sweepers, cobblers, and Muslims were made to sip amrit (baptism) from the common bata (steel bowl); and, 5. That they did not bow before the Guru Granth Sahib when there was no sewadar or Granthi in attendance.21 All the above so-called sacrilegious indictments were deliberated upon by the opponents in meetings held in Faridkot and Amritsar and adopted in the form of resolutions. Above all, a hukamnamah was obtained from the Akal Takht, Amritsar, on March 18, 1887, ex-communicating him from the Panth.22 In addition, similar hukamnamahs were got issued from Takht Kes Garh (Anandpur Sahib), Takht Patna Sahib (Bihar), Takht Dam Dama Sahib (Talwandi Saabo), and Takht Hazoor Sahib (Abchal Nagar, Nanded), in the name of Sikh sangats. Baba Khem Singh also sought to enlist support for himself and against Prof. Gurmukh Singh from other Singh Sabhas. These hukamnamahs were in contradiction to an earlier joint hukamnamah issued by the Akal Takht and Darbar Sahib in 1879 calling upon all the Sikhs to join the Singh Sabha movement which aimed to restore the original form of Sikhism.23 Professor Gurmukh Singh for whom Panthic service was dearer than his own life, kept his flag flying. Under his leadership, the Singh Sabha, Lahore, in the 1890s relentlessly pursued the objectives of defending the Sikh faith from hostile onslaughts; he propagated the faith in its unadulterated form by peripatetic updeshaks, and used his facile pen which led to a lot of publications; and by organising Singh Sabhas to have history committees to make the community conscious of its unadulterated and hoary past, without its layers of superstitions and misinterpretation. The last quarter of the 19th century in the Punjab was marked by a period of intense dynamism, of ideological and religious conflict amidst an increasing polemical atmosphere. Each group within a given religious community, Hindu, Sikh or Muslim, sought to project its own concepts and in the process struggled within its own community and beyond. The religious competitiveness between the two minority communities, Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab, concerned itself more with their sense of identity than with the question of power and dominance. Attempts among the Punjabi Hindus to create a new, modernised and respectable religious tradition inevitably altered their existing relations with all other religious communities in the Punjab - Muslims, Sikhs and Christians - at a more fundamental level. The educated Punjabi Hindu who found himself in a vacuum at first turned to the Brahmo Samaj, and later to the more aggressive Arya Samaj. Paradoxically, it were the Sikh reformers, including Kanwar Bikram Singh, who alongwith resident Bengalis and some Punjabi Hindus were instrumental in bringing Swami Dayanand to the Punjab and giving a fillip to the Arya Samaj movement. They looked askance both at the spread of cow slaughter and the activity of the Christian missionaries in the Punjab. Following the brutal suppression of Namdharis, there was a void and they looked for succour from without. Swami Dayanand, to begin with, had sought to bring all social reformers on one platform; and on the eve of the Delhi Darbar in 1877, he had convened a meeting at the place of his sojourn in Delhi, which was attended by Munshi Kanahaya Lal Alakhdhari, Babu Narain Chander Roy of Lahore Brahmo Samaj, Babu Keshab Chander Sen of Calcutta, Munshi Indramani of Moradabad, Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan of Aligarh and Babu Harish Chander Chintamani of Bombay. Swami Dayanand refused to accept any doctrine which refused to accept the Vedas as revelation. This fundamentalism was not acceptable to many and so the effort had failed. Swami Dayanand was now in a more receptive mood to listen to the Sikh and Punjabi Hindu reformers. They, to begin with, brought about a transformation, a shuddhi in his thought processes. Swami Dayanand as a result discarded in its entirety much of his interpretation of Vedas propounded in the Satyarth Prakash of 1875 edition.24 For instance, during the Rig Vedic age, eating of the bovine flesh and offering of animals for religious sacrifices was a common practice. Following that, Swami Dayanand in the 1875 edition of Satyarth Prakash had advocated: 1. “Flesh should be used in performing havan morning and evening” (p. 45); 2. (Sanctioned)killingofanimals(p.171); 3. “Itislawfultokillasterilecowandeatitsflesh”(p.302); and, 4. In the course of the refutation of the tenets of Jainism, considered it lawful to kill animals for the sake of their flesh (p. 399). Swami Dayanand now agreed to reverse his earlier views about beef eating,25 and in due course established Cow Protection Society. He also wrote a book on Cow Protection. The principles of Arya Samaj laid down in 1875 were revised and relaid at Lahore in 1877 with the assistance of a committee of three - Lala Sain Das, Lala Jiwan Das and Lala Mul Raj -when the Arya Samaj was founded afresh, with Bhai Jawahar Singh, a leading Sikh revivalist as its Secretary. Swami Dayanand found ready acceptance among a section of Punjabi Hindus who had been so deculturised that they knew neither Sanskrit nor Hindi and could read their own scriptures only in Urdu translations. The membership of the Samaj consisted by and large of Hindu commercial classes - Khatris, Aroras and Banias - who virtually monopolised western education; it met three of their pressing needs, viz. an upward social mobility because of their improved economic status, defence of established values from onslaught of Islam and Christianity, and a palatable reformed Hinduism avowing monotheism “on the authority of Vedas”.26 His vision of a Hinduism based on infallibility of Vedas, shorn of idolatry, polytheism, Brahminical domination and intricacies of the Jati (caste) system, possessing rationality and modern science found ready acceptance among the urban commercial sections of the Hindus. The Arya Samaj identified itself with Sikhism as a movement which had sought to create a purified social structure devoid of idolatry, the caste system, and evils of priestly dominance.27 “Aryas I would capture Sikh past and make it their own”. Both worked for transformation of the contemporary society on identical lines. Both, had an identical programme - both were monotheists and denounced image/idol worship, social superiority of Brahmins, onslaught of I Islamic and Christian missions, caste inequality and purdah; and stood for widow remarriage and female education. They worked in close collaboration.28 The young educated Sikhs reacted to the Samaj with sympathy and a few with enthusiastic commitment. Bhai Jawahar Singh worked closely with Swami Dayanand and was a moving spirit of the Samaj. He served as Vice President of the Paropkarni Sabha, Secretary of the Lahore Arya Samaj right from its inception and was Secretary of the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College fund collection committee. Bhai Jawahar Singh’s leadership in the Samaj brought some other Sikhs to the movement, including Bhai Ditt Singh and Bhai Maiya Singh. Bhagat Lakshman Singh found himself on the same ideological wavelength and joined the Samaj. Through the early 1880s, young educated Sikhs worked in the Samaj with little noticeable strain.29 Aryas and reformist Sikhs stressed similarities of ‘true’ Sikhism and Arya Hinduism. For Swami Dayanand, Sikhism was one of the innumerable cults of Hinduism, to be noted, refuted and then forgotten.30 His major targets for criticism were orthodox Hinduism, Islam and Christian missions. Sanatanist Hindus responded with equal vehemence. The Brahmo Samaj in the Punjab at first aligned with Swami Dayanand, but shortly distanced itself. In the ensuing controversies, Swamiji had little to say against the Sikhs. Only once in Amritsar, he chose to belittle their faith, its founders and the current Sikh practices. The Sikhs were outraged and the Nihangs threatened to kill him. Dayanand later recanted and withdrew his criticism of Guru Nanak whom he had earlier described as a man of little learning because of his lack of knowledge of the Vedas or Sanskrit.31 In a letter to Bhagat Singh, Chief Engineer at Ajmer, he promised to delete the unsavoury references to Sikhism from the forthcoming edition of the Satyarth Prakash.32 Orthodox Sikhs saw that Swami Dayanand’s belief in the infallibility of Vedas was as uncompromising as was that of the Muslims in the Qoran, and to him Guru Granth Sahib was of secondary importance. Nonetheless, some Sikh reformers continued to be zealous Arya Samaj workers. Swami Dayanand had set the tone and his overzealous followers, with whom anti-Sikhism was an article of faith, followed suit. After his death in 1883, a thoroughly revised version of the Satyarth Prakash which again, like the principles of Arya Samaj, was the work of a committee in which Munshi Indramani of Moradabad played a prominent role, was published in 1884. It contained Swami Dayanand’s earlier criticism of the Sikh faith despite his express commitment to delete it. His followers proved anti Sikh zealots, and overruled him. Arya Samajis now acquired the ingredients of a newly oriented framework of hatred of non-Aryas which in course of time became more scurrilous. The revised edition carried direct and vituperative attacks on all religions including the Sikh Gurus, scriptures and the Sikhs, wantonly wounding their susceptibilities. Thereafter, criticism of the Sikh faith and the current Sikh practices increased in Arya Samaj publications, which were sometime downright sacrilegious.33 This caused uneasiness among the Sikhs in the Arya Samaj fold. Their religious consciousness as to true Sikhism got further awakened. The missionary work of Prof. Gurmukh Singh was in conflict with the new fangled Arya aggressiveness. Incidentally, this sowed the seeds of Arya Samaj-Sikh tension which got a twist and became Hindu-Sikh tension after the Indian independence because power in the province fell in the hands of Arya Samajists who had a stranglehold over the Indian National Congress in the Punjab, and carried on their war on the Sikhs with renewed vigour from a vantage position.34 The last straw which caused a breakup came at the Lahore Arya Samaj anniversary celebrations on November 25, 1888, when Lala (Pandit because of his learning) Guru Datt Arora in a speech at the gathering sharply criticised Sikhism. Pertinently, he said that if Swami Dayanand called Guru Nanak a fraud, what did that matter? Swamiji had the sum of the Vedas in his hands! He continued that “Guru Gobind Singh was not even a hundredth part like our Maharishi Swami Dayanand Saraswati and it is difficult to say whether the Sikhs have any religion or not, but surely they have no knowledge of any kind.”35 Other Arya speakers, specifically Pandit Lekh Ram and Lala Murii Dhar rose to second Lala Guru Datt’s acerbic comments and added their own words of sarcasm to the criticism of Sikh religion. The reaction was immediate. Bhai Jawahar Singh, Bhai Ditt Singh Giani, and Bhai Maiya Singh immediately resigned from their Samaj membership and were welcomed with open arms by Prof. Gurmukh Singh into the Lahore Singh Sabha. This was not merely a loss of three persons for Arya Samaj. This switchover greatly strengthened the Lahore Singh Sabha. Each of them became a staunch defender of Sikhism. Two of them, Bhai Jawahar Singh and Giani Ditt Singh, became leading lights of the Sikh resurgence movement. Soon, the controversy moved to the press and led to a debate for over a decade marking, a low watermark in Arya-Sikh relations. The 1890s was a period of religious controversy and discord in the Punjab, with various communities involved in a bitter debate within and without themselves. What worsened the position most was the debate that the Arya Samajists had with the Muslims, orthodox Hindus and the Sikhs, mostly outside Mochi Gate, Lahore, on a somewhat regular basis. The Sikhs faced onslaught from various sides - from within, from Christian missionaries, from Ahmadiyas who contended that Guru Nanak was a Muslim, and from the Arya Samajists who contended that the Sikhs were a sect of Hinduism and not a separate religion. By the close of the century, the situation became so perverse that the Aryas contended that they were not Hindus but Aryas, and should be returned as such in the forthcoming census. At the same time, they wickedly asserted that the Sikhs were Hindus! The Lahore Singh Sabha successfully met the challenge from within, by trying to erode the base of Baba Khem Singh Bedi, who, even in 1890s, persisted in his efforts to get recognised as the fifteenth Guru of the Sikhs. The Lahore Singh Sabha by maintaining a correct line, prevented any deviations. Prof. Gurmukh Singh was conscious of the laudable objectives of the earlier Nirankari and Namdhari movements and had seen how the two movements had deviated from the centre of Sikhism by reverting to the institution of the personal Guru. That was divisive and against the injunctions of Guru Gobind Singh who had abolished personal Guruship and had passed it on to the Adi Granth. The Lahore Singh Sabha and the branches affiliated to it gave a position of eminence to the Adi Granth (Guru Granth Sahib) as the successor of Guru Gobind Singh and the current Guru of the Sikhs and for all times to come, to the exclusion of other claimants whose claims were false. Trumpp did an unforeseen but signal service to the Sikh community by providing an overview that stressed the inconsistencies within the current Sikh practises and its predominant Hindu character. His analysis was either seen as an evidence against Sikh attempts to assert a distinct identity, or as an attack that had to be confronted and proven wrong. Trumpp’s approach came quite handy to the Hindu-Arya Samaj literature on Sikhism. This led to what is aptly called a period of ‘khandan mandan’ i.e. attack and defence preaching. Sikh journalism right from its inception had served as a forum for discussion of religious values with writers regularly dilating on exposition of the gurbani (scriptures), Sikh history, lives of Gurus and the Sikh martyrs. An intensification of the religious controversy caused intellectual turmoil. Prof. Gurmukh Singh and Bhai Kahan Singh of Nabha toured the Punjab and discovered the hitherto unknown traditional Janam Sakhis, biographies, of Guru Nanak for publication. Two societies, Gurmat Granth Pracharak Sabha of Amritsar and Gurmat Granth Sudharak Committee of Lahore, evaluated sources and sought to prevent the printing of unauthentic Janam Sakhis, and inferior editions of the Adi Granth.36 In addition, works of individual Sikh historians and theologians like Giani Gian Singh’s volumes on Sikh history, Bhai Kahan Singh’s commentaries on Sikhism, glossaries, and a massive encyclopedia on Sikh religion and literature, and Giani Ditt Singh’s voluminous literary outpourings on martyrs, history and scriptures added to the new consciousness. The second aspect of intellectual fermentation - the emergence of pamphlets and small tracts, polemical in character, as vehicles of attacking and defending/preaching - were expressive of the same concern. Nothing was sacred in the emotional tract war - scriptures, heroes or family life - and faltering fellow Sikhs were equal recipients. “Punjabi has a store (house) of insults and derogatory ferms, and probably these have never been put to more devastating use than when Sikh opponents locked horns.”37 The earnestness of the Lahore Khalsa Diwan and the pragmatic approach of Prof. Gurmukh Singh were instrumental in the foundation of the Khalsa College, Amritsar, in 1892, after more than a decade of tireless efforts.38 The College Council was controlled by its Vice-President Sir Attar Singh Bhadaur with Jawahar Singh serving as General Secretary.39 Another upshot of the efforts of the Lahore Khalsa Diwan and Prof. Gurmukh Singh was their success in drafting a British Officer, Max Arthur Macauliffe, to resign his commission as District Judge and undertake the preparation of a translation of the Adi Granth in English.40 Macauliffe had been caught up in the process of the vitality and self-examination of the Singh Sabha movement during 1882-1893.41 He now relied on prominent Sikhs such as Bhai Sant Singh, Bhai Sardul Singh, Bhai Kahan Singh of Nabha and Giani Ditt Singh in providing him guidance in the interpretation. The completed sections were circulated among the Sikh scholars and vetted by a special committee formed for the purpose at Amritsar.42 Mention may also be made of the laudable efforts made by Bhai Takht Singh in establishing Sikh Kanya Mahavidyalaya, a high school with a hostel for girls, at Ferozepur, during the period. Giani Ditt Singh wrote scores of essays and was followed by Bhai Mohan Singh Vaid, Babu Teja Singh Overseer, and Bhai Vir Singh. The first three served as links in an informal communication chain binding the dispersed organisations. This culminated in the establishment of the Khalsa Tract Society with headquarters at Amritsar in 1894 under the auspices of Bhai Kaur Singh. It channelised the production and distribution of small, priceless, volumes on theology, religion, history, philosophy, social practises and topics of current interests, making pleas for vital and revived Sikhism. In the process, the Sikhs clarified, refined and delimited their own religious identity.43 This was also to serve as a counter to the preaching of Christian missionaries whose success as shown in the 1891 census was quite noticeable. They, in 1893, had imported several lakh (hundred thousand) volumes of the Bible in Punjabi for propagation of the gospel. Thanks to Singh Sabhas, the Sikhs all over were catching up in education and were better placed in securing employment on the civil side under the government, apart from constituting by the end of the 19th century, the major component in the army. Side by side, with the growing Sikh-Arya controversies and discord, a measure of limited cooperation in the realm of shuddhi (purification) continued. The Sikhs offered assistance to the Arya Samaj to stem the tide of Christian and Islamic conversions. In the early 1890s the Arya Samaj, the Singh Sabhas and the Shudhi Sabha (which represented both the Hindus and the Sikhs) sometimes in alliance, performed purification ceremonies. The Sikhs had an advantage in having a complete tradition with initiation ceremonies. In 1890s there were instances of Arya Samaj and Singh Sabhas cooperating with each other in reclaiming lost Hindus and Sikhs respectively.44 These represented a tangled relationship between the two. Developments within the Arya Samaj irretrievably affected the Sikh-Arya relations. Arya Samaj was divided into two factions: one with Lala (Pandit) Guru Datt and his close allies Lala Munshi Ram (later known as Swami Shraddhanand) and Pandit Lekh Ram (Mahatma Party) which articulated a militantly religious version of Arya Samaj, and the other with Lalas Hans Raj, Lal Chand, Lajpat Rai (College Party) who propounded a more moderate and rational wing of the Samaj. This division was formalised in 1893-94 with vegetarianism and meat-eating becoming the issue symbolising their other differences as well. This had its impact on Arya-Sikh relations in the Shuddhi Sabha. Cooperation between the Sikhs and moderate Aryas, however, continued and the radical Sikhs now instituted a ‘pork test’ for converts from Islam.45 This was galling to radical Aryas because of their rigid insistence on vegetarianism. This further contributed to communal discord in the Punjab. The Shuddhi Sabha and Singh Sabha Lahore cooperated in 1894-96. In August 1896 they were successful in the mass conversion of about 200 outcaste Sikhs according to the Sikh rites.46 The Shuddhi Sabha now aimed to reclaim the outcastes and stem the success of the Christian missionaries. During the last decade of the 19th century, the question of Sikh identity was posed with greater frequency. The young educated Sikhs increasingly sought a place for themselves within a distinctly Sikh world. The aggressive Arya preachers continued to criticise the Sikh Gurus and Adi Granth. The moderate Aryas came to the defence of the embattled Sikhs. The Arya Gazette (July 15, 1897), their mouthpiece, for instance, wrote that Swami Dayanand had an imperfect knowledge of Gurmukhi and that the remarks made by him in the’ Satyarth Prakash were based on second-hand information. This caused a furore among the radical wing of the Arya Samaj.47 The question of Sikh identity and Arya-Sikh relations were now caught in inter-Arya conflict between the two sections over the question of infallibility of Swami Dayanand or otherwise. For the next two years, the issue of identity of the Sikhs was debated with increasing frequency. Bhai Jagat Singh, a Sikh member of the Arya Samaj, contended that Sikhism was merely an earlier version of the Arya Samaj. Lala Thakar Das and Bawa Narain Singh supported his position in their brochures published in 1899, “Sikh Hindu Main” (Sikhs are Hindus). Bhai Kahan Singh of Nabha in his famous tract ‘Hum Hindu Nahin’ (We are not j Hindus) also published in 1899 cogently analysed the distinctive characters of Hinduism and Sikhism, and laid the basis for the Sikh assertion to a separate identity and communal separateness.48 This tract did much more than anything else to de-Hinduise the Sikhs, and ‘Hum Hindu Nahin’ soon became the rallying cry for the Sikhs’ assertion of their identity. This debate continued with vigour and caused heightened group consciousness. The conversion of Rahtia Sikhs in June 1900 by the Arya Samaj and cutting off of their long hair publicly at Lahore,49 caused an irretrievable schism between the Arya Samaj and the Sikhs on the one hand, and between revivalists or Tat Khalsa and the Gurdwara management on the other, as Rahtias were only asking for the right to equal treatment guaranteed to them at pahul (baptism) ceremony. During 1901-1903 the Sikhs debated with radical Aryas the meaning of Sikhism and their separateness from the Hindus. The alleged job discrimination by the government, because of economic competitiveness between educated Sikhs and Hindus, added fuel to the existing communal competition. It also led to language controversy, with Arya Samajists identifying themselves with Hindi in Devnagri script and the Sikhs with Punjabi in Gurmukhi script.50 Other issues which agitated the revivalists were mismanagement of Gurdwaras, translating of Sikh precepts into practices in Sikh shrines, misuse of Gurdwara funds on the profligacy of Mahants and Pujaris, and the need for strengthening education among the community. By the time, the Amritsar Singh Sabha under the leadership of Sunder Singh Majithia had reasserted its primacy. There was a steady weakening of the Lahore Singh Sabha largely due to the death of the people at the helm of its affairs.51 This position was rather formalised at a special meeting of Amritsar Singh Sabha held in November 1901. It was attended by many influential Sikhs from all over the Punjab. This resulted, after due consultations with the Lahore Singh Sabha, in a larger meeting at Amritsar on October 30, 1902; a new organisation, the Chief Khalsa Diwan, came into being, with Bhai Sahib Bhai Arjan Singh, Chief of Bagarian, as President and Sunder Singh Majithia as Secretary.52 It aims and objects were as follows: 1. UpliftoftheSikhsinallspheres-political,social,moralandeconomic; 2. Propagation of the Guru’s Divine World, carrying of his teachings to the farthest hamlet, and the spread of the fragrance of nam all around; 3. Removalofilliteracyandthespreadofeducationamongall,irrespectiveofcasteand creed; and, 4. Protection of the political rights of the Sikhs and the redressal of their grievances through constitutional means. The Khalsa Advocate, started in 1903, carried the Diwan’s message to the Sikh intelligentsia and masses. Bhai Vir Singh became the leading light in. the Sikh Tract Society and wrote a score of tracts in a lucid style. This gave birth to modern Punjabi prose. Bhai Mohan Singh Vaid and Babu Teja Singh Overseer, continued to render signal service to the community by their voluminous writings. The reunification of two sections of the Arya Samaj by 1904 proved cataclysmic to the Sikh reformers. It energised them. Hitherto the moderate (College) section of the Arya Samaj had for long been closely aligned with Tat Khalsa; its knuckling under to the extremist section of the Arya Samaj brought an end to its limited cooperation with Tat Khalsa, also termed neo-Sikhs, in Shuddhi Sabha. It led to communal mobilisation on both the sides. The Sikhs now asserted that Shuddhi was essentially a Hindu concept. The holy amrit (baptism) ceremony of the Khalsa was all encompassing for entry of persons of any religion or creed to the fold of the Khalsa.53 This severing of the last connection with a section of Arya Samaj egged the Sikh revivalists to look inwards, and concentrate more on setting their own house in order. Sikhism from 1904-05, about a year before the partition of Bengal, reasserted its independent position. It began to consolidate and clarify numerous issues that had been agitating the community during the last 50 years. Paradoxically, the Tat Khalsa, right from this period of introspection and self-assertion, found themselves in conflict with the government. This was notwithstanding the efforts of the Chief Khalsa Diwan to charter a middle course and adopt a flexible approach. The added Sikh sense of identity, combined with the strength the revivalists had gained, led them to purge their religion of idolatry. In 1905, Arur Singh, manager of the Golden Temple ordered the removal of all Hindu idols from the precincts of the Golden Temple, thereby putting an end to the performance of Hindu rituals in that area. This meant the Sikh revivalists now breaking with the orthodox Hindus, after a bitter struggle with the reformist Hindus and Arya Samaj. The Hindus used to worship a Hindu deity, after a sacred bath at the Golden Temple tank, and the Brahmins used to officiate at these ceremonies. That put an end to their traditional privileges.54 The Sikhs asserted monotheism of their religion wherein idols had no place. The Sikhs received support from unexpected quarters. In a significant judgement in 1905, King Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan dismissed an appeal by Hindus for keeping idols in dharmsala (Gurdwara) Hari Rai in Kabul. He made a clear distinction between idol worshipper Hindus and the Sikhs - “followers of Baba Nanak who was one of greatest Unitarians and was opposed to idol worship.” He went on to add that Hindus had no concern with Sikh shrines, as Sikhs had nothing to do with Hindi Thakurdwaras or Shivdwaras.55 Surprisingly, the removal of idols form the Golden Temple lee to a lot of infighting among the Sikhs themselves. Some of then accused the Tat Khalsa of weakening the community from within. Some Pujaris too were critical of the revivalists. Others unnecessarily blamed the British policy of ‘divide and rule’ succeeding in Golden Temple, Amritsar. By now, the revivalist Sikh newspapers such as the Khalsa Advocate, the Khalsa Samachar, the Khalsa Sewak and the Punjab were clamouring for taking over of the Gurdwaras by the community. They highlighted the licentious living, debauchery, rape and sacrilege apart from misappropriation of funds by mahants of several Gurdwaras, which were increasingly being misused and desecrated. It had its impact on the Chief Khalsa Diwan which, under pressure from Singh Sabha militants, adopted a resolution in 1906 seeking transfer of the management of the Golden Temple to representatives of the community. This was a direct challenge to the administrative control of the government formalised in 1859. The government chose to ignore the resolution. In May 1907, the Punjab urged formation of a “Gurdwara Sambhaal Committee” (Committee for the Control of Gurdwaras) having wider implications.56 The Sikhs by now opened up and went in for Dharam Prachar, propagation of faith, through updeshaks, pracharaks, and kirtni jathas in a big way within the Punjab and especially in Sind where they met a great success. This marked the period of self-assertion by the Sikh community. Mention may be made of Sant Attar Singh of Mastuana, Sant Sangat Singh of Kamalia and Bhai Hira Singh Ragi who, day in and day out, went in for prachar, disseminating of Gurus teachings by discourses and kirtan, devotional singing of Guru’s hymns.57 Singh Sabhas cropped up in various parts of the Punjab, establishing new gurdwaras and laying emphasis on the spread of education. Sunder Singh Majithia and Harbans Singh Attari started leading preaching jathas to Sind where they established a number of Singh Sabhas and spread the message of the Gurus. Sukhmani, the Psalm of Peace, was being recited in every Sind home.58 The setting up of Khalsa Bradari (Brotherhood) for levelling of class distinctions by the Sikhs from backward classes under the patronage of the Chief Khalsa Diwan in 1907 and the Sikh Missionary College at Tarn Taran in 1908 were reflective of the new consciousness. The Khalsa Handbill Society set up the same year would bring out, for free distribution, 20,000 copies of inexpensive literature to villagers, not covered by urban meetings and newspapers.59 The Sikh world was agog with the introduction of the Anand Marriage Bill in the Legislative Council in October 1908 by Tikka Ripudaman Singh of Nabha. This provided the first case of mass Sikh mobilisation. The community held over 300 public meetings and sent coordinated petitions carrying 700,000 signatures.60 The Singh Sabhas had percolated to the village level and had become a mass movement. When the Arya Samaj sought to convert en masse the low caste Sikhs in Jalandhar in 1909, the revivalists outwitted them; they received them within the fold of Sikhism and ate food at their hands. The Pujaris of the Golden Temple fell foul of the Anand Marriage Act; so also was the case with the efforts of Tat Khalsa in reclaiming backward classes into the Sikh fold and receive such Sikhs as their social equals and eating with them. The religious authorities of the Golden Temple and their cohorts controlling Dharamasalas and Gurdwaras all over the country came into collision with Tat Khalsa; they even began to refuse them admission or accept offerings from them. The Pujaris made a vigorous protest to the Deputy Commissioner at the proposed procession from Railway Station to the Golden Temple on the eve of the Sikh Educational Conference in 1910, as it was led by the same leaders who had eaten at the hands of converted Ramdasias and Rahtias.61 The Sikhs were as much influenced by goings on at the national level following the partition of Bengal in 1905, especially the swadeshi movement which found much wider acceptance in the north, south, east or west. Bhai Mohan Singh Vaid’s diary of February 1906 makes a telling reading of the impact of the swadeshi movement in unifying all parts of India.62 The unrest in the Canal colonies symbolised by Sardar Ajit Singh’s playing up Banke Behari’s soul stirring song, “Pagri Sambhal O Jatta”, (O Peasant, Guard Thy Honour) and unrest following the partition of Bengal affected the Sikh youth. This led the students of Khalsa College, Amritsar, to accord a most enthusiastic welcome in February 1907 to Gopal Krishan Gokhale, then regarded by the government as a most dangerous man. They, unhooked the horses of his carriage, yoked themselves instead, and pulled it to the College. They listened raptly to his lecture in the College Gurdwara wherefrom Guru Granth Sahib had been especially removed. From 1908, the Sikhs in Britain and North America flooded the Punjab with revolutionary literature and constituted a vocal element in the growth of Sikh national consciousness.63 The Pujaris of the Golden temple in this case also came on the wrong side of the community, and condemned the popular reaction in 1908. The government overreacted. It took over the administration of the Khalsa College. This came as a rude shock to the Sikh community. Master Sunder Singh of Lyallpur wrote a brochure, ki Khalsa College Sikhan da hai, (Does Khalsa College belong to the Sikhs?). He accused the British of taking over the college surreptitiously the way they had taken over the Punjab, though they were the guardians of Maharaja Daleep Singh, and acted in breach of faith. A concomitant development which came as a redeemable feature was the foundation of the Sikh Educational Conference by the Chief Khalsa Diwan in 1908 to promote the development of education among the Sikhs. The Sikh Educational Conference did a lot for the growth of literacy in the community. It left behind a high school wherever its annual conference was held. The Sikh political attitude was in the process of evolution following the Morley-Minto Council Reforms of 1909 and the grant of separate representation and weightage to the Muslims. The Sikhs asked for similar concessions. The Chief Khalsa Diwan’s representative justified special representation for the Sikhs not on the basis of their population but their military contribution to the empire. Despite Lt. Governor’s support to Diwan’s claims, nothing came out of the move.64 By the end of the first decade of 20th century, the Sikhs were in high spirits and on the high road to emerge as a vital community. The publication in 1909 of Macauliffe’s The Sikh Religion (in six volume), which received accolades in England and over time became a major work on Sikhism, was latebyatleasthalfadecade,ifnotmore.65 MacauliffeaffirmedthatSikhismwasaseparatereligion, but still in danger of reabsorption by Hinduism. He wrote, Hinduism had embraced Sikhism in its fold, “the still comparatively young religion is making a vigorous struggle, but its ultimate destruction is, it is apprehended, inevitable without state support.” By this time, the Sikhs had outgrown the earlier phase of attempts to defend the intellectual tenets of their faith. The assertion of Baba Gurbakhash Singh Bedi (son of Baba Khem Singh Bedi of Kallar, Rawalpindi) in his Presidential Address in 1910 of Punjab Hindu Conference at Multan that the Sikhs were Hindus was misplaced and received all round condemnation in strong language.66 The census of 1911 justified the Sikh assertions and aspirations. The break with the Arya Samaj was complete. Only 63 persons claimed to be both Aryas and Sikhs.67 The Sikh population rose from 2.1 million in 1901 to 2.88 million in 1911, recording a rise of 37.1 percent (as against an overall loss of 2.2 percent in population in the province because of the plague, etc.). This was reflective of numerous Singh Sabhas reclaiming recalcitrant Sikhs within its fold. Another notable feature of the census was higher literacy among the Sikh males - of 9.4 percent as against 6.3 percent for all Punjabi males who could read and write.68 Sikh students were increasingly entering the professions. The secret memorandum prepared by D. Petrie, Assistant Director of Criminal Intelligence Department in August 1911 surveying “Recent Developments in Sikh Politics” during the last six decades, was an important document. It indicated his concern at the growth of the neo-Sikh movement which he regarded as “thoroughly disloyal”.69 The Director, Criminal Intelligence, C. R. Cleveland, toned down Petrie’s observations in his comments of October 1911 that “Mr. Petrie has disclaimed infallibility and permanence of the conclusions which his labour has led him”, and that “their modern developments are specially difficult to understand and appraise aright.”70 Unable to sort out various components in neo-Sikh aggressiveness, the authorities kept their fingers crossed. The decision to acquire a portion of land of Gurdwara Rakab Ganj, Delhi, to plan a straight road for the proposed government house, following the transfer of capital to Delhi touched off a fierceagitationamongtheSikhcommunityin1913againstthesacrilege.71 TheChiefCommissioner, Delhi, by the end of 1913 received telegrams from almost all Singh Sabhas in the Punjab. Harchand Singh of Lyallpur played a prominent role in the early stages of the Rakab Ganj Affair but was prevented from raising the issue at the Sikh Educational Conference at Jalandhar in April 1914. The Chief Khalsa Diwan led by Sunder Singh Majithia under the influence of the Lt. Governor of Punjab sought to play a retrogressive role. One progressive feature of the goings on was the framing in mid-1914 of a Constitution of the Khalsa Gurdwara Committee which took over the administration of the Gurdwaras in Delhi. This incidentally marked the beginning of the Gurdwara Reform Movement. The breaking out of the First World War put the issue, including the building of the new capital, on the back burner. The sacrilege of Gurdwara Rakab Ganj inspired a group of people, including Bhai Randhir Singh of Narangwal (who later founded Akhand Kirtni Jatha for propagation of the Sikh faith) to align himself with the returned emigrants to raise a revolt in the armed forces. Meanwhile, the Komagata Maru incident and the Budge Budge riots at the end-September had released fierce wave of indignation. The Chief Khalsa Diwan and others protested against the police firing and asked for a thorough enquiry. The onrush of emigrants, the Ghadr revolutionaries, in the following months to Punjab surcharged the atmosphere, though many of the returnees were interned in their villages. The revolutionary plan to effect a simultaneous rising by armed forces at Lahore, Ferozepur and Rawalpindi fell through because of a spy. Thereafter, the Ghadrite revolution degenerated into a campaign of terrorism and sporadic violence, culminatingly eventually in Babbar Akali movement. It caused ripples in the Sikh community. The moratorium on agitation because of war did not impinge on Sikh concern over Gurdwara reform. A pamphlet in English printed at the cost of the Chief Khalsa Diwan advocated freedom of temples as the basis of all reforms. Already, as a result of exertions of the Ramgarhia Sabha, the Chief Khalsa Diwan and the Sikhs of Rawalpindi district, wearing of the sword was allowed in Punjab in June 1914. This was extended to cover other parts of British India in May 1917, and to Sikhs soldiers in 1920. As a result of the new consciousness, the Sikhs got possession of a number of Gurdwaras. Mention may be made of Gurdwaras at Chittagong, Badel (Hoshiarpur District), Hafizabad, Gurdwara Bhai Taru Singh (Lahore), Campbellpur, Dhantaur (Abbotabad District) and Akali Phula Singh Samadh at Naushera (NWFP) which came under the management of the Sikhs as a result of civil suits or mahants willingly subjecting themselves to Sikh sangats (congregations). Civil suits were instituted over the mismanagement of Gurdwaras in Assam, Bengal, Bihar, U.P. apart from those in the Punjab - Kurukshetra, Thanesar, Sultanpur, Dalla, and malpractices at Patna Sahib and Panja Sahib which did not permit revivalists Sikhs to perform religious services.72 The holy tank, Santokhsar, at Amritsar was cleaned by kar sewa (voluntary labour), making the resolution of the Municipal Committee Amritsar to fill it up redundant. The announcement of the Secretary of State for India, Edward Montague, in the House of Commons in August 1917, of the policy of His Majesty’s Government “of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire”, changed the ground situation, and led to renewed political activity. Already in January 1917, Sunder Singh Majithia had, in a Memorandum, asked for separate representation for the Sikhs, not based on their numerical strength but “proportionate to the importance, position and services of the community”. The Memorandum pointed out to the inadequate Sikh representation in the Reformed Council and pleaded for “one-third share in all seats and appointments in the Punjab.” The Hindus in the Punjab opposed the Sikh contentions. Under the Lucknow pact between ‘Hindu’ Congress and Muslim League in 1916 they had conceded to Muslims 50 percent of representation in the Punjab, and knew that any weightage to the Sikhs would be at their cost. The Punjab Provincial Congress Committee dominated by Arya Samajist Hindus in November 1917 denied the very separateness of the Sikh’s existence. It contended that “the Sikhs are a part of the larger Hindu community” and as such not entitled to separate electorate.73 The Sikhs figured nowhere in the Congress-League scheme of 1916. Master Tara Singh in a letter published in the Khalsa Akhbar of November 9, 1917, warned the Sikhs of joint Hindu-Muslim ‘conspiracy’ to trample on the smaller nations. There was Hind-Sikh tension and increasing moments of strife between the Tat Khalsa and the Arya Samajists. It renewed the determination of the revivalists to re-examine the question of Gurdwara management and control, as Pujaris at various Sikh Gurdwaras including the Golden Temple, Amritsar, were acting more as Hindu-Brahmins and serving as Trojan horses of Hinduism. The issue came to the fore at Gurdwara Babe di Ber, Sialkot, in 1918 when the revivalist Sikhs unsuccessfully asked for management by a representative committee of local Sikhs; they instituted a civil suit against the appointment of the new mahant, a minor grandson of the old Mahant, who was placed under guardianship of a patit (apostate) Sikh Honorary Magistrate. Meanwhile, the Sikh revivalists won a significant political victory when the Motague- Chelmsford Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms published in July 1918 accepted in principle the Sikh demand for separate representation, in the process giving an effective recognition to their independent political entity. The Sikhs universally welcomed the new dole of reforms towards self- government. Two issues now cropped up: the quantum of Sikh representation in the reformed Council, and the definition as to who was a Sikh. The recommendations in February 1919 of the Southborough Committee which had been appointed to work out details came out as a great disappointment on both counts. It recommended to the Sikhs, 15 percent of the elected seats, and wanted the electoral officer to “accept the declaration of an elector that he is a Sikh, unless he is satisfied that the declaration is not made in good faith” - making Keshadharis, Sehajdharis, Nirmalas, Udasis and others to be eligible for enrolment in special Sikh constituencies.74 These defeated the very purport of separate electorate, to the great chagrin of the Tat Khalsa. The Sikhs felt betrayed. The stirrings in the community led to a meeting of Sikh intelligentsia at Lahore on March 30, 1919. Sardar Gajjan Singh, a prominent leader of Ludhiana, and one of the two Sikh representatives in the Punjab Legislative Council, presided. It was decided to establish the Central Sikh League as a purely political organisation. Shortly afterwards, the situation in the Punjab exploded because of the agitation against Rowlatt Bills, and the call for Satyagraha by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. It led to perpetration of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre on Baisakhi, April 13, 1919, when troops under Gen. Dyer opened fire killing 379 and wounding over 2,000 unarmed persons. Then followed brutal repression. The wind of change did not affect the Chief Khalsa Diwan and the traditional Sikh leaders. Arur Singh, Sarbrah, and the head priests of the Golden Temple, Amritsar, not only conferred saropa (robe of honour) on General Dyer but also initiated him and Capt. Briggs into the brotherhood of the Khalsa, investing them with the five k’s, the sacred emblem of brotherhood by letting them off from keeping keshas, long hair, and giving up smoking.75 This was outrageous. The Sikhs of all shades were by now disenchanted with the government. The Tat Khalsa was bitter and started articulating Sikh grievances with a greater degree of vehemence. Various issues got enmeshed to pave the way for militancy. Fundamental issues came up with fierceness and challenged the values nurtured by the revivalists for the last half a century. To begin with, there was the very question of Sikh identity, and the jurisdiction of the government to define who was a Sikh. This was complicated by government interference in religious affairs of the Sikhs; the continued management of the Golden Temple under official patronage; the glaring defiance of Temple management in according differential treatment to low caste Sikhs causing obstruction to revivalist groups; the judgement in June 1919 confirming the appointment of an apostate Sikh as manager of Gurdwara Babe di Ber, Sialkot, bringing to the fore the inadequacy of law; and of the British Courts serving as vehicles of imposition of status quo to the indignation of the Tat Khalsa. Then were the questions of continued management of Khalsa College, Amritsar, by the British, and the redressal of the wrong done to Gurdwara Rakab Ganj in pulling down its outer walls. Though the Punjab government had exempted Kirpan from within the purview of the Arms Act in 1914, it now sought to reverse the decision by putting a limit on its length.76 The Sikh newspapers, the Singh Sabhas and other organisations continued dissemination of brochures, pamphlets and handouts, and agitate the various issues with a greater degree of acrimony, raising the tempo of new consciousness. The holding of the inaugural session of the Central Sikh League in Amritsar in end - December 1919 to coincide with the annual sessions of the Indian National Congrees and the Muslim League at the same place, was significant. The Central Sikh League, like the Congress and the Muslim League was an elitist organisation M. K. Gandhi and Madan Mohan Malaviya attended the inaugural session of the Sikh League. Politically, the Sikh League adopted a cautions attitude. It was forthright in expressing its disappointment at the inadequacy o Sikh representation in Central and Provincial legislatures. It referred to the long standing demand of the Sikh community for management of the Golden Temple by a representative body of Sikhs responsible to the Panth, and demanded that “the management and control o Sikh Temples and endowments should no longer be withheld from the community.”77 The setting up of District Sikh Leagues in the first half of 1920 provided new forum to educated Sikhs to air their grievances against the government. At the Sikh League meetings, references were always made in the context of the sufferings of the Sikhs, am their sacrifices in the context of inadequate returns. It was this consciousness that “bred militancy and saw the emergence of Khalsa nationalism”, which “was vividly expressed in revival of the Akali cult.”78 In the summer of 1920, Akalis - people with god’s name in their hearts, wearing black or deep blue turbans and large kirpans - started appearing in public meetings. This proved contagious and affected Sikh soldiers too. The government’s decision to invite Arur Singh, Sarbrah of the Golden Temple, and Gurbaksh Singh Bedi as representatives of the Sikh community, to tender evidence before the Reforms Advisory Committee, and their endorsement of the Southborough Committee recommendations to accept” everyone as Sikh who claimed himself to be so, caused furore among the Tat Khalsa. It invited widespread condemnation throughout the province. Resolutions were adopted insisting that only keshadhari Sikhs could justifiably be considered Sikhs.79 Arur Singh came in for special condemnation for pretending to be a religious guide too. In desperation, a Sikh deputation left for London in July 1920 and put forth its case to the Secretary of State but to no effect. The Joint Parliamentary Committee, on its own, increased Sikh representation by two seats, raising the Sikh representation in the Punjab Council to 18.75 per cent. The Tat Khalsa felt bitter at the inadequacy of the Sikh representation, attributed it to the government mischief, and decided to boycott the 1921 elections. Sehajdhari Sikhs who had the option to be registered in either Hindu or Sikh constituencies, solved the problem for the Tat Khalsa by registering themselves as the Hindus. In view of the Sikh militancy, the government issued a communique on July 14, 1920, expressing its intentions to withdraw from the management of the Golden Temple and make alternative arrangements in consultation with Sikh members of the reformed Legislative Council, to put off the matter by a year. The government’s procrastination provoked the revivalists to step up their campaign for immediate resignation of Arur Singh, the government appointed Sarbrah. They threatened to take his effigy in a mock funeral, if he did not resign. Demoralised at governments’ asking him to proceed on two months leave, Arur Singh appeared before the revivalists at their Jallianwala Bagh Diwan with folded hands. He asked for forgiveness and announced his resignation. This went home to the authorities who regarded it as a “decided victory for the party of reformers.”80 The Tat Khalsa militancy, now that the question of reforms was out of the way, took a revolutionary turn. Khalsa nationalism was on the march. Events followed in quick succession to make the reform movement a torrent. The first question to be resolved related to the reconstruction of the outer walls of Gurdwara Rakab Ganj, Delhi. The government permitted the reconstruction of walls at the intercession of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh of Nabha in October 1920. The move earlier in July by Kartar Singh Jhabbar to raise a Shahidi Jatha (martyrs squad) to reconstruct the walls became superfluous as government relented and conceded the point in September. The Shahidi Jatha incidentally laid the foundation of first Of the several Akali Jathas that came into being shortly. Gurdwara Babe di Ber was the first to be liberated after Khalsa Sewak Jatha of local Sikhs, despite hurdles, started performing daily services at the Gurdwara and restarted Guru ka Langar. On October 5, 1920, the Tat Khalsa elected a permanent committee of 13, to manage the Gurdwara. Matters regarding the administration of the Golden Temple came to ahead in a dramatic manner. On October 12, 1920, the newly baptised low caste Sikhs at the annual session of Khalsa Bradri were taken to the Golden Temple accompanied by revivalists. The priests refused to accept karah prasad, sacramental food, from them, or offer prayers for them. The revivalists insisted on the right of every Sikh to do that. After theological discussion, the Guru Granth Sahib was consulted. The Granthi amongst the objectors, to his consternation, read out third Sikh Guru, Amar Das’s hymn, “Brother, He showers grace even on those who have no merit and takes from them true Guru’s service. By touch of Philospher’s stone, i.e. the Guru, base metal has become gold. . . Our light has blended with His light, and we have become one with Him.” The priests, as also others, visibly affected offered prayers and accepted prasad from the hands of the newly converted Sikhs. When the whole party went to Akal Takht, the priests there fled. They did not return even when called by Sunder Singh Ramgarhia, the new Sarbrah. They were accused of sacrilege. The following day, the Deputy Commissioner constituted a provisional committee of nine, all reformers, including Prof. Teja Singh, Bawa Harkishan Singh, Teja Singh Bhuchar, Kartar Singh Jhabbar and others with Sunder Singh Ramgarhia, as its head to manage the two shrines.81 Gajjan Singh who had come in for severe criticism for associating with collection of funds for the outgoing Lt. Governor, Michael O’Dwyer, was ousted from Presidentship of the Central Sikh League in October 1920 session in Lahore. He was replaced by Kharak Singh, a lawyer from Sialkot, and intimately connected with the Tat Khalsa movement. The Central Sikh League now at Gandhi’s instance opted for a programme of non-violent non-cooperation with the government on lines similar to those adopted earlier by the Congress. By the time, non-cooperation in the field of education had spent itself. The impact of Gandhi on Sikh militancy aroused the faculty members of Khalsa College, Amritsar. They wanted to save the institution from the brunt of non-cooperation. At the same time they wanted to wrest control of the management from the government. They gave an ultimatum to the government asking it to withdraw its control over the management of the College by November 5, 1920, or failing that they would resign. During the period, the faculty members kept a low profile and did not permit outsiders to come into the institution, much less address the students. After much haggling, the government yielded, giving place to moderate Sikhs - Sunder Singh Majithia who became President, Harbans Singh Attari who took over as Secretary, Bhai Jodh Singh and others.82 The new management was unhampered by any differences with the Akalis. The premier Sikh institution was saved from the baneful impact of Gandhian non-cooperation which would have led to its disaffiliation from the Punjab University. The end result was the upshot of an admixture of caution with valour. A hukamnamah was issued from the Akal Takht for convening a general body meeting of the Sikhs on November 15, to elect a representative committee of Panth to control the Golden Temple, Amritsar, and all other Gurdwaras. Two days before, the Punjab government, in consultation with Maharaja Bhupinder Singh of Patiala, constituted a committee of 36 - all reformers - with power to co-opt others, to manage the Golden Temple and other Gurdwaras like that of Tarn Taran affiliated to it. The gathering at Akal Takht, after two days deliberations constituted a committee of 175 members, including the 36 named by the government, to manage all Gurdwaras in Punjab and other parts of India. The representation was according to districts in Punjab and according to provinces outside. Members were also elected to represent Sikh states and Sikh bodies in Burma, Malaya, China and America.83 The inaugural meeting was held on December 12, 1920, at the Akal Takht when the Committee named itself, Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC). It constituted the highest consummation of the spirit of democracy among the Sikhs. Moderate Chief Khalsa Diwan leaders held leading positions -Sunder Singh Majithia as President and Harbans Singh Attari as Vice- President, with Sunder Singh Ramgarhia (government appointed Sarbrah) as Secretary. The Punjab government heaved a sigh of relief. Noting that it had proceeded on ‘constitutional lines’, it did not interfere in its proceedings. The SGPC constituted the Shiromani Akali Dal which formally came into being in January 1921 to serve as a central body controlling and directing various Akali Jathas that had mushroomed from mid-1920. The purport of the SGPC and the Akali Dal was to conduct a purely religious reform movement to bring all Sikh shrines under the control of the SGPC and purge them of non- Sikh practices. The flurry of activity led to the Akalis arriving in gurdwaras to be liberated in strength, and setting up local committees of the Tat Khalsa after making provision for the existing Mahant if he cooperated or ejecting him if he did not. Already, on the death of the existing Mahant, Gurdwara Punja Sahib had come under the control of Tat Khalsa on November 18, 1920.84 The Punjab government, anxious not to provoke conflict with the reformers, or do anything to drive them into the lap of Gandhiites, adopted a policy of neutrality or non-interference. It told the Mahants and Pujaris that the government had no role to play. They could resort to civil courts or seek police protection on payment of expenses.85 The government also announced its intention to initiate a committee to look into gurdwara reforms and enact suitable legislation. The misdemeanour and depravity of Mahant Narain Das of Gurdwara Janam Asthan, (the birth place of Guru Nanak) at Nankana Sahib was well known and now invited attention of the Panth. He had a reputation of immorality and lewdness, and was condemned by the local congregation for scandalous behaviour, sacrilege and misuse of gurdwara funds. The SGPC on January 24, decided to hold a meeting of the whole Panth at Gurdwara Janam Asthan from March 4 to 6, 1921, to call on the Mahant to reform himself. The reformers had a bath in blood, the following day, when a group of them went to Gurdwara Tarn Taran to amicably persuade the pujaris to reform themselves. The Pujaris at first got into negotiations and drafted mutually acceptable terms. Then, late in the evening, after getting drunk and with the assistance of hired men, they brutally attacked a group of reformers injuring seventeen of them; one of them died the next day. The authorities found the Pujaris to be in the wrong. The Pujaris confessed their crime, tendered a written apology and placed themselves at the mercy of the Panth. Mahant Narain Das of Gurdwara Janam Asthan, seeing the writing on the walls, at first entered into negotiations with the Tat Khalsa who were agreeable to meet his demands. Then, he changed his mind. He played a leading role in the convention of Mahants and Pujaris at Lahore around February 19, 1921, when they expressed themselves against Singh Sabha reformers and called on the government to restore the status quo ante at the Golden Temple, Amritsar. Meanwhile, he hired 28 Pathans and goondas from Majha, collected arms and ammunition besides other weapons, which caused a scare in the surrounding areas. The main diwan was still two weeks away. He, however, attacked an unscheduled jatha of 150 reformers led by Bhai Lakshman Singh visiting the shrine for religious services on February 20, 1921, killing brutally most of them. They were fired upon without warning and hounded from room to room. At least, one of them was tied to a tree and burnt alive. When a massacre inside the shrine was on, a group of Sikh devotees arrived outside. Mahant Narain Das on horseback ordered killing of each and every long haired Sikh, and his men pursued some of them in the fields upto the railway station, killing and burning most of them. He also tried to burn down the dead bodies in a group in the shrine. Those killed outside were thrown into kilns and burnt alive. The Guru Granth Sahib was riddled with bullets. A few managed to escape including a boy of 12 who took refuge under the cot of the Guru Granth Sahib.86 Informed by a local Sikh official, the Deputy Commissioner, who was camping 12 miles away arrived by noon. He asked for troops which arrived late in the evening. Narain Dass and 26 Pathans were arrested. The Gurdwara Janam Asthan was placed under military guard. The government first gave the figures of dead as 20, then raised it to 67 and finally to 130 - the number of skulls counted in the shrine. Actual figure could be another 20 or so. The news of the Nankana massacre spread like wild fire and within hour? Sikhs from all parts, deeply stirred by this carnage, marched on to Nankana Sahib. They reached the place despite hurdles by the authorities in blocking the roads, re-routing the trains and deployment of troops to cordon off the area. By the afternoon of February 21, 1921, 1000 Akalis and some members of the SGPC confronted the Deputy Commissioner, and were “resolved to advance on the Gurdwara or be shot” by troops. The government relented and handed over the management of the shrine to a Committee of seven headed by Harbans Singh of Attari. He took over in the name of the SGPC. The troops and the police were withdrawn.87 The Nankana massacre caused a wave of indignation among the Sikhs. There was widespread belief of the government complicity, if not encouragement to the Mahant. The expression of unequivocal abhorrence by the Punjab Governor, Sir Edward Maclagan, and the institution of an ‘impartial’ enquiry did not lessen suspicions against the government. The appointment of Sardar Mehtab Singh, Public Prosecutor, to conduct a preliminary enquiry showed the government’s earnestness to allay Sikh suspicions and avoid direct conflict with them. But the elevation of C.M. King, Commissioner Lahore Division, who was considered by the Sikhs an arch villain, to the post of Asstt. Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, complicated the matters. A number of prominent leaders of the Congress and the Khilafat /visited Nankana Sahib to exploit the prevalent Sikh resentment against the government and give it a direction. Their intentions were not clean. For M.K. Gandhi, the visit on March 3, was quite instructive. He had already taken politics into religion by supporting the Muslims on the Khilafat wrongs, and rationalised the move for the Hindus as a device to save the cow; and also told them that his overall objective was to establish Ram Rajya. He now sought to do the same with the Gurdwara Reform Movement, and the British were not unaware of the possible mischief he might play. To his dismay and amazement, Gandhi now learnt that the Sikhs did not consider themselves to be Hindus, which he had perceived them to be. Precisely, for his Gujarati audience, he wrote in the Navjivan of March 13, 1921,” Till today, I had thought of them as a sect of Hinduism. But their leaders think that theirs is a distinct religion.” Though, Gandhi was told that his reference to them as Hindus was insulting to the Tat Khalsa, he was not reconciled to that till his very last. Here was Gandhi, a bar-at-law, in his earlier 50s, a widely travelled man in the midst of his political career, who had not heard of a Sikh, much less Guru Nanak or his mission! He could still learn if he had an open mind. Gandhi went on to add, “Their sacred book is the word of their gurus and, apart from that book, they accept no other scriptures as holy”. Gandhi developed mental reservations about the non-violent nature of the Gurdwara reform movement and further went on, “In addition to five symbolic articles mentioned above (the five Ks), the Akalis wear a black turban and a black band on one shoulder and also carry a big staff with a small axe at the top. Some of them have staff without an axe.88 Fifty or a hundred men of such groups go and take possession of gurdwara; they suffer violence themselves but do not use any. Nevertheless, a crowd of fifty or more men approaching a place in the way described is certainly a show of force and naturally the keeper of the Gurdwara would be intimidated by it.”89 Gandhi could have surmised that what Akalis were practicing was the non-violence of the strong and not of the weak or coward, which he did not. Speaking at Shahidi Diwan on March 3, 1921, and in his message to the Sikhs of Lahore the following day, Gandhi sought to integrate the Gurdwara reform movement into the national movement against colonialism. He wanted them “to dedicate this martyrdom to Bharat Mata and believe that the Khalsa can remain free only in a free India.” He warned them of government’s designs to win them over. To exasperate the Sikh feelings, he said, “Everything I saw and heard points to a second edition of Dyerism more barbarous, more calculated and more fiendish than Dyerism at Jallianwala.” He wanted the Sikhs not to seek punishment of perpetrators of the crime, and boycott the British Courts. He lectured them that taking a large party to take possession of a Gurdwara constituted a show of force and offered them a gratuitous advice to go in for arbitration boards for settlement of possession of Gurdwaras or postpone the question till the attainment of Swarajya. To asphyxiate the Sikh assertion of their identity perhaps for ever, he finally wanted them to suspend the Gurdwara reform movement.90 Gandhi, in short, in his inimitable style took politics into religion which the Central Sikh League, a political organisation, by leaving the reform movement to the SGPC and the Akali Dal had scrupulously avoided. Gandhi had already become a “Hindu holy man with political cloak” in “quest for power”.91 The Sikhs were not immediately taken in, but the damage had been done. Gandhi had sown the seeds of division in the Tat Khalsa which sprouted in a few months. Sardul Singh Caveeshar, theorising for the Akalis, wrote, “The Sikh knows that if his religion is safe, he can certainly regain the lost liberty of his country; but if his religion is not safe, even if his country be free, there is no guarantee that he shall be able to maintain that freedom. In fact it is the freedom of his religion that is the best safeguard for the freedom of his country.”92 The Sikhs demanded institution of two cases: one against the Mahant and his henchmen, and the second against the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, for their connivance. Despite their misgivings about official attitude especially since D. Petrie’s taking over the investigations, they pursued relentlessly the case against the Mahant and others. It culminated in the Sessions Court Judgement on October 12, 1921, sentencing the Mahant and seven others to death, 8 to transportation for life, 16 Pathans to 7 years rigorous imprisonment, and acquitting the remaining sixteen. The High Court, however, on March 3, 1922 influenced by specious arguments advanced by Mr. Hassan Imam of Patna reduced the sentence of the Mahant to transportation for life, confirmed death sentence only on three, transportation for life against two and acquitted all others includingthePathans.93 Thedecisioncameasananti-climax.Theauthoritiesadmittedthedifficulty they were facing in explaining it to the Sikh soldiers who showed great resentment at the final denouement. The Nankana massacre gave a great fillip to the Gurdwara reform movement. Kartar Singh of Jhabbar and Teja Singh of Chuharkhana played a prominent role. During the next fortnight or so, the Akalis reformed about two dozen gurdwaras mostly in the central Panjab, with Mahants in most cases voluntarily placing the shrines in the control of the SGPC and accepting the liberal terms offered.94 There were a number of reverses when the authorities activated themselves and Akali volunteers were sentenced to imprisonment. With the taking over as Officiating Chief Secretary by Mr. C. M. King there was perceptible hardening in the attitude of the administration towards the Akali movement. The post-Nankana tragedy period saw mass-scale arrest of Akali workers under Seditious Meetings Act, Arms Act and other provisions as if a reign of repression was let loose on them. Some of the Akali volunteers were even charged with dacoity, old cases were dug up against the revivalist Sikhs, and a large number of them were convicted. In such an atmosphere, efforts of the government to effect legislation for better management of the Gurdwaras were half hearted and ill conceived. Such was the case with Education Minister, Mian Fazle Hussain’s Resolution in Punjab Council in mid-March recommending to the Governor General to promulgate an Ordinance pending enactment of legislation. He conceded that the existing law was ill equipped and outdated to meet the current situation that had arisen. Some Hindu members, including Ganpat Rai, who was legal adviser of Mahant Narain Das, and declared himself to be Sehajdhari Sikh, wanted representation of Hindus and Muslims too in management of Sikh shrines! Raja Narendra Nath, President of Hindu Sabha and some other Hindu members spoke of various sects in Sikhism - Tat Khalsa, Sehajdharis, Sanatani Hindu-Sikhs, Nirmalas and Udasis - and wanted representation for each of these groups. The Tat Khalsa denied existence of any sects. They wanted to manage their shrines in accordance with the teachings of the Sikh Gurus. They had doubts about the utility of an Ordinance. The proposal was dropped. But it led to formulation of the Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Bill, 1921. The Bill as it emerged from the Select Committee on April 8, 1921, provided for a Board of Commissioners to administer Sikh gurdwaras and shrines which were defined as Sikh places of public worship. The Board was to consist of a non-Sikh President, a Sikh member nominated by the government and two Sikh members out of a panel of 8 proposed by a majority of Sikh members of Legislative Council. The President had casting vote in case of a tie. This meant that the government had full control through the Board Chairman and the nominated member. Moreover, who was a Sikh was not defined. The publication of the Bill invited sharp reaction all around. The reaction of ascetic orders of Nirmalas, Udasis, besides Sehajdharis and Hindus was critical and vociferous against denying them any representation. The reaction of Tat Khalsa was bitter, as it meant government control not only of the Golden Temple as hitherto, but all the Sikh shrines. The debate in the Provincial Legislative Council reflected the corresponding divisions between the Tat Khalsa and others - Hindus of all hues. Raja Narendra Nath stated that the Bill lent state support to religious reform and contravened the British policy. He also asked for representation in the Board for each sects within the Sikh faith. Mehtab Singh asserted that since Nirmalas, Udasis, Sehajdharis by their own admission were Hindus, the Sikhs were “not prepared to permit their interference in our religious affairs and wounding our sensibilities.”95 The Gurdwaras belonged to the Panth, and no other person could have a say in their administration. Because of lack of agreement, the Gurdwara Bill was postponed. There were mischievous attempts to set the Hindus against the Sikhs. But the Shankaracharya of Sharda Peeth and Lala Lajpat Rai came forward to sympathise with the Gurdwara reform movement and stemmed the anti- Sikh tide.96 The conference convened to sort out differences between Mahants, aided by Ganpat Rai and Raja Narendra Nath, and representatives of the SGPC on April 23, 1921, over Gurdwara legislation got bogged down. The Mahants insisted on following rituals inconsistent with the teachings of Guru Granth Sahib. They also demanded that the President of the Board should be a European and not a Sikh. The Press Communique of April 30, announcing failure of negotiations, exasperated the Sikh feelings further. The SGPC met at Akal Takht on May 10-11, 1921, when the General Committee, with an attendance of only 40 members, decided to adopt passive resistance in respect of Gurdwaras already under its control, and non-cooperation by boycotting intoxicating liquors, fostering swadeshi, and organising and availing of Panchayats. Master Tara Singh, Secretary, SGPC, ordered, in the name of Akal Takht, the change of Guru Granth Sahib’s rumalas into swadeshi ones, and also prohibited the use of foreign sugar for karah prasad.97 “The resolution on non-cooperation was purely constructive and did not suggest any boycott of courts, schools or titles,” as was the case with Gandhian non- cooperation movement in vogue.98 Gandhian politics-in-religion undermined the SGPC, and led to the first divisions and dissensions in the Tat Khalsa. Harbans Singh of Attari, Vice-President, resigned from his office and membership of the Working Committee, while Prof. Jodh Singh was induced to withdraw his resignation with some difficulty. To both of them, the adoption of non-cooperation meant entering the political avenue and was not within the scope of the SGPC charter. The adoption of non- cooperation was otherwise premature and unnecessarily caused loss of direction, especially when the mandate of the SGPC was expiring in another couple of months. Efforts were now concentrated on organising Akali Jathas, strengthening further the base at the grass root level and organising fresh elections to the SGPC. These were completed by August 1921. The composition of the SGPC was by and large the same, but the new executive committee reflected the image of Central Sikh League. Taking over of Presidentship of the SGPC by Kharak Singh who was also President of the Central Sikh League unnecessarily tended to give a similarity in management of the two bodies, which even the governmental authorities conceded had differences in outlook.” Mehtab Singh took over as Secretary. Sunder Singh Ramgarhia was the new Vice-president and was replaced later by Capt. Ram Singh. The SGPC in end-August 1921 confirmed the resolution on passive resistance adopted in May last. It now proceeded to organise Shiromani Akali Dal at the base level with the active participation of people of all levels going down to inert masses at village level all over the Punjab. A survey carried out by the Criminal Investigations Department from November 1921 to February 1922 revealed that the drive had met with a great success. The Akali Dal had emerged as a truly Sikh national organisation reflecting the Sikh national consciousness all over the Punjab, with perfect means of communications, and an individual Akali constituting a well disciplined unit in the Jatha. The Akali Dal was product of clever planning and reflected considerable organising ability. It encompassed all classes of the Sikhs - Jats, Khatris, Aroras, Mazhbis, sweepers, carpenters, labanas, reflecting the composition of population in different districts. Women were associated in increasing numbers. The Akalis had essentially become a rural movement. The brain behind the movement was, however, supplied by the educated Sikh townsmen of professional, trading and shop keeping classes.100 When in September 1921, the SGPC decided to raise a Shahidi Jatha, (martyrs squad) of 5,000 to carry further the Gurdwara reform movement, quotas were fixed for all districts based on their population, so as to reflect all areas and all classes of the Sikhs. Occasionally, Akalis wore turbans neither black nor blue but saffron, the colour of martyrdom which re-emerged once again in Punjab following the Operation Bluestar. The Akali volunteers vow ran thus: “In the presence of Sri Guru Granth Sahib, I promise that I will present my body and soul for the reformation of the Gurdwaras. In this work I will always obey the command of my Jathedar, and even if in great distress I will not offend anyone by word or action.”101 The Akali movement for taking over of mismanaged gurdwaras was resumed at a low key in September 1921, with workers showing their presence in Teja and Hothian in Gurdaspur district. But it was the British faux pas in taking over the keys of Golden Temple that gave the movement a great momentum. The Executive Committee of the SGPC on October 29, 1921, adopted a resolution asking its Vice-president, Sunder Singh Ramgarhia (Manager of Golden Temple appointed by the British in 1919) to handover the keys of the treasury to its President, Kharak Singh. Ramgarhia consulted the Deputy Commissioner. The Punjab Government, on being informed, issued him certain instructions as a result of which he, on November 8, deposited the keys of the treasury with the Indian Magistrate, who in turn deposited it with the Government Treasury. He also resigned as the Sarbrah of the Golden Temple. The government mistakenly believed that the SGPC wanted to use Gurdwara resources for political purposes. It appointed Hony. Capt. Bahadur Singh as the new Sarbrah. That created a crisis situation and invited all a round condemnation. The SGPC now constituted a Publicity Bureau with Prof. Teja Singh at its head to project its case to the general public. The Bureau did a commendable job in reaching the remote corners of the Sikh world. Faced with hostility all around, the government was nonplused. The SGPC did not permit the newly appointed manager to function. Perspiring in the presence of Kharak Singh, he agreed to resign. The official repressive policy and awarding of sentences to Akali volunteers who refused to put up any defence on the plea that they were non-cooperators, added to their prestige and popularity. The government, to its chagrin, found that no Sikh was willing to accept the office of Sarbrah at its hands. Also, it was unsuccessful in playing the Hindus against the Sikhs in this matter. The government instituting a case in the Keys Affair was regarded as a waste of time, as no Sikh was coming forth to contest the position of the SGPC. In a significant statement before the Court, Kharak Singh claimed that as President of the SGPC, or of Sikh Panth, his position was like that “of the President of the United States, France and Germany.”102 A government assessment conceded that, “In so far as the aims of the Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee are purely religious, there is now little doubt that it represents the general body of up-to-date Sikh opinion.”103 Being on the horns of a dilemma, the government was left with no option but to negotiate with the SGPC, conceding the demand of Kharak Singh “the uncrowned King of the Sikhs”. The government announced on January 12, 1922, its decision to finally withdraw from the management of the Darbar Sahib and leave the administration in the hands of the Sikh community, or SGPC, and allow the keys to be given over at once. Even after the unconditional release of all those arrested in connection with the keys affair, Akali leadership refused to collect the keys from the District Magistrate. The government had to send an Indian Gazetted Officer to hand over the keys to Kharak Singh at a Diwan especially arranged for the purpose, in “circumstances of utmost humiliation”, and that “The Panjab Government had humiliated itself to dust”104 before the SGPC. M.K. Gandhi’s telegram to Kharak Singh read, “First battle for India’s freedom won. Congratulations.” This gave a wrong signal both to the Sikhs and the government. The Akali victory in Gurdwara matters, in fact, had nothing to do with India’s freedom.105 It unnecessarily bloated the extremist Akali ego and aggravated the government’s hurt pride. Gandhi’s gesture was fraudulent in character, loaded and futile. It neither helped to change his outlandish assessment of the Akali movement, nor mitigate the Hindu opposition to gurdwara reforms, as we shall see later. The Central Sikh League resolved in January 1922 to increase its participation in the non- cooperation campaign but wisely placed the proposed Akali Fauj (army) under its command, while the SGPC declared its intention to limit itself solely to religious concerns. Even a government study in February 1922 conceded that the contention of the SGPC that Akali movement was religious and non-political “cannot be lightly dismissed.” But the same persons holding offices in the Sikh League and the SGPC complicated the position. Not only that, Kharak Singh and Sardul Singh Caveesher held the position of President and Secretary respectively of both the Central Sikh League and the Punjab Congress. On the eve of its abject surrender on the Key question, the government sought to re- establish a relationship of mutual confidence with the Sikhs. The communique of January 11, 1922, was a calculated move. The reaction of unqualified triumph among the Sikhs on Keys affair was quite predictable. But there was need for some conciliatory gesture on the part of Tat Khalsa to mitigate the feelings of humiliation of the government. This was more so after Gandhi’s withdrawal of non-cooperation movement which he termed a “Himalayan miscalculation” following the Chauri Chaura incident on February 5, 1922, and ratification of the decision by the Congress Working Committee a week later. Gandhi’s promised Swaraj within one year ended in fiasco. It was time now for the SGPC and the Akali leadership to sit down and do cool thinking, and not only reiterate the purely religious nature of the Gurdwara reform movement, but also to come out of Gandhi’s snare of mixing politics with religion. And, there was an opportunity knocking at the door in the form of the projected visit of the Prince of Wales in the last week of February to Khalsa College Amritsar: he was willing to announce the raising of its status to that of a Sikh University, a la Aligarh Muslim University and Benaras Hindu University, promoting studies and research in Sikh history, religion and philosophy.106 Only 16 months earlier, the faculty members of Khalsa College had risen to the occasion by not letting mixing of non-cooperation movement with the liberation of Khalsa College from the government control. Now, there was all round failure, principally because the same set of Sikh leaders were holding offices in the Central Sikh League, SGPC and Punjab Congress. They failed to distinguish their functions -as head of SGPC and Akali Dal vis a vis Central Sikh League and Punjab Congress. The acceptance of office as President of Punjab Congress by Kharak Singh who claimed for himself the position like that of President of United States, France and Germany, as head of Sikh nation, was most unwise. That unnecessarily placed him in a subordinate position. In prevented him from taking a correct decision. The Sikhs failed to realise that their fight was principally not only against Mahants, but also the elitist Hindus, whose representatives in the Panjab Legislative Council, as the 1921 debate showed, were deadset against the Tat Khalsa aspirations. The fight was not against the British. The failure to act now made them pay a heavy price in the form of Guru Ka Bagh sufferings, and the forced abdication of Maharaja of Nabha leading to Jaito morcha, agitation. These were quite unnecessary and could have been avoided. The fact that the Sikhs came out gloriously in both these agitations does not mitigate the failure to act rightly and well in time. The goings on in the Punjab came to the sharp notice of the Viceroy’s Council in the third week of February 1922. The general consensus was for immediate and severe action against the Akalis. It, however, had to await the departure of the Prince of Wales, freeing the police and the army from security duties. The British functionaries at various levels highlighted the defiance of authority that the Akalis were showing. The SGPC realised the gravity of the situation in view of possible wholesale repression and belatedly made some gestures of accommodation by countermanding the taking over of certain gurdwaras, and otherwise adopting a moderate attitude. Prof. Sahib Singh, Joint Secretary, SGPC, in his instructions issued to Akali Jathas on March 19, 1922, warned them of the government’s resolve to crush the Akali movement by force. He advised them to pursue peaceful lines to avoid “fruitless sacrifices” and save “the sacred Gurdwaras and Akali movement from mutilation.”107 One wishes, that this type of wisdom had dawned on the Sikh leadership six weeks earlier. The repressive methods adopted from March 20, by the police which was assisted by the army, led to arrest of 700 Akalis including Kharak Singh, in a fortnight. But as a result of Sahib Singh’s advice, the local authorities reported that the Akali Jathas dispersed of their own accord. The deployment of troops became redundant and these were soon withdrawn. It, however, intensified the propaganda battle between the SGPC and the Punjab government over official repression and government’s interference in Sikh religious affairs. The undercurrent of official hostility blew up in August in the form of Guru Ka Bagh morcha, agitation. On instructions from the Home Secretary, District Magistrate Amritsar ordered the mass scale arrest of Akalis. The authorities obtained a complaint, from a reluctant Mahant, on cutting of useless kikar trees.108 The institution of criminal proceedings against five Akalis looking after the Gurdwara on August 9, 1922, and their conviction the following day to 6 months rigorous imprisonment, for cutting trees provoked the Sikhs to assert their right. This made the authorities to wreck-, untold atrocities on thousands of Akali volunteers over a period of three months. It was remarkable the way the Akali volunteers offered themselves to be beaten mercilessly without raising an arm. They heroically kept the vow of non-violence taken before the Akal Takht. Pandit Madan Malaviya, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Rev. C.F. Andrews declared the beating most cowardly and inhuman. They showered high praise on the Akalis. C.F. Andrew’s description of the equipoise with which Akali volunteers bore, what he termed, the most cowardly and foul blows needs to be recalled. He wrote, “The vow (of non- violence) they had made to God was kept to the letter. I saw no act, no look, of defiance.”109 As to “the spirit of the suffering endured”, he stated, “It was very rarely that I witnessed any Akali Sikh who went forward to suffer, flinch from a blow when it was struck. . . . The blows were received one by one without resistance and without a sign of fear.”110 It was not for nothing that the Golden Hawk popularly associated with Guru Gobind Singh was sighted daily at Guru Ka Bagh, and gave the Guru’s blessings to his devotees, and assured them success. The government again, in view of adverse circumstance, sought an escape route. Through the good offices of Sir Ganga Ram, it extricated itself from a difficult position. Ganga Ram took on lease the Guru Ka Bagh on November 17, and handed over the same to the Gurdwara Committee. That resolved the basic falsely built-up issue. The volunteers numbering 5605 continued to languish in jail till Hindu-Muslim riots in Amritsar in April 1923; the Akalis constructive role gave the government an alibi to release them.111 The government pushed the Gurdwaras and Shrines Bill of 1922, the following day, through the Panjab Legislative Council in the teeth of opposition of both the Tat Khalsa and the Hindus. It was stillborn. Several Mahants after the cessation of the Guru Ka Bagh morcha voluntarily affiliated themselves to the SGPC, extracting liberal terms. Gandhi was all the more piqued, firstly, at Akalis running a perfectly non-violent movement drawing encomiums all around whereas his movement had ended in a fiasco; and, secondly, at Hindu-Muslim riots extinguishing whatever good was left of his non-violent non-cooperation movement. However, the testimony of C.F. Andrews and others on Guru Ka Bagh Morcha, to Gandhi seemed bunkum. Being a typical egotist, he could not brook such encomiums being showered on the Akalis, about whom he had such serious reservations. In mid-May 1923, Indulal K. Yajnik was transferred to stay with Gandhi in Yerwada Jail. He discussed with Gandhi “about the wonderful heroism and disciplined suffering of the Akali Sikhs, who carried out a most extraordinary species of satyagraha against their corrupt temple priests, and, incidentally against the Government forces allied with them.” Gandhi was most disagreeable to the introductory opening of the subject. And, we can not do better than quote Yajnik on his discussions with Gandhi. which hurt him and “chilled my enthusiasm.” “He told me that he had read a good deal of literature about the Sikh religion and the Sikh religious campaigns, and also knew the Akalis well by experience, and he had come to the conclusion that their campaign fell far short of true Satyagrah, for he had no doubt that they harboured violence in their heart even when they appeared to welcome a hailstorm of bullets, swords and spears with apparent equanimity. Even the large numbers in which they marched on Nankana, and other shrines, served to show that they harboured in their hearts a species of violence. Hurt at such adverse judgement, I brought to his notice the generous encomium that had been showered on them by no less a person than Mr. C.F. Andrews, who had seen with his own eyes, these hefty men beaten and even killed during their successive struggles without even an attempt at retaliation. He heard all this and much more that I put before him. But while expressing the warmest admiration for their heroism, he rigidly stuck to his conclusions and refused to give his saintly blessing to such a semi-militant movement.”112 The Akalis hardly had any breathing time when circumstances forced them to launch yet another agitation. Maharaja Ripudaman Singh of Nabha, well known for his pro-Tat Khalsa proclivities,113 had a dispute with the Maharaja of Patiala, known for his pro-government role. He had no dispute with the Government of India, but as a result of mediation was forced to abdicate in July 1923. Col. Michin, who, with the help of troops and armoured cars, took the Maharaja by surprise on July 8, 1923, taunted him with the query, “Where is that Akali?” The announcement of deposition by the government the following day, helped raise a storm of protest against the Government interference in Nabha and was described as a challenge to the Akali movement.114 The Akali leadership formally took up the question of the restoration of the Maharaja on July 10. Before taking any drastic action, the elections to the SGPC which were due were completed by the end of July when all Khalsa Sikhs above 18 were permitted to vote. The new Committee took up the Nabha case more vigorously. Tension mounted up. The Akalis in defiance of state orders continued to hold diwan indefinitely. The Nabha police in order to arrest all the Akalis, including the one reading the holy Granth, was said to have disrupted the Akhand Path (continued recitations of the holy Granth). This provided the causes belli for another Akali morcha, this time at Jaito. In a widely publicised resolution, the SGPC held the Government of India, responsible for the unbearable insult to Sikh scriptures.115 The SGPC started sending daily Jathas, to begin with of 25 persons from the Akal Takht, to Gurdwara Gangsar at Jaito, from September 14, 1923, to assert its right of free worship and resume the interrupted Akhand Path there, and for restoration of the Maharaja. This trial of strength lasted till the enactment of Gurdwara legislation bringing to fruition the Gurdwara reform movement. The government was conscious that the issue behind the Sikh unrest was a religious one and stirred deep feelings among the community. It, therefore, permitted, the Jathas to move unhindered in the British territory and wanted to deal with them in the Nabha state territory. The Jathas once in Nabha territory were told to give an undertaking that they will not indulge in political activity, i.e. ask for restoration of Maharaja, and, on refusal, were arrested and dispersed to remote and inhospitable places. The government took, with serious concern, the political nature of the demand for restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha, on which it brooked no compromise. A policy of repression followed. A press communique charged the SGPC and the Akali Dal with “sedition and conspiracy to overawe Government”. Both the organisations, on October 12, 1923, were declared unlawful. 50 member of the SGPC were arrested and charged with conspiracy to wage war against the King Emperor.116 The remaining members of the SGPC filled the vacancies and carried on the agitation. The sufferings drew countrywide attention and also support of the Indian National Congress which at its Delhi session in 1923 deputed Jawaharlal Nehru, Principal A.T. Gidwani and K. Santanam to go to Jaito for an on the spot study. They were arrested and sentenced to two had a half years imprisonment in September. Motilal was greatly perturbed, and, as a result of his efforts, they were released in November 1923 after giving an undertaking to leave Nabha immediately. However in his Autobiography, (1936), Jawaharlal untruthfully wrote that “there as no condition attached” to their release.117 Jawaharlal, at the time, was quite upset at his father’s attitude and Motilal was no less disappointed at his son’s nonchallant behaviour which was against the family traditions. Motilal asked his son to ponder as to why, when Gandhi, Malaviya, Andrews and others were involved, he was holding aloof? He, at that stage, apprised Jawaharlal of the story of transformation of Kauls into Nehrus, beginning with the land grant by Emperor Farrukhsiyar in 1716 to the son of Ganga Dhar Kaul alias Gangu Brahmin as a belated recognition for his services to the Mughal empire.118 Motilal justified the action of Ganga Dhar Kaul, as, in his views, Guru Gobind Singh’s creation of the Khalsa constituted a direct threat to Brahmin ism. Jawaharlal being a dutiful son and a conscientious Brahmin fell in line, and there was a perceptible change in his attitude towards the Akalis.119 Henceforth, the family traditions constituted the overriding influence in Jawaharlal’s attitude towards the Sikhs. The arrest of top Congress leaders at the time added fuel to the fire. The Congress at its Sabarmati Session in November 1923 and again at Kakinada the following month, extended support to the Akalis. Maulana Mohammad Ali, President of the Congress described it as “a fight of faith against falsehood.” Learning from experience, of the need to have committed Sikh members in the Punjab Legislative Council to push through the Gurdwara reforms, the Akalis fought the December 1923 elections to the Sikh seats in the Legislative Council. They won all but one of them.120 They were quite pleased with the results. In January 1924, the Akalis were forced to undertake another agitation at Gurdwara Bhai Pheru in Lahore District whose Mahant resiled from an earlier agreement and charged the Akalis with trespass, leading to their arrest and conviction. Batches of 25 started to present themselves for arrest, resulting in 4,000 arrests till September 1925 when the morcha was suspended. The arrest of the second batch of 62 SGPC members and Akali leaders on January 7, 1924, signified the government’s move to smash the movement. The Akalis faced the challenge with firm resolve. They announced despatch of a Shahidi Jatha (martyrs squad) of 500 to leave Amritsar on February 9, 1924, reaching Jaito on February 20-21, the third anniversary of Nankana tragedy. Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlu, Principal A.T. Gidwani and Mr. S. Zimmand of New York Times who were with the Jatha on February 21, before it entered Nabha territory, testified that the Jatha was moving in perfect order and non-violence, was unarmed when it was fired upon in the afternoon, leading to about 100 dead and 200 wounded.121 About 700 Sikhs including the members of the Jatha and accompanying crowds were arrested. To justify its action, the government in a communique on February 22, alleged that a Jatha of 6,000 Akalis armed with fire arms, chhavis and spears entered the Nabha territory and fired. bullets at the Administrator. This was denied by eye witnesses including Dr. Kitchlu, Gidwani and Zimmand. Zimmand wrote to Gandhi, “I observed carefully the Jatha and the crowds. . . and to the best of my knowledge the Jatha, and the crowd following the Jatha, were not armed, and behaved in a peaceful manner.”122 On February 27, 1924, 47 members of Central Legislative Assembly including M.A. Jinnah, Sir Mohammad Yaqub and Pt. M.M. Malaviya wrote to the Home Secretary asking for enquiry into Jaito Affair. They also moved an adjournment motion to discuss the happenings in Jaito. It was not allowed. As against that, the antenna of M.K. Gandhi’s over-fertile, brain picked up the signals of government’s communique and also government’s contentions over the last two years that what the Akalis really wanted was not the gurdwara reforms but the restoration of Sikh rule in the Punjab. His study of Sikhism, as he told Indulal K. Yajnik, told him that Sikhism and non-violence were poles apart. His mind was already occupied in making important formulations on non-violence using the Akali behaviour pattern during the Guru Ka Bagh morcha and now the Jaito morcha as laboratory test cases. He was stunned at the phenomenal leadership pattern of the Akalis, and that too in running a non-violent struggle, without his being associated with it. He thought that the creed of non-violence was his baby and the Akalis had no right to run away with it. By the time, Gandhi had come under the baneful influence of Lala Munshi Ram alias Swami Shraddhanand and blessed his shuddhi movement (for reconversion of Muslims into Hinduism), subject to the condition that there was no attack on the Qoran. The impact of Shraddhanand clouded Gandhi’s mind. Firstly, from at least 1924, he shied away from Hindu-Muslim unity. Secondly, he relentlessly pursued his strategy to overwhelm the Sikhs. Another evil influence was that of K.M. Panikkar, looking after the Congress-established Akali Sahayak Bureau to help the Akalis. He was dead set against the Akalis running an agitation for completion of the ruptured Akhand Path at Jaito, and also like Gandhi had misgivings about the non-violent character of the Akali movement. He was against the Akali organisation, and the Sikhs being exempted from the Arms Act to permit them keeping the kirpan, which he regarded as a threat to other communities. Gandhi threw his bombshell on the Akalis on March 4, 1924, when in contravention of earlier Congress resolutions he wanted the Akalis to separate the Akhand Path issue from that of restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha, and run two separate agitations. He also brought in his advice, tendered after the Nankana tragedy, to refer to arbitration the disputes over historic gurdwaras and “that the movement is neither anti-Hindu nor anti any other race or creed.” In Gandhian terminology there was a Hindu race, a Muslim race, a Sikh race, and other races inhabiting Punjab and India. Last, but not the least, he wanted the SGPC to affirm that it “has no desire for the establishment of Sikh Raj” and further that the SGPC “is purely a religious body and, therefore, as such can have no secular object or intention.”124 That was gratuitous and showed the extent to which his mind was caught in mire. The SGPC and Akali Dal had already been politicised because of him by adopting non-cooperation and Swadeshi, and fighting Punjab Legislative Council elections in December last. As to the desire to establish the ‘Sikh Raj’ Gandhi, had something more to say, and we shall come to that shortly. Some Akali leaders met him to explain their stand on the Nabha issue, and Gandhi again on March 9, reiterated his advice to separate the Akhand Path and the Nabha issues.125 Not content with that, he started issuing Open Letters to the Press casting aspersions on non-violent character of the Akali movement. He also indulged in dialectical semantics about violence, passive violence, non-violence, passive resistance, civil disobedience, and satyagraha, all derived from the working of his overfertile mind on the pragmatic Akali movement, which for him served as a functional laboratory. Because of Gandhi’s adverse propaganda, the Akalis in their letter of April 20, 1924, to him made a gallant gesture dissociating the Akhand Path issue from the Nabha issue completely, and emphatically denied any aspirations to establish the Sikh Raj.126 This did not satisfy Gandhi who in next salvo in the Young India’ of June 26, 1924, while lauding the Akalis, formulated basic, postulates forhissuccessorstofollowforalltimestocome. Precisely,hewrote: Ulterior motives and ambition for the establishment of Sikh Raj are imputed to them. The Akalis have disclaimed any such intention. As a matter of fact, no disclaimer is necessary, and none can prevent such an attempt being made in the future. A solemn declaration made by all the Sikhs can easily be thrown on the board if ever their successors entertain any such unworthy ambition.127 Hence, the policy of continuous distrust and destablisation of the Sikhs pursued by Congress leaders since independence. Assisted by Gandhi’s salvos against the Akalis, Sir Malcolm Hailey, who took over as Lt. Governor of Punjab in May 1924, initiated a subtle policy of creating pro-establishment groups loyal to the government. The landlords/landed gentry, some retired army personnel and civil pensioners were organised into Sewak (service) or Sudhar (reform) Committee. By October 1924, the formation of provincial level Sikh Sudhar Committee was announced. A Jatha organised by it was received at Jaito and after giving the requisite undertaking was permitted to perform the interrupted akhand path on October 21-23, 1924. This undercut the SGPC which had so far sent 13 Jathas apart from one from Bengal. It sent another three jathas apart from one from Canada before restrictions on akhand path at Jaito were removed in April 1925. The Akalis performed 101 akhand path as a sort of penance for disruption of one akhand path two years earlier, and the process was completed by August 6, 1925. At this critical stage, when Hailey was undercutting the Akalis by Sudhar Committees, nationalist leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Mohammad Ali Jinnah came to their rescue. Malaviya first drafted a Gurdwara Bill in consultation with the Akalis and wanted the Sikh members of the Punjab Legislative Council to move it. And, Hindu members to support it. In case it fell through, he proposed to move an All India Gurdwara Bill in the Central Legislative Assembly as there were Gurdwaras outside Panjab as well.128 This took the sails out of Hailey who now realised the poignancy of the Sikh demand and conceded the initiative to the SGPC and the Sikhs themselves to draft a permanent Gurdwara Bill. As a result, the Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Bill of 1925 on the principles enunciated by the Tat Khalsa was put on the anvil. The bill envisaged the establishment of a board of management of all Sikh gurdwaras and shrines based on universal adult franchise of Sikhs aged 21 years or over. The Bill defined a Sikh who made the declaration: “I solemnly affirm that I am a Sikh, that I believe in the Guru Granth Sahib, that 1 believe in the Ten Gurus and that I have no other religion.”129 A patit (apostate) was excluded from membership of the Gurdwara Committees - the definition of patit being left to the Sikh Gurdwara Judicial Tribunal, set up under the Act. Sehajdharis, who on their own admission were Hindus, stood apart and obviously had no role in the Gurdwara management. The Bill ensured that the control over all Sikh religious institutions would effectively pass on to the Khalsa Sikhs. The publication of the Bill raised a furore among the Hindus - Sehajdharis, Udasis and Nirmalas - who contended that Sikhism was never a separate religion, apart from Hinduism. Even M.K. Gandhi indirectly tried to harden the Hindu resistance to accepting Sikhism as an independent religion. It was Guru Gobind Singh’s creation of the Khalsa that had, in the eyes of those having superficial knowledge of Guru Nanak’s mission, set the Sikhs apart from the Hindus. In a write up in the Young India of April 9, 1925, he described Guru Gobind Singh as “a misguided patriot” for advocating the use of force in certain circumstances, but showed his reverence for Lord Krishna who “is Lord of the Universe, the creator, preserver, and destroyer of us all” from the application, for “He may destroy because He creates.”130 What Gandhi was driving at was made explicit in his write up in the Young India of October 1, 1925 (even after the adoption of Gurdwara Bill in July) in response to Mangal Singh’s bringing to his notice the unusual condemnation of his slanderous views. He wrote, “My belief about the Sikh Gurus is that they were all Hindus. . . I do not regard Sikhism as a religion distinct from Hinduism. I regard it as part of Hinduism and the reformation in the same sense that Vaishnavism is.”131 Vaishnavism, historically, had served as a vehicle for absorption of heterodox creeds/religions by declaring their gods or prophets as Avatars of Vishnu, and subject them to accept caste system and fall within the framework of Varna Ashram Dharma. It was in this process that the first Trithankra of the Jains who do not believe in God, and Lord Buddha were accepted Avatars of Vishnu in the eighth- ninth century. Gandhi’s evil intentions towards Sikhism were quite explicit. This was sinister coming from a man who later was acclaimed the father of the nation - a ‘nation’ whose ‘father’ did not recognise Sikhism as a separate religion and could assume the legitimate role of undermining its independent entity. Not surprisingly, the Hindu members of Punjab Legislative Council opposed the Sikh Gurdwara and Shrines Bill. Raja Narendra Nath, and Dr. Gokal Chand Narang, who had earlier written profusely about the Sikh nation and Sikh nationalism,132 now representing Hindus and Sehajdharis respectively appended minutes of dissent in the select committee. They wanted the last part of definition of Sikh “that I have no other religion” to be deleted, and even objected to disqualification of patits (apostates). The Bill introduced by Tara Singh of Moga, as a Private Members Bill, was adopted by the Punjab Legislative Council on July 8, 1925, and the earlier Act of 1922 repealed. It was enforced from November 1, 1925. Speaking on the occasion, Tara Singh said that during the Gurdwara reform movement, Akalis suffered 30,000 men and women behind bars, 400 dead and 20,000 injured, besides dismissals from services, withdrawals of Jagirs and Pensions, confiscation of properties and imposition of fines, etc. These were not refuted by official members. Giani Nahar Singh, a contemporary, put the figures at 40,000 behind bars and 500 dead. With the enactment of Gurdwara Act, came to fruition, after a bitter struggle and a great deal of sacrifices, the Sikh efforts to assert their identity. Hailey, however was a success in sowing seeds of discord among the solid Sikh community. He did not believe in the policy of forget and forgive. He wanted only those among the Gurdwara prisoners to be released who gave an undertaking to implement the Gurdwara Act. Some came out after giving an undertaking, others followed mostly in early 1926 after completion of their sentences. This, unnecessarily, caused a schism in the two sections, those who gave an undertaking led by Mehtab Singh and came into power in the SGPC, and those who did not, led by Kharak Singh who seized power the following year. Though a compromise was effected between the groups and they decided to sink their differences, these again cropped up causing disunity in the Sikh Panth around clash of personalities, to the hilarity of the forces which opposed the assertion of separate Sikh identity.134 It was worse that this prevented the Sikh community from putting its bead together and taking stock of the situation. This was very much needed. Various forces were interacting in Indian polity. It was necessary for them to identify those like Gandhi who emitted total hostility towards the Sikh aspirations and not to fall in his trap, in the times to come. Footnotes: 1. Saint Nihal Singh, “The Sikh Struggle Against Strangulation”, Fortnightly Review, London, 1912 (97), reproduced in Ganda Singh (ed) Panjab Past and Present (herein after referred to as PP&P), Vol. VII, April 1973 (The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Panjab 1850-1925), pp. 16-17. 2. Ibid. Also, Ganda Singh in Ibid, p. ix. 3. Governor General, Lord Dalhousie, wrote in April 1849 that the “hatred of Sikhs against the British exceeds the national and religious animosity of Sikh against Afghans.” See, Dolores Domin, “Some Aspects of British Land Policy in Panjab after 1849”, PP&P. Vol. VIII, April 1974, pp. 16-17. 4. 8,000 persons were imprisoned during the first year of British administration of Punjab. 5. N.G. Barrier, The Sikhs and Their Literature. (Delhi, 1970), p. xix. 6. Khushwant Singh, History of Sikhs, Vol II (Princeton, 1966), pp. 112-13. 7. N.G. Barrier, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXVlI (1968), pp. 525-26. 8. Ian J. Kerr, “The British and the Administration of the Golden Temple 1859”, PP&P, Vol X, October 1976, p. 308. 9. Ibid., p. 315: Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform and the Sikh Awakening, 1922 (Amritsar, 1984 reprint) p. 98. 10. For text, see Kerr, n. 8, pp. 317-19. 11. Ganda Singh, n. 1, p. xi. 12. Forfulleraccountsee,GandaSingh,KukiandiVithia,1944. 13. Saint Nihal Singh, n. 1. p. xi. 14. Ernest Trump, The Adi Granth or Holy Scripture of Sikhs, (London, 1 877), p. viii: see also Barrier, n.3, p. xix-xx. 15. Surprisingly, during the last couple of decades or so. Dr. Trump has come to inspire scholars like W.H. McLeod (in his biography of Guru Nanak and later in his Evolution of the Sikh Community and other publications) with the same objective to denigrade Sikhism. What practically McLeod has written is only a rehash of Trump and the Arya Samaj literature on Sikhism in the last quarter of 19th century. If he were to write a dated, historical essay, he would have to give the opposite, Singh Sabha, viewpoint also. This, he had no mind to. Therefore, McLeod is projecting the whole thing as his original thinking, which certainly it is not. A rationale scholar who is interested to go into the sources of McLeod’s studies should go through the available material in Selections from Vernacular/ Native Newspapers Published in the Punjab, available in the National Archives of India New Delhi, to go into both the sides of the controversy for a balanced view. 16. Kartar Singh and Gurdial Singh Dhillon, Stories from Sikh History, Book IX, (Socio-Religious Reform Movements 1849-1947), (Delhi, 1978) pp. 75-76. 17. Ibid. 18. 18. Ibid, p. 77-78. 19. Ibid, pp. 80-82. 20. Ibid, p. 89. 21. See,lettertoeditorfromGianiBrahmaSinghBrahma,Ajmer,TheSpokesmanWeekly(Delhi), November 28, 1983. 22. FollowingwasthetextoftheHukamnamah: Ik Onkar Sati Gur Prasadi Sri Akal Sahaye, Akal Sahay, Takht Sri Akal Bunga Sahib Ji, Sri Darbar Sahib We the undersigned Singh Sahibs, Poojaris, Takht Sri Akal Takht, Bungaji Sahib and Sri Darbar and Baba Atal Rai Sahibji, and Jhand Bunga Sahibji and Shaheed Bunga Sahibji, have examined the case of Gurmukh Singh, Secretary, and have found that this person at some places, contrary to the Guru’s devotion, has shown disrespect to Sri Guru Granth Sahib and Guru-Ansh (descendents of Gurus) and Gurbani, orally and in print, and this leads to the conclusion that his faith is totally averse to the Sikh beliefs and for such reasons we all Poojaris, Granthis and Lambardaars of the aforementioned Gurdwaras, put in our hand that the said Gurmukh Singh is expelled from the Panth Khalsa. The said Gurdwaras shall not accept his Ardaasa and shall have no link with him. Let all Sikh sangats be warned to avoid his association and following. Whosoever shall adhere to his following shall be deemed to be a be-mukh and be taken to be liable to tankhah (fine) and shall be punishable with the similar treatment. This issues on 7th Chet, Samat 418 Guru Nanak - Christian Era March 18, 1887. Signatures: Present Singh Sahibs, Auhdedaars, Granthis and Pujari. 29 Panth dignitaries, including Bhai Narain Singh, Granthi, Gurdwara Tarn Taran. Ibid. See, also Jagjit Singh, Singh Sabha Lehar, (Ludhiana, 1974), pp. 30-40. This hukamnamah was revoked only in September, 1995 at the Word Sikh Conference held under the auspices of Akal Takaht and the services of Prof. Gurmukh Singh appreciated. 23. Teja Singh, n. 9 p. 65. 24. Swami Dayanand reflected a considerable amount of flexibility in changing his interpretation of Vedas according to the need of the hour. For instance, in one of his discourses at Lahore, he said that the sun revolved around the earth. Back home, his admirers told him that people will think poor of Vedas as the latest scientific know ledge reveals that earth revolves around the sun. The following day, Swami Dayanand revised his interpretation of Vedas accordingly. See, Ditt Singh, Sadhu Dayanand te Mera Sambad, 1900, (Ludhiana, 1990 reprint) pp. 58-59. 25. See also, Dhanpati Pandey, Swami Dayanand Saraswati (Builders of Modern India, New Delhi, Publications Division, 1985), p. 49. 26. Norman G. Barrier, “The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Panjab”, PP&P, Vol. V, October 1971, pp. 344-45. See also, Parkash Tandon, Punjabi Century, (London, 1961), chapters 4 &5. 27. Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab, (Delhi, 1976), p. 136. 28. See, Richard W. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making, (Delhi, 1987) pp. 123-25 for community of views between Arya Samaj and the Sikh reformers. 29. Jones, n. 27, pp. 135-36. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid, p. 40 32. Swami Dayanand’s letter to Sardar Bhagat Singh of Ajmer, quoted in Ganda Singh, “The Origin of Hindu-Sikh Tension in Panjab”, PP&P Vol. XI, October 1977, p. 326. 33. Jones, n. 27, p. 137. 34. See, Ganda Singh, n. 32. 35. Jones, n. 27, pp. 137-38. 36. Barrier, n. 5, p. xxi. 37. Ibid. 38. The institution started as a middle school in 1893 and started B.A. classes in 1899. 39. Kartar Singh, n. 16, pp. 117-22. 40. This resulted in publication of The Sikh Religion, Its Gurus, Sacred Writings, and Authors, by the Oxford University at Clarendon Press in 1909. 41. Fordetailssee,N.GeraldBarrier,“InSearchofIdentity”inLanguageandSocietyinModernIndia, Editors: Robert I Crane and Bradford Spangenberg, (Delhi, 1981),pp. 11-15. 42. Macauliffe summed up his early impressions in two essays. In the first essay, ‘The Holy Writings of the Sikhs (Allahabad, 1900), he let the Gurus speak for themselves. He emphasised the separate nature of Sikhism and the heroism inherent in recent Sikh tradition. In the second essay, ‘The Sikh Religion and Its Advantage to the State’ (Simla, 1903), he projected Sikhism as a distinct religion and a universal ethical system. “We have seen that Sikhism prohibits idolatry, hypocrisy, caste exclusiveness, the concremation of woman, the use of wine and other intoxicants, tobacco-smoking, infanticide, slander, pilgrimages to the sacred rivers and tanks of Hindus.” 43. Barrier, n. 5, xxii; Fox, n. 28, p. 168. 44. Kenneth W. Jones, “Hum Hindu Nahin: The Arya Sikh relations, 1877-l905”, PP&P, Vol. XI, October 1877. pp. 388-400. 45. Jones, n. 27, pp. 202-03. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid, p. 206. 48. Ibid, p. 207. 49. Ibid, pp. 208-09. 50. Ibid, p. 210. 51. S. Attar Singh of Bhadaur died in 1896, Professor Gurmukh Singh in 1898 and Bhai Ditt Singh in 1901, leaving behind Bhai Jawahar Singh and Bhai Maiya Singh in the field. 52. Kartar Singh and Dhillon, n. 16. p. 99. 53. Jones, n. 27, p. 210. 54. Ibid, p. 211. 55. Fortextofjudgement,seeTejaSinghn.9,p.64. 56. Ibid, p. 101. 57. Teja Singh, “The Singh Sabha Movement” in Ganda Singh (ed), n. 1, p. 44. 58. “ChiefKhalsaDiwan-FiftyYearsofService”,inIbid,p.71. 59. N.G. Barrier, “The Sikh Resurgence 1849-1947: An Assessment of Printed Sources and Their Location” in W. Eric Gustafson & Kenneth W. Jones, Sources on Punjab History (Delhi, 1975, p. 227). 60. N.G. Barrier, n. 5, p. XLIII. 61. D. Petrie, “Memorandum on Recent Developments in Sikh Politics,” (1911) PP&P, Vol IV, October 1970, pp. 292. 62. Munsha Singh Dukhi, Jiwan Bhai Sahib Bhai Mohan Singh Vaid, (Delhi 1989, reprint), p. 72. 63. N.G. Barrier, n. 59, p. 232. 64. Ibid,: Kartar Singh, n. 16, p. 108. 65. MacauliffeattendedtheSikhEducationalConferenceatRawalpindiin1910.Nobodywentto receive him at the Railway Station, and the promoters of the Conference refused to include a Resolution saying that the work was worthy of Sikh’s consideration. Broken in health and more in spirits on account of debt incurred in publication of the volumes, he left for England where he died in 1913. It was, thereafter, that the Sikh Educational Conference adopted a resolution appreciating his services. See, Teja Singh, n. 57, pp. 40-41. 66. See,RajivA.Kapur,SikhSeparatism:PoliticsofFaith(Delhi,1987),pp.46-47. 67. Jones, n. 27, p. 311. 68. Census Report 1911, Part I, p. 292, quoted in Kapur, n. 66, p. 41. 69. For text, see n. 61, pp. 302-79. 70. Ibid, p. 301. 71. For full story see Sangat Singh, chapter on “Gurdwara Rikab Ganj Affair” in Freedom of Delhi, (Delhi, 1973), pp. 198-220. 72. For details, see, Teja Singh, n. 9, pp. 67-75 & 319-20. 73. Kapur, n. 66, p. 73. 74. Report on Constitutional Franchine, p. 7, quoted in Kapur, n. 66, p. 80. 75. IanColvin,TheLifeofGen.Dyer,(London,1929),pp.201-02. 76. Guru Gobind Singh had used kirpan, kharag and talwar as synonyms. High Court Judgement upholding the Sikh position came rather late. 77. Teja Singh, n. 9, p. 81. 78. Akalis owed their origin to Guru Gobind Singh and served as self appointed guardians of the faith. See, Kapur, n. 66, p. 92: Teja Singh, n. 9, pp. 305-16. 79. Kapur, n. 66, p. 155. 80. Cf.MohinderSingh,TheAkaliMovement,(Delhi,1978),p.21. 81. ForfullstoryseeCf.TejaSingh,n.9,pp105-08. 82. Cf.TejaSingh,“KhalsaCollegeAmritsar”inGandaSingh(ed)n.1,pp.86-94. 83. Teja Singh, n. 9, p. 135. 84. Ibid, p. 123. 85. C.M. King’s letter to Baba Kartar Singh Bedi spelling out the government policy came in for indictment by Sir Valentine Chirol for not spelling out their duties vis a vis their rights. 86. Forfullstory,see,TejaSingh,n.9,pp.148-96. 87. Ibid. 88. Speaking on March 3, 1921, at Nankana Sahib, M.K. Gandhi stated that he had been told ‘that your kirpans and your battle axes were part of your dress. So let them be. But I assure you that the time had not come for their use.” 89. Exphasis added Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (hereinafter referred to as CW) (Delhi Publications Division - published in various years). Vol. 19, p. 401. 90. Ibid. 91. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, Thy Hand, Great Anarch! India 1921-52, (London, 1987), p. 48. 92. Cf.SardulSinghCaveeshar,“TheAkaliMovement”1944inGandaSingh(ed),n.1,p.141. 93. Teja Singh, n. 9, pp. 70-71. 94. Fordetailssec,V.M.Smith(ofCriminalInvestigationDepartment,Memorandum),“TheAkali Dal and Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 1921-22”, reproduced in PP&P, Vol I, October 1967, pp. 292-99. 95. Kapur, n. 66, p. 119. 96. Teja Singh, n. 9, p. 229. 97. Fauja Singh, “Akalis and the Indian National Congress”, PP&P, Vol XV, October 1981, p. 455. 98. Teja Singh, n. 9, p. 233. 99. See n. 94. 100. Ibid. 101. Ibid, p. 290. It stood Akalis in goodstead for over six decades in running non-violent and peaceful Guru ka Bagh, Bhai Pheru and Jaito morchas against the British, two Punjabi Suba morchas against Nehru, two against Indira’s draconian emergency and for liberation of Delhi Gurdwaras, and finally the Dharam Yudh morcha in 1980s which was subverted by Indira Gandhi’s introduction of violence in Sikh politics. 102. Sohan Singh Josh, Akali Morchian da Itihas, (Amritsar, 1972), p. 125; Mohinder Singh, n. 80, p. 47. 103. Smith, n. 94, p. 277. 104. John Maynard, “The Sikh Problem in the Punjab, 1920-23”, Contemporary Review, September 1923, reproduced in PP&P Vol. XI, April 1977, p. 139. 105. The refusal of Jawaharlal, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi after independence to enact All India Gurdwara Act even after their commitments to do so, points to that. The Brahminical Hindus would rather dissolve the Indian Union than permit consolidation of Sikhism. 106. Kapur Singh, Saachi Sakhi, (Jalandhar, 1972), p. 51. 107. Kapur, n, 66, p. 149. 108. Teja Singh, n. 9, p. 276. 109. Ibid, pp. 289-96. 110. Ibid, p. 296. 111. Ibid, pp. 303-04. 112. Indulal K. Yajnik, Gandhi: As I Knew Him (Delhi, 1943 edn), pp. 299-300. 113. It was Tikka Ripudaman Singh of Nabha who had introduced Anand Marriage Act in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1908 which was adopted the following year. 114. Mohinder Singh, n. 80, p. 66. 115. Kapur, n. 66, p. 175. 116. Ibid, p. 177; Kartar Singh, n. 16, p. 229. 117. For text of Nabha Orders, see PP&P, Vol VIII, April 1974, pp. 200-01; Jawaharlal Nehru, Autobiography [1936 ] (Delhi, 1980 reprint), p. 114. 118. Talks in 1955-56 with Sodhi Pindi Dass of Bharat Naujawan Sabha and a member of Hindustan Socialist Republican Army to which belonged Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and Rajguru. Jawaharlal Nehru in 1920s was leaning towards the extremists who had a lot of interaction with him. Motilal Nehru’s discourse to his son about Gangu origin of the family was talked of among the extremists and revolutionaries, who also monitored his various moves, some with Gandhi’s assistance to hold Jawaharlal back from a more active role in anti-imperialist struggle. See also, Chapter 3, n. 14 ante. 119. Nehru to Kitchlu, 9 April 1924, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Vol II, p. 152. 120. Kartar Singh, n. 16, p. 232. 121. SGPC Communique, quoted in Ibid, p. 244. 122. For text, see Mohinder Singh, n. 80, pp. 212-15. Gandhi was released from jail on February 5, 1924. 123. Sohan Singh Josh, n. 90, pp. 356-60. 124. Cf. CW, Vol 24, pp. 283-85. 125. Ibid. Vol. 23, pp. 231-54. 126. Josh, n. 90, pp. 353-54. 127. CW Vol. 24, pp. 283-85. 128. Mohinder Singh, n. 80, pp. 134-35. 129. For text, see M.L. Ahluwalia, Gurdwara Reform Movement 1919-1925, An Era in Congress-Akali Collaboration. (Delhi, 1985), pp. 286-364. 130. CW, Vol. 26 pp. 486-92. 131. 131. Ibid, Vol. 28, p. 263. 132. He was awarded Ph.D. by London University for his thesis. Transformation of Sikhism, well known book published by him. 133. Mohinder Singh, n. 80, p. 137. 134. After Indian independence, Sir Malcolm Hailey served as a loadstar to these forces gathered together under Gandhian flag. 5 The Sikhs And Indian Independence (1925-1947) The Sikhs made sacrifices wholly out of proportion to their demographic strength for India’s fight for freedom. Their contribution to the number of persons sent to the gallows, sentenced to transportation1for life, otherwise imprisoned and subjected to fines was, to say the least, overwhelming. But the returns for them were totally inadequate. On independence, the power was transferred to the All India Muslim League led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in Pakistan, and the Indian National Congress led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, ably assisted by Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai J. Patel in residual India. The Sikhs, who constituted the third party with whom the British negotiated for transfer of power, drew blank except for certain paper, not real, safeguards. And for their achievements, the Muslim League did not suffer a single man going to gaol, much less to transportation for life or gallows; while the Congress under Gandhi led three sporadic movements, by fits and starts - the Non-Cooperation Movement 1920-22, the Civil-Disobedience Movement 1930-32, and the Quit India Movement, 1942. Gandhi did not represent the sum total of Indian nationalism, nor was the Congress analogous to the independence movement. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan aptly described the colourful ceremony, in what later came to be known as Ashok Hall of Rashtrapati Bhavan, in Delhi, on the night of August 14-15, 1947, as a windfall which no doubt it was both for the Muslim League in Pakistan and the Congress in India. The Sikh discomfiture was due both to the inadequacy of Sikh leadership which proved no match to Gandhi and Jinnah to which we shall turn later, and the nature of Indian nationalism personified by Gandhi. The sense of Hindu nationalism, arose amidst the sense of2defeat at the hands of the Muslims and went on swelling in volume during the entire Muslim rule. “In the sphere of emotions and ideas no Hindu was expected to give the allegiance of his heart to the Muslims, and no Hindu did”3 His external servility went hand in hand with the emotional disaffection, beyond the conqueror’s military or political power.4 The Hindu nationalism spurted forth on the decline of Muslim power in the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries. The Maratha concept of ‘Hindu-pad padshahi’ - the imperial status of Hindus - aptly summed up the pan-Hindu aspirations.5 As against that, Islamic revivalism, now that Muslim power was on the decline, re- emphasised the community’s links with the Ummah and attributed the fall to its delinking from the mainstream. Amidst these corresponding and retrogressive mobilisations, the rise of liberal nationalism seeking separation of religious consciousness s from social mores was retarded, if not stillborn, and found limited acceptance. This paved the way for the rise of religious nationalism - Hindu nationalism(s), Muslim nationalism and a re-emphasis of Sikh nationalism. The Hindu nationalism articulated by the Shivaji and Gahesh festivals in Maharashtra by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee’s novel Anand Math in Bengal, and Swami Dayanand’s Arya Samaj in the Punjab were disparate in character; the partition of Bengal provided an over-arching umbrella, with Anand Math6 and one of its song Bands Matram1, which eventually was accepted as one of the two Indian national anthems, getting primacy in providing the ideological basis. The inspiration in all cases was hostility to the Muslims: in addition in Punjab it was also to the Sikhs. The fusion or consummation of various brands of local Hindu nationalisms was not complete till the assumption of leadership by M.K. Gandhi who emerged as a Hindu holy man, a typical Sadhu or saint under a political cloak. Gandhi certainly was one time inheritor of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee’s mantle of Hindu nationalism. Since Gandhian brand of Hindu nationalism was camouflagged as secular nationalism it would be of interest to ascertain, what is secularism and wherein the Gandhian brand fitted therein. The Europeans, particularly the French leaders of thought, emphasised that to carve out a secular society and integrate different classes and communities into a modern national entity, it was essential that the religious consciousness and values be purged altogether from popular consciousness and social concerns. The societal set-up was to be integrated on the basis of traditional social values. There was successful revolt against priestly domination. It was rather unfortunate that no segment of Indian national movement was willing to concede that traditional values in India had the potentiality to integrate the Indian society which continued to be propelled by “the tremendous strength of religious consciousness among the popular classes.”8 Hindu social system struck at the roots of individual and national identity. Gandhi, on assumption of Indian leadership following Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Bills, sought “to sharpen as well as widen the moral sensibility of Hindu society” and used religious imagery like Swaraj, Ram Rajya and Dharma Rajya, as also, “symbols, myths and images which had been ingrained in popular psyche over the centuries, by the folk saints of India” for nationhood and self-determination.9 The non-violent non-cooperation movement launched in 1920 was principally designed to canalise the Muslim discontent over the harsh terms imposed by the allies on Turkey at the Peace Treaty of Sevres in 1920 leading to the abolition of Khilafat, an extraterritorial issue; to it were also tagged to set aright the Punjab wrongs, and attaining Swaraj in one year. To his credit, it must be stated that Gandhi so hypnotised the people that no one raised a finger about his utterly fantastic and dubious proposition of Swaraj in one year. And, Gandhi rationalised the Hindu support to the Muslims by saying that he wanted to save the cow from the knives of Muslims and also establish Swarajya or Ram Rajya, Dharam Rajya! If the British by granting separate electorate to the Muslims and the Sikhs had taken religion into politics, Gandhi was now taking politics into religion. What was the impact on the people? It was not that M.A. Jinnah and K.M. Munshi, who were in the thick of the movement and later poles apart, realised the gravity of Gandhi’s pandering to the gallery which could have a deleterious effect; even people like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan who had not so far come into contact with Gandhi felt the pinch of his mixing religion with politics and playing to the Hindu gallery.10 A Brahmin early in 1921 told Nirad C. Chaudhuri in exultation and raucous fanaticism that “He’s come to re-establish Hinduism.” Significantly, Gandhi while in Yerwada Jail in 1923 said, “We must learn to seal the image of Rama and Krishna on every yarn of the thread spun out of the spinning wheel.”11 And, this was the spirit in which people took Gandhi. Whether intended or not, his mass-movement gave expression to atavistic aspirations and prejudices of both the masses and the intelligentsia, and it was “the atavistic nationalism of the Hindus” that triumphed in the end.12 A remarkable feature of his method, deductible from the non-cooperation movement of 1920-22, was his assumption of dictatorial, powers, sidelining other stalwarts in the Congress including C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and others. He also forged a small group, the Working Committee, bypassing the unwieldy Subjects Committee. From mid-1923, he started signing himself “Bapu” to his co-workers in Congress reflecting his intentions and resolve to emerge as an absolutist and father figure in the Congress. Following Hindu-Muslim riots in 1923, after his calling off Satyagraha without achieving any of his three objectives, and incidentally leaving the Khilaftists in the lurch without any alternative, he turned his back on Hindu-Muslim unity. He became a partisan of Hindu communal nationalism of Hindu Mahasabha, galvanised by Lala Lajpat Rai, with the assistance of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, M.R. Jayakar, N.C. Kelkar, Purushottamdas Thakurdas, B.S. Moonje, Taraknath Das and V.S. Srinivasan.13 Persuaded privately by Lajpat Rai, Gandhi visited Punjab, December 4-10, 1924, to meet the people affected by communal riots, especially those in Kohat (NWFP). He was a guest of Lala Lajpat Rai at Lahore where he met a cross section of Hindu and Muslim leaders. It was this visit to Punjab which brought about a metamorphosis, if it can be called that, in Gandhi’s attitude towards Hindu-Muslim problem. Lajpat Rai, especially since 1923, was a changed man out “to forge greater unity and solidarity among all sections of the Hindu community and to unite them more closely as parts of one organic whole.” He precisely advised the Hindus that “You must begin to take care of your interests as a community first and then as a nation and some times both simultaneously.”14 The pan-Hindu leaders under the aegis of Arya Samaj, especially Swami Shraddhanand reactivated Sangathan and Shuddhi movements. This made the Muslims to counter it with Tanzim and Tabligh movements. Gandhi gave a clean chit to Lala Lajpat Rai who in his words was “frank as a child” and blessed Swami Shraddhanand’s move at Suddhi or reconversion of Muslims but stipulated that there should be no attack on the Qoran. He also pleaded with the Sanatanist Hindus to stop critical writings on the Arya Samaj, though he was greatly disappointed at the contents of Satyarth Prakash.15 Gandhi had a high regard for Arya Samajists despite their “narrow outlook and a pugnacious habit” because “wherever we found Arya Samajists, there is life and energy.” He vouchsafed that “Swami Shraddhanand believes in Hindu-Muslim unity”, overlooking the fact that Shraddhanand wanted unity with the Muslims, the way a man wants unity with bread! Gandhi could not rise above his narrow sectarianism to see that Shuddhi and freedom struggle could not be carried on simultaneously by the same forces without causing a national disruption. It was not for nothing that M.A. Jinnah shortly afterwards said, that “You cannot get away from being a Hindu, if you are a Hindu.”16 Jawaharlal Nehru who later emerged as Gandhi’s heir-apparent, making an assessment of non-cooperation movement over a decade later, perceptibly observed that “the general Muslim outlook was. . . one of Muslim nationalism or Muslim internationalism, and not of true nationalism”. Similarly, “the Hindu idea of nationalism was definitely one of Hindu nationalism” though it was difficult “to draw a sharp line between Hindu nationalism and true nationalism. . . as India is the only home of the Hindus and they form a majority there. It was thus easier for the Hindus to appear as full blooded nationalists than for the Muslims, although each stood for his own particular brand of nationalism.”17 In short, in the words of Nirad C. Chaudhuri, “There is no true national resurgence in India because there are no true nationals.”18 Again, “The really strong passion which fed Indian nationalism was the Hindu xenophobia, which was created by the Hindu way of life and shaped their attitude to all who are not Hindus.”19 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in the unexpurgated edition of his India Wins Freedom in a similar vein admits that the Congress was predominantly a Hindu body, national only in name, working to secure power for the Hindus and did not live up to its secular character. He pensively recounts unbecoming moves, out of communal considerations, by Sardar Patel and Dr. Rajendra Prasad ousting K.F. Nariman in Bombay and Dr. Syed Mahmud in Bihar from the leadership of the Congress Provincial Assembly Parties in 1937, to draw home the point of Congress, in practical parlance, not coming out successfully in its test as a truly secular and national organisation.20 Also, for the same considerations, how Gandhi had built up Dr. Rajendra Prasad in Bihar.21 Even after independence. Congress’s commitment to secularism was skin deep. The fact that Maulana Azad was President of the Congress from 1940 to 1946 and a leading member of the Cabinet in post-independence period adds poignancy to his views as to the character of the Congress that emerged in its final phase. He had the moral courage to record his views, though he chose to suppress them for 30 years after his death, not to embarrass his contemporaries, and expose their Hindu proclivities not withstanding their facile secular assertions to the contrary. In the process, he also upheld the Muslim League charge of his being a ‘show boy’ of Hindu Congress. One, however, wishes that the Sikh show boys, rather mercenaries, in the Congress pick up the moral courage to record their candid views. In post-independent India, it has been fashionable for some people to speak of a third kind of nationalism, radical nationalism, represented by Jawaharlal Nehru.22 But that remained only a figment of people’s imagination. Jawaharlal was not an independent entity, and remained under the shadow at first of his father, and later of M.K. Gandhi, with its aftereffects remaining for another decade after Gandhi’s death in 1948. Those who contend that Jawaharlal was radical or more secular in character should ponder over the fact that it was the Cabinet meeting presided over by him shortly after independence which took the decision to reconstruct Somnath Temple at government expense23. He played communal politics setting one section of society against the other, for Nehru admittedly was a racialist Brahmin. A couple of side effects of assumption of leadership of the national movement by Gandhi may be recounted. He steered the national movement away from revolution by neatly putting forth that half of India was too weak to participate in violence and the other half unwilling to do so. He also warded off the interaction of democratisation of national politics with socialisation of means of production; his doctrine of trusteeship of wealth was, for its own reasons, acceptable to landed and industrial magnates who underwrote Gandhi and at his instance, gave regular doles to maintain various Congress leaders and their families working under his stewardship. Similarly, Gandhi was not inaccessible to the British, for he was not against British imperialism as such. Nirad Chaudhuri opines that “All Hindu are traditionally imperialists, and they condemned imperialism only so far as British imperialism made them subject to an empire instead of its masters”, that “the strongest political passion of ancient Hindu was directed towards conquest and domination” and this “conditions the attitude of the present Hindu ruling class.”24 Significantly, Gandhi did not condemn British imperialism in South Africa. He not only sided with the British during the Boar war, but also during his over two decades of stay in South Africa did not utter a single word or write a single line for the sufferings of the black people. To him, Black Africa simply did not exist. He only protested against humiliations perpetrated on his own people. The discernible British administrators, aware of Gandhi’s support to the British during the Boar War, serving as a recruiting sergeant during the First World War, (when Home Rule Movement was at its peak) for which he was awarded Kaisar-i-Hind Medal, and his propensity to contain revolutionary terrorism and otherwise localise the impact of various movements, lionised Gandhi and never posed a serious challenge to his prestige and leadership in India. They rather helped to build him up. Gandhi’s leadership of the national movement permitted the British to canalise it to the channels they wanted it to progress, and the end-results were not disappointing to them. We shall revert later to the tactical nature of Gandhi’s concept of non-violence in practice and see how he graduated into connivance and later approval of violence, though for obvious reasons he did not admit it. He came to practise hypocrisy on a vast scale at the national level. We have already taken note of his support to the British during the Boar war, and his serving as recruiting sergeant during the First World War. In the previous chapter, we noticed how Gandhi felt ill at ease at his analysis of the assertion of Sikh national identity during the Akali movement and sought to asphyxiate it by at first suggesting arbitration between the forces of good and evil which he knew were outside the purview of arbitration, and then making a plea for postponement of the Gurdwara reform movement till the Indian independence when he hoped to deal with them in his own way, and from a position of strength. Since the Akalis did not fall prey to his chicanery, he openly came out against the Sikh aspirations during the Jaito agitation - and sought to cause them harm by casting aspersions on the non-violent character of the Akali movement, to the glee of British administrators. Despite the enactment of Gurdwara reform legislation, Gandhi was not reconciled to their emergence as an independent entity; he was out to subvert the Sikh position. So far as the Sikhs were concerned, Gandhi constituted a totally hostile force and a dangerous threat. This was compounded by the religio-moral metaphysics in which he clouded his pronouncements, and the deference which the Sikh leaders thoughtlessly began to show him. By the time of enactment of the Gurdwara Act of 1925, India was still passing through the phase of communal conflict. This led to the murder of Swami Shraddhanand in Delhi in 1926, which caused its downward course. Gandhi during the period had receded from the national scene and was keeping a low profile. Early in 1927, amidst the receding curve of Hindu-Muslim riots, Gandhi fired his next salvo against the Sikh assertion of independent entity. He gave expression to his atavistic inner cravings when, without any provocation, he stated at Gaya on January 15, 1927, that “there were only three religions in the world, namely Christianity, Islam and Hinduism.” He would regard Buddhism and Sikhism as branches of Hinduism.25 Gandhi, in the process, showed that he had not advanced from his village days! Since Buddhism, in Gandhi’s views, was a branch of Hinduism, so would be Shintoism and by deduction Confucianism. What about Judaism? If it was not a part of Islam or Christianity, would Gandhi claim it to form a part of Hinduism? Would Gandhi claim Qadianis or Ahmadiyas, who have universally been disclaimed by the Muslims world, to form part of Hinduism? Was Gandhi’s Hinduism broad enough to contain disparate non- conforming elements all over the world? Or, was it expressive of Hindu imperialism, or chauvinism? Whatever it was, there was no doubt about Gandhi’s intolerance of Sikhism. Badly split following the enactment of Gurdwara legislation in 1925, the Sikhs did not take stock of the situation - the mistakes they committed during the course of the movement, the forces arraigned against them and the course they should follow in their national self-interest. The divisions created in their ranks, at first by Gandhi, and, later by Hailey only tended to atomise them. The position of the Sikhs was peculiar in the Punjab. The Muslims, a majority in the Punjab, were overall minority in India. The position of Hindus was the reverse, and both of them suffered from the majority-minority or minority-majority syndrome. The Sikhs were a minority in the Punjab and had an infinitesimal overall position. The Punjab to them was not only their homeland but also their holy land. Because of their demographic position, they sometime took supra-national position on national issues which was temerarious to the two major communities. Two major issues which confronted the Sikhs in the second half of 1920s were, the quantum and mode of representation in the provincial and central assemblies and inclusion of Sikh colour in the national flag. On both these issues, they drew a blank. It was during this period that Gandhi perfected the strategy of offering the Sikhs empty promises together with putting off the issues by referral to committees and commissions. That the Sikhs fell into the snare laid for them was their misfortune and showed lack of application. As against that, the Muslims had a better sense of history and the interplay of the forces at work. For instance, the Muslims of all shades of opinion who met Gandhi in December 1924 at Lahore were of ‘one mind’ as regards their political demands. Broadly, they were unanimously against the Muslims being reduced to a minority or even equality with other communities in representation in Muslim majority provinces.26 This impinged on the Sikh position in the Punjab. The Muslims were willing to accept population as the basis of representation provided the same principle was made applicable to representation in local bodies, services and central legislature too. From the All Parties Conferences held in Delhi in January 1925, March 1927 and February 1928, it was clear that the Muslims were determined to secure an effective guarantee of protection of their vital interests, vis. retention of their majority in Bengal and the Punjab, whether by separate electorate or by joint electorate with representation on population basis, apart from the separation of Sind from Bombay, thereby creating another Muslim majority province. Following the lead of Maulana Hasrat Mohani, a prominent Muslim League leader for the formation of Hindu and Muslim majority provinces under a Federal government, Lala Lajpat Rai in November-December 1924, in a series of articles in the Tribune had advocated splitting the Punjab with Ravi as the boundary into East and West Punjab provinces apart from the formation of East Bengal and Sind provinces to solve the communal tangle.27 That provided a rational solution to both the Hindu and Muslim leaders. But the Hindu leaders of the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha failed to rise to the occasion and come out with radical solutions to the intractable problems. The goings on at All Parties Conferences should have come as an eye opener to the Sikhs to unite on one platform and chart out an independent course. It was obvious that the hands of the Hindus and the Muslims were tied by the Lucknow Pact of 1916 wherein the Sikhs did not figure at all. And, even now, both the Hindus and the Muslims were hostile to the Sikh claims. The Sikhs should naturally have looked to the British for fulfillment of their aspirations. The appointment of the Simon Commission in November 1927 to review the working of reforms came at an odd time, for the Hindus and the Muslims as two communities were still involved in communal fracas. The boycott of the Commission by the Congress was quite understandable. The Akalis of both the groups followed suit as mere camp followers, as against the Muslim League which did not, keeping in view their national self-interests. The Sikhs had their dose of disappointment in the Nehru Committee Report. The Sikhs, moved by national impulse and to pave the way for creation of integrated nationalism, advocated complete abolition of separate communal representation. But the Committee headed by Moti Lal Nehru never examined the Sikh problem in its proper perspective. It was seized of the Hindu- Muslim problem from all-India perspective on the basis of give and take between the two major communities. For Punjab, it recommended complete abolition of communal representation, whereas the Sikh position was for abolition of communal representation, not in isolation, but throughout the country as a process of nation-building. Mangal Singh, Sikh representative on the committee, came in for severe criticism. The Akalis, as also the Central Sikh League, rejected the Nehru Report. Later, in December 1928, they walked out of the All Parties Conference at Calcutta, after the amendment moved by Mehtab Singh of the Central Sikh League that ‘communalism should not be made the basis of the future policy of India in any shape or form’ was ruled out by Dr. M. A. Ansari, President of the Conference. Harnam Singh, however, asserted that Nehru Report’s division of the country into Hindu-India and Muslim-India was not acceptable to the Sikhs.28 Above all, Kharak Singh had basic objections to Nehru Committee’s asking for Dominion Status instead of Complete Independence which he favoured. After the Sikh walkout, a resolution that the Sikhs be given the same concessions as were accorded to the Muslims and the non-Muslims in other provinces was expected to be carried by a considerable majority but for the unexpected opposition of Moti Lal Nehru. He went back on his earlier assurance and swung the pendulum the other way.29 Moti Lal Nehru, however, made a cryptic statement that “he wished he could blow the Punjab out of the map of India.”30 What he meant was not that he wanted to blast Hindus and Muslims out of Punjab, but the Sikhs who constituted an inconvenient third party that did not fit into the all India pattern!31 Gandhi now entered the stage with a few palliative words.” Personally, I think we have not done full justice to the Sikhs”, he said, and wanted to ward off the threat, held out by Baba Kharak Singh, of the Sikhs boycotting the next Congress session in Lahore in December 1929.32 The formation of the Sikh National Party by Congressite Sikhs was quite understandable, but not the decision of Master Tara Singh for fighting for Sikh rights from within the Congress. That showed he had little perception of the forces at work in the Congress. Since the Muslim League in Calcutta in 1928 had broken with the Congress, all the efforts of Gandhi during 1929 were concentrated on winning over the Sikhs without yielding on the substance. Speaking at a Sikh meeting in Karachi in February 1929, he advised the Sikhs to be patient and not lose faith in the Congress.33 In October 1929, he sent a message through Sardul Singh Caveesar to the Central Sikh League’s Annual Conference at Lyallpur assuring that the question of Sikh representation was not closed but open for discussion and adjustment.34 Master Tara Singh in his Presidential Address made a misplaced plea for “standing with the Congress.” Precisely, he said, “I would not mind if you instead of standing with Congress, boycott it and stand in front of it in the fight for freedom. But if you boycott the Congress and stand in the back lines, it will be a matter of shame for our community. Those who are for boycotting the Congress must devise some positive fighting programme, and I am sure all the people here will be with them. . . If we go on working with the Congress as before, our attitude may be misunderstood and we may not be considered earnest in our demands. This is also dangerous and we have to chalk out a via media. It is not difficult to chart a safe course if you gentlemen consider unity to be the chief need of the time.”35 Tara Singh was for fighting against the British imperialism and offering support to the Congress without a realistic appraisal either of the political forces at work including duplicity of the Congress leadership or the political and social interests of the Sikhs. He was opposed by Amar Singh of Sher-e-Punjab who wanted boycott of the Congress unless it offered satisfaction on issues agitating the Sikhs. The session had to be adjourned sine die amidst rowdy scenes. Baba Kharak Singh summed up “the voice of the Sikhs” for boycott of the forthcoming Congress session.36 He, as President of the SGPC, however, gave permission to Tara Singh, his vice President, to attend the Congress session in his personal capacity, and not as a representative of the Sikh community. Now that the offer of accepting the Dominion Status was lapsing by end of the year, and the Congress was moving towards adopting a resolution asking for ‘Purna Swaraj’ or Complete Independence - which however was betrayed in 1947 - the Congress leaders made empty gestures to win over the Sikhs. An informal conference was held on December 27, 1929, on the eve of the Congress session by the Sikh leaders, Kharak Singh, Mehtab Singh, Tara Singh and Amar Singh with Gandhi, M. L. Nehru, Dr. M. A. Ansari, Dr. Satya Pal and Sardul Singh Caveeshar. Gandhi brought to the notice of the Sikh leaders the Congress Working Committees’s resolution withdrawing the offer of Dominion Status. With that, he contended, the Nehru Committee Report would automatically lapse and no review was called for.37 The Sikhs were made to believe that the Congress session would adopt a resolution extending them an assurance that in future no constitution would be acceptable to the Congress that was not acceptable to them. This resulted in the adoption of a Resolution at the Lahore Session which said that “this Congress assures the Sikhs, the Muslims and other minorities, that no solution thereof (of the communal question) in any future Constitution will be acceptable to the Congress that does not give full satisfaction to the parties concerned.” This omnibus type resolution was not worth the paper written on. The specific assurances extended to the Sikh leaders verbally were not translated into writing. Gandhi conceded, “It was adopted for the sake of Sikhs”, but rationalised the omnibus type resolution with a view to “placate all communities” and avoid “coercion of minorities”.38 Sikh leaders like Master Tara Singh who lacked legal training or an analytical mind, were taken in. Precisely, Tara Singh stated, “Congress leaders have risen to the occasion and acted like statesmen. Mahatma Gandhi is to be congratulated, for it is he, who is mainly responsible for this resolution. I am sure that the Congress will gather great strength and a wave of enthusiasm will sweep the Sikhs.”39 Jawaharlal Nehru, two decades later, attributed the beginning of “extreme poverty of Sikh leadership in thought and action” to this period when they, led by Tara Singh, started blindly trusting the Congress leaders.39a Tara Singh rued in post independence period his woolly impressions of Gandhi and his cohorts, gained during the freedom struggle. As against that, the All India Sikh Conference, held simultaneously with the Congress session at Lahore, with Baba Kharak Singh as President, authorised Kharak Singh to constitute a committee of not more than seven to continue negotiations with the Congress and offer it cooperation, if satisfied. Kharak Singh was not in favour of offering cooperation to the Congress in its programme of Civil Disobedience Movement unless the Sikhs were given ironclad guarantees. He had another specific grievance over non-inclusion of Sikh colour in the national flag despite Gandhi’s assurance to the contrary. The Simon Commission expressed a lot of sympathy for the Sikhs but offered them nothing concrete in the absence of a mutual agreement. The Sikh representation remained almost the same as before. Because of the unconditional cooperation offered by Shiromani Akali Dal to the Congress, which has aptly been termed as ‘blind’,40 under the leadership of Master Tara Singh, the Sikhs participated in strength on the independence day celebrations on January 26, 1930, and later in the Civil Disobedience Movement. Tara Singh was taken on the ‘War Council’ setup for the purpose by the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee. As against that, Baba Kharak Singh refused to serve on the Council unless the Sikh colour was included in the national flag.41 The Akalis offered 5,000 volunteers who were to join the struggle under their own flag. After the arrest of Dr. Kitchlu, Master Tara Singh emerged as the ‘Dictator’ to lead the Civil Disobedience Movement. However, following the Akali volunteers proceeding to Peshawar to help the Pathan followers of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who had been fired upon in Kissa Khwani Bazar, Tara Singh was arrested in Lahore and incarcerated in Gujrat jail. While still in jail, he later replaced Kharak Singh as President of the SGPC and was congratulated profusely by Congress leaders despite his mixing religion with politics. Tara Singh, however, compromised the Presidentship of the SGPC by continuing as an AICC Member. The Akali volunteers were not permitted to proceed beyond Dina in Jhelum, where they were lathi charged till every one of them became unconscious.42 The incident of firing on Gurdwara Sis Ganj, Delhi, on May 6, 1930, by the police in retaliation to Congress workers entering the Gurdwara and throwing brickbats on the police, when bullets hit Guru Granth Sahib, caused widespread resentment among the Sikhs. According to Montmorency, Punjab Governor, this brought a lot of extremist Sikhs into the movement. The SGPC launched a campaign for boycott and picketing of foreign cloth shops in protest against this firing. Though Kharak Singh sought to maintain a distinct identity of the Sis Ganj agitation, it certainly gave strength to the Civil Disobedience Movement.43 The Sikh contribution to Civil Disobedience Movement was the largest proportionately, as testified by Duni Chand, a Congress leader from the Punjab. According to Tara Singh, out of 7,000 volutneers-convicted in Punjab, 3,000 were Sikhs. But this was not sufficient to placate the Congress warlords to shed their policy of duplicity towards them. Baba Kharak Singh was brought on a stretcher to the SGPC meeting on August 31, 1930. He threatened to resign unless the Shiromani Akali Dal refused to fight under the Congress flag which did not include the Sikh colour. He did not want the Sikhs to be taken for granted. The Punjab Provincial Congress Committee (PPCC) recommended incorporation of the Sikh colour in the national flag. But Jawaharlal Nehru, Congress President, was not amused and termed the PPCC decision as hasty and untimely. Following the Gandhi-Irwin pact and his subsequent release, Gandhi visited Gurdwara Sis Ganj, Delhi, on February 26, 1931, to offer his sympathies to the Sikhs at the firing incident of May 6 last, which he said he had studied with painful interest. Visibly moved at the narration of police highhandedness and sacrilege of the Gurdwara, Gandhi made an important announcemnt44 which was later quoted by the militants after the Operation Bluestar as an authority to take up arms against the government. Gandhi was not unaware of the general feeling among the Sikhs of the fraudulent nature of Congress leadership and the policies they were pursuing towards them, and said, “Trath and non- violence have no room for fraud or falshood. . . . In physical warfare even chicanery and fraud have a place but non-violence precludes the use of all other weapons except that of truth and justice.” He went on to add, “I venture to suggest that the non-violence creed of the Congress is the surest guarantee of its good faith and our Sikh friends have no reason to fear betrayal at its hands. For the moment it did so, the Congress would not only seal its own doom but that of the country too. Moreover the Sikhs are a brave people, they will know how to safeguard their right by the exercise of arms if it should ever come to that.” Further that, “why can you have not faith? If the Congress should play false afterwards you can well settle surely with it, for you have the sword. . . I ask you to accept my word. . . let God be witness of the bond that binds me and the Congress with you.” So, here was Gandhi delivering a pledge on solemn oath in the name of Truth and God. He wrote voluminously about Truth, “but after reading all that no one could discover what exactly he meant by Truth.”45 And about God, Gandhi was no doubt a religious man so was Aurangzeb. Gandhi did not tell the Sikhs at the time that when they seek “to safeguard their right by the exercise of arms”, they shall be facing the armed might of the state, and in Jawaharlal Nehru’s words “superior arms will prevail”,46 to save it from the ‘doom’ of which he spoke. Anyhow, the deemed apostle of nonviolence, Gandhi’s authorisation to Sikhs to resort to arms to safeguard their interests was of dubious character. At Gurdwara Sis Ganj, Gandhi also said that “the flag controversy is being conducted mostly by those who had held aloof from the national movement.” He wanted the Sikhs to have faith in the Congress.47 The Congress flag as originally designed had white, green and red colours with spinning wheel, from top to bottom, representing Christianity, Islam and Hinduism. When the Sikhs asked for inclusion of kesari as their colour, Gandhi “tried to pacify them with false promises and lame excuses.”48 He first said that the matter would be considered by the All India Congress Committee which now, because of CD Movement was unable to meet. Later, on April 8, 1931, he stated that the national flag, his personal creation, had been before the country for ten years, and “a lot of sentiment has gathered around it”. He was aware that Sikhs were dissatisfied, and it was only to please them that he had agreed to have a committee about the flag.49 The Congress in August 1931 changed the national flag despite Gandhi’s sentiments, to consist of three colours, horizontally arranged as before, with saffron, white and green colours from top to bottom with the spinning wheel in dark blue in the centre of white band, “it being understood that colours have no communal significance”, but that “saffron represents courage and sacrifice, white peace and truth, and green shall represent faith and chivalry and the spinning wheel the hope of masses.”50 Jawaharlal Nehru in a letter to Maulana Azad gave a different interpretation with saffron representing Hindus, white Christians and green Islam, and he wanted him to convey the same to his Muslim friends. Gandhi did not deliberately spell out his real objection to the inclusion of a Sikh colour in the national flag as he did not consider Sikhism to be a separate religion, distinct from Hinduism. However, Congress during the flag controversy perfected the strategy of putting off the inconvenient matters about the Sikhs by constitution of committees, commissions, etc. Baba Kharak Singh was not satisfied with Gandhian chicanery and kept aloof from the Congress movement, paving the way for the ascendancy of Master Tara Singh in the Shiromani Akali Dal and the SGPC. The Sikhs - both the Akali Dais and the Central Sikhs League - did not participate in the first Round Table Conference (RTC) following the Congress lead. They did not nominate any one to represent them at the second R.T.C. Master Tara Singh handed over the charter of 17 Sikh demands to M. K. Gandhi, nominated as sole representative of the Congress, and wanted him to represent the Sikhs too!51 Such was the blind faith of the Sikhs in Gandhi and the Congress! Mention may be made of one of the demands for redistribution of boundaries of the Punjab transferring predominantly Muslim districts to NWFP to produce a communal balance, so that no one community was in a position to dominate. Ujjal Singh and Sampuran Singh who had attended the first and second RTCs were sponsored by the government. One of Gandhi’ s pronouncements at the second RTC should have received due attention of the Sikh leaders, but it did not. Speaking on the proposal to grant separate electorate to Depressed Classes, or Untouchables, which had come up in the form of a Minorities Pact put forth by the Muslims, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and the untouchables to the British Prime Minister, Gandhi, who was also entrusted by the Sikhs to represent them, said, “We do not want on our register and on our census untouchables classified as a separate class. Sikhs may remain as such in perpetuity, so may Mohamedans, so may Europeans. . . I don’t mind untouchables if they so desire, being converted to Islam or Christianity. I should tolerate that, but I cannot possibly tolerate what is in store for Hinduism if there are two divisions set forth in villages.”52 Gandhi deliberately and mischievously excluded the option of conversion of Depressed Classes to Sikhism, which was within the framework of the Indian culture, as against Islam and Christianity representing Semitic cultures. The Sikh leaders back home did not read, much less analyse, what Gandhi said at the RTC. Following the failure of the second RTC, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald issued on August 16, 1932, the Communal Award. It came as a rude shock to the Sikhs as also to Gandhi, on different counts. The Sikh disaffection arose out of the statutory majority of over 51 per cent given to the Muslims in the Punjab, whereas the Sikh representation, as hitherto, was around 19 per cent. This led to a furore among the Sikhs against the Communal Award which was bracketed with the Nehru Committee and the Simon Commission Reports. It was decried both in the press and from platform. The establishment of a new Khalsa Darbar representing all sections of the Sikhs, and raising of 100,000 strong Akali Shahidi Dal to conduct the agitation, were steps in the right direction. It emphasised upon them the necessity to find a common umbrella organisation with common minimum programme to protect the Sikh interests. But the leadership failed to rise to the occasion. It only caused both Ujjal Singh and Sampuran Singh to resign from the RTC. The Hindus, only to confront the Muslims and reduce them to a minority in Punjab, sought the Sikh support. Otherwise, they had little sympathy for the Sikh cause. Gandhi and Congress did not utter a word at the Sikh predicament. At the All Party Unity Conference at Allahabad on November 3, 1932, the Sikhs agreed to accept the statutory Muslim majority in the Punjab with a joint electorate. In return, the Sikhs were promised a seat in the provincial cabinet and 4.5 percent seats in, the central legislature. The deliberations of the Unity Conference were torpedoed by the declaration of Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State, on December 24, 1932, granting Muslims 33.5 percent representation in the central legislature. He also agreed in principle to the separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency. Since no Sikh was willing to attend the third RTC, the Government sponsored Tara Singh of Moga, a former member of Punjab Assembly, to represent the Sikhs. No changes, however, were made in the Award. The Sikhs were left high and dry both by the British government as also the Congress in which they had reposed their confidence. Also, it was obvious that the repeated Congress assurances to the Sikhs to duly protect their interests in any future constitutional settlement with a view to secure their participation in the Congress movement, were phoney in character. So was also the case with Gandhi’s reiteration to the Khalsa Darbar deputation which called on him at Lahore on July 15, 1934, that “no constitution would be acceptable to the Congress which did not satisfy the Sikhs. “He added, “Similarly, the Congress would not reject what the Mussalmans wanted, nor could it accept what Hindus or Sikhs reject.” Gandhi also spoke of numerous complaints against the Sikhs for tempting Harijans to reject Hinduism and become Sikhs, which, he said, was reprehensible.53 By the time, Gandhi had emerged as the undisputed leader of the caste-Hindus, which was an indirect upshot of his fast unto death over the issue of grant of separate electorate to the backward classes under the Communal Award. This fast was unnecessary and uncalled for. A day before, on September 20, 1932, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, leader of the Depressed Classes, or Untouchables, in the backdrop of mounting caste-Hindus mobilisation at all levels - village, town, city, all over India - to subject untouchables to largescale violence and bloodshed, had been coerced to agree to joint electorate of caste Hindus and Untouchables. The only safeguard conceded was that the latter would hold primary elections selecting candidates to be put up to joint electorate. Gandhi, none the less, went on fast and in the background of threatened mass scale violence forced Dr. Ambedkar, who had earlier described his projected fast as a ‘political stunt’, to hold face to face talks. Ambedkar was coerced to accept the spurious solace of warding off of caste-Hindu violence against the Untouchables.54 It rather got accentuated and is continuing till today. The small gains made by Dr. Ambedkar in securing primary election of candidates by separate Depressed Classess electorate was lost in the process of its incorporation in the Communal Award and later translation into the Government of India Act, 1935. Ambedkar’s objective was to ensure that elected Backward Class candidates voiced their true interests. This was not acceptable to Gandhi and was subverted. And, Gandhi later bluntly stated that he had never agreed to that.55 If Gandhi or Congress did not abide by their solemn commitments under the Poona Pact arrived at with untouchables, whom Gandhi termed as integral part of Hinduism,56 what hope could there be for minorities that Congress would honour the commitments and agreements it was making with them? A fact which stood out clearly was that Gandhi had forged the,” use of ‘fast unto death’ as a potent weapon of coercion, and violent one at that, in sharp contrast to his earlier doctrine of non- violence of 1920-22 era. Gandhi, by now, assumed a new position in Hinduism, and could afford to cease to be even a primary member of the Congress to retain its leadership. If Gandhi staked his life to prevent the assertion of their religious identity by the Depressed Classes apart from Hinduism, was he serious in permitting them the option of conversion to Islam or Christianity, the Semitic religions having a different social system? Gandhi knew that the depressed classes were so interwoven into 5 caste-Hindu socio-economic system that it would be difficult for them to accept Islam or Christianity, and not be uprooted from their social and cultural mores. By conversion to Sikhism they could remain within the broad Indian cultural framework and yet regain their dignity and self respect denied to them for centuries because of the sanctions of Hindu Shastras. At the second RTC, Gandhi had already closed that option for them. Dr. Ambedkar also knew that the uplift of depressed classes was not possible within the framework of Hinduism. He was pondering over the offers by the Muslims and the Christians for mass conversion of 5 million untouchables when the small Sikh community of Bombay, led by Gurdit Singh Sethi, offered him conversion to Sikhism.” At their instance, a delegation from the Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Nankana Sahib, and the SGPC, established contact with various sections of depressed classes. They also participated in the Untouchables Conference at Poona on January 10-11, 1936. The Nankana Sahib Committee established the Guru Nanak Prachar Trust on January 25, 1936. Considering the importance of the subject, the All Parties Sikh Conference, held under the Presidentship of Mehtab Singh on April 13, 1936, constituted an All India Sikh Mission under the presidentship of Master Tara Singh and convened the Gurmat Prachar Conference (conference for propagation of Sikh faith) which was also attended by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. He made public his intention in a round about manner to adopt Sikhism. As a result of these confabulations, the Sikhs set up a private press at Bombay for publication of Ambedkar’s paper Janta. They also established a Khalsa College in Bombay to impart higher education to backward classes.58 The Hindu leaders were; not unaware of Ambedkar’s confabulations with men” of various religions. The leaders of Hindu Mahasabha, Dr. B.S. Moonje and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya were not in favour of conversion of backward classes to Islam or Christianity, as by that they would go outside the purview of Indian culture; They, However, encouraged Dr. Ambedkar to go in for Sikhism. As a result of a series of discussions between the Sikhs, Dr. Ambedkar and R.B. Rajah apart from Dr. Moonje, Savarkar, Madan Mohan Malaviya and J.K. Birla, an outline of the proposed entry of Backward Classes into Sikhism was drawn up. It was as follows: “If Dr. Ambedkar were. to announce his decision that he and his followers are prepared to embrace Sikhism in preference to Islam and Christianity, and that he shall honestly and sincerely cooperate with the Hindus and the Sikhs in propagating their culture and in counteracting the Moslem movement for drawing the depressed classed into the Moslem fold, the Hindu Mahasabha will be prepared, in view of their having agreed to remain within the Hindu(read Indian) culture, to make an announcement that it will not object: 1. To the conversion of the Depressed Classes to Sikhism; 2. To the inclusion of the neo-Sikhs in the list of the Scheduled Castes; and 3. To the enjoyment by the depressed classes of the political rights of the Poona Pact by free competition between the Sikh and the neo-Sikh depressed classes as provided for under the Poona Pact.59 The time and venue of the proposed ceremony were to be announced shortly. Jugal Kishore Birla donated a sum of Rs. 25,000 to the Sikhs for the purpose. The proposal was brought to the notice of Gandhi in strict confidence. He was so upset that he was besides himself. He wrote to Dr. Moonje on July 31, that his proposal was subversive of the spirit of Yervada (Poona) Pact and wholly contrary to the untouchability movement.60 He wrote a long write-up in the Harijan on August 22, 1936, under the title ‘A Dangerous Proposal’, and brought into recirculation the term Harijan, children of God, for depressed classes; he said, he could not contemplate of their going out of the Hindu fold.61 In a letter dated September 7, 1936, to Jugal Kishore Birla, Gandhi wrote: “Today I will only say that to me Sikhism is a part of Hinduism. But the situation is different from the legal point of view. Dr. Ambedkar wants a change of religion. If becoming a Sikh amounts to conversion, then this kind of conversion on the part of Harijans is dangerous. If you can persuade the Sikhs to accept that Sikhism is a part of Hinduism and if you can make them give up the separate electorate, then I will have no objection to Harijans calling themselves Ramanujis or Sikhs.”62 Reverting to the same subject m the Harijan of September 19, 1936, he wrote, that “Dr. Ambedkar does not regard Sikhs as Hindus. He definitely wants a change of faith”. If Sikhs were Hindus that won’t matter. But “since Sikhs consider themselves to be a separate religion and have separate electorate, no one could be a party to the proposal put forth by Dr. Ambedkar and Moonje.”63 Master Tara Singh relying on a letter written to him by Gandhi a decade and a half earlier that, “I am Indian; I do not talk of this or that community”, sent Master Sujan Singh, General Secretary of All India Sikh Mission to Gandhi. Knowing the purport of the visit, Gandhi took out his watch and said he would give Sujan Singh five minutes. What passed between them, in the words of Sujan Singh, was as follows: SS: Do you have any objection to the untouchables becoming Sikhs. MKG: Are the Sikhs Hindus? SS: No. MKG: If the Sikhs are not Hindus, then what is the difference between a Muslim and a Sikh? When the untouchables are not to remain Hindus, why should they become Sikhs? Why should not they become Muslims? Master Sujan Singh then referred to Gandhi’s letter to Tara Singh and said, “You call yourself an Indian, why do you see a difference between Hindus and Sikhs? One may be a Sikh, a Hindu, or a Muslim, what is that to you? He will still remain an Indian. Whether Dr. Ambedkar becomes a Sikh or a Muslim what difference does that make to you?” MKG: (a bit irritated) Sardar Sahib, E have no more time. SS: You are a hypocrite.64 Really, Gandhi had brought hypocrisy on a vast scale in public life in India, and the Sikhs were found wanting in meeting that. Already, the Sikh leadership had not analysed Gandhi’s writings on the Sikhs, especially after the Nankana Sahib tragedy and the Jaito affair, nor his promotion of Hindu cause including Shuddhi vis a vis Muslims and his use of ‘fast unto death’ as a weapon of offence. Gandhi now went into a multipronged offensive. Firstly, he sought create disunity in the ranks of depressed classes and built up M.C. Rajah of Tamil Nadu against Dr. Ambedkar. Secondly, he wanted the “Sikhs to take to the Devnagri script in place of the Gurmukhi.” He went on to add that “There is no elegance about the (Gurmukhi) script; But I understand that it was specially invented like Sindhi to isolate the Sikhs from the other Hindus.”65 What an ignoramous he was! The degree of his intolerance may be judged from the fact that he singled out Gurmukhi script, and offered no corresponding advice to Gujratis, Oriyas, Bengalis much less on languages in South India to give up their scripts in favour of Devnagri. He sanctified the denial of their mother tongue after independence by a section of Punjabi Hindus. Lastly, he re-used the offensive weapon of ‘fast unto death’- this time to have untouchables classified as Hindus, a depressed and backward section, entitled to special facilities and concessions. The fast went on for three weeks. The British, knowing the utility to them of Gandhi, yielded, and, in consonance with the formulae chalked out by Caste Hindus, issued a proclamation saying that Untouchables were Hindus and would be entitled to special concessions only if they remained within the Hindu fold and not otherwise! Rightly, his services to Hinduism with its Varnashramdharma, inbuilt inequalities, were great. Mayawati of Bahujan Samaj party on the basis of her reading of Ambedkar papers, was not wrong when she in 1994 termed Gandhi as a great enemy of Dalits. Gandhi ensured that depressed classes remain depressed for all times to come. It has been contended by some that Dr. Ambedkar’s move to adopt Sikhism was political in character. Come what may, there was no doubt that Gandhi was moved by sectarian considerations and Sikh xenophobia. Meanwhile, before the Government of India Act, 1935, incorporating the Communal Award received Royal accent in August 1935,66 Sikh-Muslim undercurrent of hostility found expression in the form of fracas over Shahidganj Gurdwara. Some Muslims, despite earlier Court Judgements, contended that it was a mosque and should be handed over to them. The Hindu Congress leaders saw in it the potential to keep the Sikhs off balance and adopted a neutral stance, much to the chagrin of the Sikh leadership. Master Tara Singh gave vent to his feelings of disgust when he said that the Congress would keep aloof even if Muslims attacked the Golden Temple.67 On the eve of January 1937 elections, the Sikhs were in a pathetic situation. Their objective, especially since 1928, was clear: to ward off Muslim or Hindu domination. If the Muslims posed a threat to their political aspirations, the Hindus in addition threatened their cultural identity as well. It was imperative for them to assert their genuinely independent entity and be the fourth arm to turn the Hindu-Muslim-British triangle into a quadrangular relationship, and in the process bargain with the Muslims and the British to safeguard their interests. But the vocal sections of the Sikhs, led by Master Tara Singh, which in the early 1930s asserted its leadership, as far as control over the SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal were concerned, had been tied to the apron strings of the Congress, undermining the Sikh credibility. The Central Akali Dal of Giani Sher Singh/Baba Kharak Singh had by the 1930s no independent political programme and concentrated only on anti-Tara Singh activity.68 If it was the clash of personalities that tore asunder the two Akali Dais, Master Tara Singh had fundamental objections to cooperating with the Chief Khalsa Diwan elements whom he considered loyalists, though they had community of outlook so far as basic Sikh issues were concerned. Tara Singh in 1936 committed a series of mistakes. The formation of Khalsa National Party (KNP) by the Chief Khalsa Diwan under the leadership of Sir Sunder Singh Majithia and Sir Jogendra Singh, and the rejection of their offer, of a Unity Board to select candidates for all Sikh seats, by the Akalis, was quite understandable in view of Tara Singh’s ideological commitments. But not the decision of the Akalis to fight the elections jointly with the Congress which practically did not exist in Punjab, except for certain pockets of reactionary urban Hindus, a legacy of the days of. Lala Lajpat Rai. The initial Akali opposition to the Congress caused a split in Akali ranks with Mangal Singh resigning from the Presidentship of the Khalsa Darbar, and Harcharan Singh Bajwa from the General Secretaryship of the Khalsa Youth League.69 The Congress formed a separate Congress Sikh Party in August 1936 with Sarmukh Singh Jhabal as President to develop mass contacts and erode the Akali base. It was joined by the Kirtis, the former communists and Sikhs socialists.70 Giani Sher Singh on the other hand joined hands with the Khalsa National Party. In view of this polarisation of forces, the Akalis fell into the Congress trap and decided to cooperate wholeheartedly with them ignoring in the process Gandhi’s Sikh xenophobia over backward classes joining the Sikh faith. Not only that, Shiromani Akali Dal unabashedly agreed to atomise its regional character by agreeing that Akali candidates, returned to the legislature, would form part of the Congress Legislative Party and be amenable to its discipline.71 The 1937 elections were contested by the Congress (12 seats), Akalis (15 seats), and socialists (one seat) combine vis a vis the Khalsa National Party (19 seats), and the Unionists (2 seats) supported by the Central Akali Dal of Sher Singh. None of the combinations contested all the seats. The Khalsa National Party won 14 seats, the Akalis 10, the Congress, the socialists (who later joined the Congress) 1 each and independents 3. The pattern of voting (KNP 29.9%, Akalis 26.16%, Congress 16%, socialists 1.46%, Unionists 2.02% and Independents garnering 21.85%) showed that Sikh voters were confused at the alignment of forces. 72 The Akalis met in April 1937 to revitalise the party when it was decided to permit members of the Akali Working Committee to be on the Executive Committee of the SGPC. The Akalis regarded the Congress as the vanguard of freedom struggle and decided to extend it support. By June, the Akalis asked the Sikhs to join the Congress in strength.73 This was in sharp contrast to the Muslim League resistance to the Congress attempt to muck it up in U.P. in return for seats in the provincial government. The League drew pragmatic conclusions from the episode whereas the Akalis continued to function with a single track mind. As against the Congress attitude to the formation of government in U.P., the Unionists who won an overall majority in the Punjab legislature adopted a different attitude. They offered seats in the Cabinet to the Khalsa National Party, apart from the National Progressive Party, in a genuine coalition government. As a result, Sunder Singh Majithia of KNP and Sir Manohar Lal of NPP were taken as members of the government formed by Sir Sikander Hayat Khan on April 1, 1937. With the conclusion of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact on October 15, 1937,74 turning the Unionist Muslims into the Muslim Leaguers,75 the Unionists committed the same blunder that the Akalis had committed earlier by making Akali legislators to accept Congress discipline. The atomisation of regional parties was almost complete in the Punjab. Sir Sikander’s declaration that “adherence to the Muslim League would not effect the position and policy of the Unionist Party in Punjab” was, however, found acceptable to the Khalsa National Party. The Unionists followed an even handed policy in communal conflict over the slaughter of Cows, jhatka and halal, and music before the mosque questions which marred the early years of Sir Sikander ministry. He rejected the outrageous Muslim claims over Shahidganj Gurdwara and dealt severely with the Khaksar Party, a para military organisation of Muslims. Sir Sikander’s policy drew laurels from Sardul Singh Caveeshar who in a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, wrote, “The Muslim majority in the Punjab is working from the point of view of communal peace very tactfully and very successfully than Congress ministries.”76 The Akalis busied themselves with sniping at the Khalsa National Party and ignored the continuous snide remarks born out of ignorance and malice of Gandhi about the Sikhs. For instance, talking to Khudai Khidmatgars in early October 1938, Gandhi said, “Today the Sikhs say that if they give up Kirpan, they give up everything. They seem to have made the Kirpan into their religion.”77 A year later, he termed the Sikhs alongwith the Depressed Classes, the Brahmins and the Jains as social minorities, as against the Muslims and the Christians whom he termed religious minorities.78 The Akalis meanwhile continued to function under the umbrella of the Congress. For instance, at the All India Akali Conference held in Rawalpindi in November 1938 under the Presidentship of Baldev Singh, Akali and Congress flags flew side by side and the Sikhs were exhorted to join the Congress in strength. Baldev Singh in his Presidential address said, “Next to my duty towards God and my great Gurus, I sincerely believe that it is my duty to obey the mandate of the Congress.”79 In return, while the Congress Working Committee in December 1938 declared the Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League as communal organisations, which the Congressites could not join, no mention was made of the Shiromani Akali Dal, though Hindu Congress leaders from the Punjab considered Akalis communal and self-centred.80 Because of Akalis towing the Congress line blindly, they were simply treated as camp followers. The charting out of a separate course by the Akalis from that of Congress on the declaration of war in September 1939 when the Congress committed the suicidal course of retarding the war effort was a healthy trend keeping in view the Sikh interests. But this did not mean parting of the ways so far as the Akalis were concerned. According to the Tribune of October 22, 1939, “they sought to choose such a path which, consistent with their self-interest, would not weaken the anti- imperialist forces and should in no way stand in the way of India’s freedom.” The congress leaders continued to take Akalis for granted. That was the case at the time of their talks with Jinnah in early November 1939 when the Akalis got the hint of the Congress resolve to sacrifice them in case of an overall settlement with the Muslims.81 Whereas Gandhi in his article, “The Only Way” in the Harijan of November 25, 1939, denied separate Sikh identity, and declared the assurances given by the Congress to the Sikhs in 1929 as “null and void”, Jawaharlal Nehru as part of doubletalk strategy on December 12, 1939, assured Master Tara Singh that Sikh interests would not be ignored.82 The Congress was already out of power in the provinces and heading towards wilderness, Jinnah celebrated December 22, as a ‘Day of Deliverance’ to mark a complete break with the Congress. The memorandum submitted by the Akali Dal to the Congress enlisting the Sikh sacrifices in the freedom struggle in the form of participation in various movements - arrests, convictions, etc,83 was misplaced. The conflict of interest between the Akalis and the Congress in the Punjab was getting sharper. Certain events now forced the Shiromani Akali Dal to take decisive steps to safeguard the Sikh interests. The Muslim League in view of Congress’s receding from the national politics decided to sacrifice the Muslims in minority provinces and go in for “Two Nation Theory” at Lahore Session in March 1940 seeking self determination for Muslims in the North-West and Eastern parts, which, in practical parlance, meant Pakistan. And then, under Kisan Sabha influence, a Sikh squadron in April 1940 refused to go overseas. At the same time, some Sikhs of the Third Punjab Regiment deserted, while the Sikhs of Royal Indian Arms Supply Corps refused to obey the orders of the Britishers. As a result, the British were forced to impose a temporary ban on the Sikh recruitment.84 This was not acceptable to any section of the Sikhs. The British too deputed Major Billy Short to Lahore to liaise with the Sikhs. It was under these circumstances that the Shiromani Akali Dal decided to set up the Khalsa Defence League of India under the leadership of the Maharaja of Patiala, with Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh as members. The Khalsa National Party, which had stood for cooperation in war efforts, right from the beginning, now refused to participate in the Khalsa Defence League of India because of the presence therein of the Shiromani Akali Dal! Such puerile politics because of clash of personalities constituted the main cause of damage to the Sikh interests. The British lifted the ban on Sikh recruitment, but the quantum of recruitment of the Sikhs following that decision was unsatisfactory.85 The Hindus all over India took the Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution rather seriously and committed a tactical mistake by over reacting to it. So was also the case with the Sikhs. To begin with, the Khalsa National Party at its meeting on March 29, 1940, at Lahore under Sunder Singh Majithia, saw danger in the division of India into Hindu and Muslim independent states, and said that the Sikhs would not tolerate for a single day the unadulterated communal rule of any community. As a logical sequence, it asked for restoration of Sikh sovereignty in the Punjab, which was held in trust by the British during the minority reign of Maharaja Daleep Singh.86 The Khalsa Sewak, a Sikh newspaper, came out in support of a Sikh state from Jumna to Jamraud, while Dr. V.S. Bhati, a Sikh from Ludhiana, propounded a scheme of Khalistan, a buffer state between Pakistan and Hindustan consisting of Sikh districts and Sikh states under the Maharaja of Patiala. A meeting at Amritsar on May 19, 1940, set up a sub-committee to pursue the matter.87 Master Tara Singh, Presiding over U.P. Sikh Conference at Lucknow, on April 15, 1940, said, “While opposing the Pakistan Scheme some Sikhs have lost their heads and they are preaching the establishment of Sikh rule. This will be adding to the confusion created by the Muslim Leauge. Swaraj is the only solution of our country’s misfortunes.”88 There was no flagging in the Shiromani Akali Dal’s commitment to anti-imperialism and it expected the Congress to understand its deviatory policy. But that was not to be. On being informed of the Akali position on recruitment to the armed forces, Gandhi wrote a nasty letter to Tara Singh on August 16, 1940. It contained some of his preconceived notions about the Sikhs and the Akali movement. It was also influenced by Punjab Congress’s solidly supporting Subhash Chandra Bose for the Presidentship of the Congress vis a vis Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Gandhi’s nominee.89 (Gandhi considered that an affront to his leadership and did not rest till he had hounded out Subhash Chandra Bose). Precisely, Gandhi wrote to Tara Singh, “As I told you, in my opinion, you have nothing in common with the Congress nor the Congress with you. You believe in the rule of the sword, the Congress does not. . . Your civil disobedience is purely a branch of violence. I am quite clear in my mind that being in the Congress, you weaken your community, and weaken the Congress. You have to be either fully nationalist or frankly communal and therefore dependent upon the British or other foreign power.”90 It created a storm in the Sikh press, especially his snide remarks about the sword. This provoked Gandhi to have another write up, “Sikhs and Sword,” in the Harijan, of September 29, 1940, wherein he said that Sikhs were unsuitable to remain in the Congress. He upheld his letter of August 16, to Tara Singh and said that, “It can apply to the whole of Sikh community only if they accept Master Tara Singh as their undisputed leader.” He, however, reiterated that his commitment under Lahore, 1929, resolution was a “sacred trust so far I am concerned.”91 Double talk. Master Tara Singh resigned from the Punjab Congress Working Committee but gave out that his resignation was for personal reasons and that there was no change in Akali policy towards the Congress. He wanted the Sikhs to function from within the Congress to fight for Swaraj and ignore Gandhi’s tantrums to which he was subjected. In the process he showed inadequate appreciation of the threat posed by Gandhi and Congress to the Sikhs. The Congress leaders now turned against the Akalis, dubbed them communal and anti- national, and ridiculed their opposition to Pakistan and the Communal Award, in view of their advocacy of cooperation with the British in regard to war effort. The revival of the Congress Sikh League, and Mangal Singh’s terming Tara Singh a ‘traitor’, caused the Akalis to react. Tara Singh asked the Sikhs to build their own strength, so that no one whether Congress or the government could betray them.92 But he did not listen to Gandhi’s sane advice to turn “frankly communal” to save the community from the vagaries of stormy political development that lay ahead. Many Akalis courted arrest when the Congress resorted to individual civil disobedience in 1940.93 Right from the adoption of Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution, the Congress gave indications of effecting a compromise. Gandhi regarded Lahore Resolution suicidal for Muslims in India: it opened up for him vast potentialities to emerge as ‘father’ of the residual India. The statements of various Congress leaders including Gandhi, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Rajagopalachari’s ‘sporting offer’ of August 23, 1940, caused the Sikhs concern at the Congress betraying them in the Punjab in return for an overall settlement.94 Earlier, the August 1940 offer of Viceroy Linlithgow reassured the Muslim League that the transfer of power would be contingent on some mutual agreement. Neither the Congress nor the Muslim League was willing to treat Punjab, a tri-religious state, differently and cater to the Sikh interests. Besides, the Sikh uneasiness gave another opportunity to Hindus of all hues to try to take them under the protective umbrella of all- embracing Hinduism, eroding their cultural identity. The possibility of isolation from the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League stared at the Akalis. As a result of the efforts of Major Short and Penderal Moon, Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, there was a thaw in the Akali attitude towards the Unionist Government. This was accelerated by Sir Sikander’s famous hands off Punjab speech of March 11, 1941, in the Punjab Assembly virtually making a declaration of independence from Jinnah, and the void created in the Khalsa National Party by the death in April 1941 of Sunder Singh Majithia, which caused erosion of its influence. Giani Sher Singh, a powerful factor in the Central Akali Dal, made up with Master Tara Singh in November 1941, leaving the rump to the leadership of Kharak Singh who continued to pursue a policy of negativism. The realignment offerees made the Akalis a powerful factor in the Punjab politics. Amidst spectacular Japanese advance on Singapore on Feb. 15, and Rangoon on March 7, 1942, which gave birth to a feeling in India of Britain’s losing the war, the proposals of Sir Stafford Cripps at the end of March seeking constitutional accord and offering Dominion Status at the end of the war with the right of provinces to secede, was not taken seriously by the Congress leadership. Gandhi brazenly described them as ‘a post-dated cheque on a tottering bank’ and the Congress committed another ‘Himalayan blunder’. Cripps’s talks with leaders of various political parties and his conceding the principles of Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution came as a rude shock to the Sikhs. A Sikh delegation consisting of Baldev Singh, President, Sikh All Parties Committee, Tara Singh, Sir Jogendra Singh, Prime Minister of Patiala State, and Ujjal Singh of Khalsa National Party called on Cripps on March 27, and later on March 31, submitted a formal memorandum.95 They, inter alia, asked for division of Punjab into two provinces with Ravi as the dividing line to safeguard their interests. They were, however, emphatic that “they would not submit to the domination of a community which was bent upon breaking the unity of India and imposing their laws and culture on other sections of the population.” Sir Stafford Cripps in his talks with the delegation on March 27, 1942, spelled out the various stages for minority protection satisfactory to the Sikhs, including “the sub-division of the Punjab into two provinces or the setting up within the province of the Punjab of a semi- autonomous district for the Sikhs on the Soviet model”, or even a “Treaty which would be negotiated contemporaneously with the framing of the constitution” offering “minority protection clauses in accordance with the definition set out in the document.” In the context of “non- accession by plebiscite” in the Punjab, he talked of the Sikhs playing the Congress against the Muslims League and seeking more concessions from either party including “division of the province or setting up of a semi-autonomous district.” The British could be relied upon to satisfactorily “insist upon protection for the Sikh minority.” Cripps also made it clear that the British could practically do nothing once the successor Dominion decides upon non-observance of its treaty obligations. Hence, the need for the Sikhs to seek iron clad guarantees. Cripps, in short, gave ample hints, rather outlined the guidelines on which the Sikhs should seek satisfaction and pursue their future course of action. It was unfortunate that the Sikh leadership because of inherent limitations failed to comprehend, much less appreciate, the originality and positive content of Cripps propositions. What he was suggesting was for the Sikhs to conceptualise their strength and weaknesses, and lay down their objectives in the context of the impending decolonisation of the subcontinent, with the possibility of the country being divided into two dominions. On that there seemed agreement on fundamentals between the British, the Congress and the Muslim League, the three main political parties.96 The Sikh leadership failed, and failed miserably, because of poor comprehension, which affected the quality of its political moves in the later period. The Sikhs were quite restive at the prospect of being subjected to an unsympathetic and tyrannical Muslim rule in the Punjab and drew some solace from the kind words uttered in the British Parliament on April 28, by Cripps as also by Mr. Amery, Secretary of State for India. The British were concerned at the prospect of bitterness of Sikh-Muslim relations to the detriment of war efforts. They worked to bring about a Sikander-Akali rapprochement. Baldev Singh earlier in March 1942 had formed a group in the Punjab Assembly consisting of some members of the Khalsa National Party, Independents and some Akalis. The Akalis and the Unionists were now functioning on the same wave length so far as war efforts were concerned.” The community of outlook led on June 15, 1942, to Sikander-Baldev Singh pact. It was limited in character.98 Under it Baldev Singh joined the Punjab Cabinet. Shortly afterwards. Sir Jogendra Singh was nominated as a member of the Viceroy’s expanded council. This marked the beginning of the Akalis chartering an independent course.99 The Hindu press in Punjab, which seldom played a constructive role, went hysterical. It overlooked the Hindu Mahasabha’s offering cooperation to the Muslim League in similar circumstances in Bengal and Sind. Gandhi in his usual style in the Harijan of July 5 and 12, 1942, termed the Sikhs as Hindus and reiterated his earlier offensive references to Guru Gobind Singh as “a misguided patriot” for advocating resort to arms in certain circumstances,100 though in another month he agreed to connive at violence when he launched the Quit India Movement, and not to commit the same sort of mistake he made on the Chauri Chaura incident.100a According to Jawaharlal Nehru, apart from destruction of communications and government property, mobs killed 100 persons all over India, and 10,000 persons were killed because of police or military firing.101 Gandhi did not bestir himself. Also, he was willing to marshall India’s forces in favour of the allies if the British conceded the Congress demand for setting up a provisional government immediately. The Quit India Movement did not much affect Punjab, thanks to the Unionists and the Akalis. Udham Singh Nagoke and Ishar Singh Majhail faction of the Akalis aligned with the Congress, with Tara Singh’s blessings and offered themselves for arrest. Tara Singh did nothing to thwart the Congress plank and in the words of Sir Bertrand Glancy, Governor of Punjab, he was sailing in two boats.102 The thought of protecting the Sikh interests again came up in the British mind. Mr. Amery, Secretary of State, in his letter of August 20, 1942, to Viceroy linked the Sikh concern “for a degree of autonomy sufficient to protect them from Muslim domination” in the context of Pakistan scheme and sought to explore “the various possibilities they suggest in advance of any further constitutional discussions.” He came to the right conclusion that “a separate Sikhdom is really unworkable without extensive transfer of population”, and wanted the Reforms Department to work out contingency plans in complete secrecy.103 Surprisingly, Jinnah too at the time spoke of the transfer of population, for the Pakistan of his concept envisioned division of the Punjab province. The Vicerory, however, saw no circumstances in which it would be practical politics to consider any sort of ‘Sikhistan’ and he did not want to raise any hope in the Sikhs who, he said, were capable of wrecking any scheme that could go well with the communities. He significantly observed that, “The Hindus have made the mistake of taking Jinnah seriously about Pakistan, and as a result they have given substance to a shadow.”104 So was the case with the Sikhs with whom it became an obsession. Tara Singh was chary of the Muslim League though there was a sharp improvement in the communal situation involving all the three communities since the Sikander-Baldev Singh pact. But Jinnah’s visit to Punjab in October 1942 and Sir Sikander Hayat Khan’s seeing eye to eye with the champion of ‘Pakistan’, undermined the Sikh confidence in the efficacy of Sikander-Baldev Singh pact. Tara Singh started making critical references both to Jinnah and to Sikander, while Giani Kartar Singh stated at Nankana Sahib that the “Sikhs should work for the unity of India as a whole but should aim at an appropriate partition of the Punjab. . . . One of the suggestions is that this partition should be based not on population but on landed interests, as this would lead to results more favourable to the Sikhs.”105 The Sikh leadership little realised that the unity of India was jinxed, and what they needed was to draw contingency plans to avoid domination by the Hindus and the Muslims. Master Tara Singh wrote in his autobiography that he and Giani Kartar Singh perceived, after the failure of negotiations between Jinnah, Hindu Mahasabha and other leaders in October 1942, that the formation of Pakistan was inevitable; to safeguard the Sikh interests they in consultation with C. Rajagopalachari framed the Azad Punjab Scheme.106 This reflected the intellectual limitations under which the Sikh leadership was functioning. The Azad Punjab scheme pertained to redemarcation of the Punjab boundaries. As mentioned earlier, Hasrat Mohani and later Lajpat Rai in 1924, the Sikhs themselves at the RTC and in their memorandum to Cripps, had asked for the splitting up of the Punjab at Ravi into Muslim and non-Muslim units. Ajit Singh Sarhadi mentions that on May 10,1942, Hindus and some Sikhs shouted slogans of Azad Punjab Murdabad, Down with Azad Punjab, in Campbellpur streets,107 while Sadhu Singh Hamdard says that the name ‘Azad Punjab’ was mentioned in the resolution of the All India Akali Conference at Dahala Kalan on July 24, 1942.108 Possibly the nomenclature Azad Punjab was afloat already. Whatever be the case, Azad Punjab envisaged separation of six northern districts of Rawalpindi division, namely, Gujrat, Shahpur, Jhalum, Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, and Mianwali and four districts of Multan Division, namely, Jhang Multan, Muzzafargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, and the Baloch Transfrontier Territory of the Punjab - all predominantly Muslim areas. But it still left districts of Lyallpur, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Sailkot with a Muslim population of 60 to 70 per cent and some other parts of Central Punjab with a Muslim population of 40 to 59 percent. There was also a counter proposal of the separation of Ambala Division, making it more Muslim. If the argument was that trans-Jhelum territory and Multan Division did not form part of Punjab proper, so was the case with Ambala Division which was annexed to the Punjab in punishment for the role of its people in the revolt of 1857. It was not a demand for Khalistan, as some writers later mischievously termed it. An exchange of population was not averred though an undisclosed blueprint provided for compensation to evacuees from one region to the other through a system of barter.109 It was ill conceived as a sort of holding operation against Pakistan but strangely evoked strong reactions from the Congressites, Communist Sikhs, protagonists of Akhand Hindustan and other Hindus who dubbed it as “communal, anti-Hindu, anti-national, reactionary and opportunistic.”110 Even Kharak Singh in June 1943 mischievously compared Azad Punjab to Pakistan and said, “Both are schemes for the vivisection of India and both cut at the roots of its unity and integrity”.111 So was the position of the Khalsa National Party. The concept of the Sikhs holding the balance of power was not acceptable to the Hindus and was even run down by some sections of the Sikhs. To safeguard interests of the Hindus and the Sikhs in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Akali leadership in concurrence with Vir Savarkar of the Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu leaders permitted Ajit Singh Sarhadi to join the coalition Ministry with the Muslim League in May 1943, though Tara Singh later went back on his assent. An 11 point agreement was arrived at, and it was also agreed that the “question of Pakistan would be suspended and shelved during the tenure of the coalition ministry”.112 And, the Muslim League Chief Minister, Aurangzeb Khan stuck to it. The NWFP Assembly did not adopt Pakistan resolution, as against Sind Assembly which had two ministers of the Hindu Mahasabha as members.113 The objective of avoiding both Hindu and Muslim domination was quite laudable, and reflected the fears of the Sikh community of being lost in the sea of Hinduism and Islam in case of division of India on a religious basis. Like Gandhi who reflected Hindu-nationalists, the leaders of Hindu Mahasabha, with whom Akalis were aligned in opposing Pakistan, took vicarious pleasure in terming Sikhs as Hindus, and emphasised the cultural oneness of the two to the chagrin of the Akalis. Whereas the Hindu Mahasabha in concert with like minded parties like the Akali Dal was fighting tooth and nail against the vivisection of India which the concept of Pakistan entailed, the attitude of Hindu-nationalists represented by the Congress was equivocal. And that too at the time when Jinnah’s position was weak as was obvious by his inability early in 1944 to persuade Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, who had succeeded Sir Sikander Hayat Khan on his death in December 1942, to merge the Unionist Party with the Muslim League. For instance, the formulae of July 10, 1944, enunciated by C. Rajagopalachari, with which Gandhi was in agreement envisioned, “Muslim contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority” holding a plebiscite after termination of war on the basis of adult suffrage to decide the formation of a sovereign state separate from Hindustan, in return for Muslim League’s cooperation for the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period. It also envisaged transfer of population on a voluntary basis. Gandhi had his own objectives in conceding the concept of Pakistan, while some of the Congress leaders including Nehru and Patel had become almost maniacs to form an interim government and could go to any extent including partition of the country on the basis of two nation theory to achieve that. Jinnah was quite pleased that Gandhi had accepted the principle of partition but rejected the CR formulae as offering “a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and motheaten Pakistan.”114 He made a correct reading of the Hindu mind and tried to rope in the Sikhs by offering them “some kind of special autonomy” in the Punjab.115 The idea of partition was so outrageous to the Sikhs that they spurned it without going into its mechanics or using it as a lever to secure some corresponding gains from the Congress. The CR formula came as a rude shock to almost all sections of the Sikh political groups and they vigorously protested against Gandhi’s positive attitude to the partition of the country. The Working Committee of the All Parties Sikh Conference met at Amritsar on August 1, 1944. It held that the CR formula “was manifestly unfair and detrimental to the best interests of the country and the Sikh Community.” It regarded Gandhi’s approval of the same as “breach of faith” on the part of the Congress leaders and violative of assurances to the Sikhs “at its Lahore session in 1929”.116 The Working Committee also decided to approach Master Tara Singh who had retired from active politics to come back and lead the Sikh community in its struggle. A broad representative gathering of the Sikhs, of various shades of opinion except the Communists, was invited to a meeting at Amritsar on August 20, 1944. The Central Akali Dal dissociated itself from the Amritsar meet, but it rejected the CR formula and said that the Sikhs would not accept India’s vivisection. The Amritsar gathering in a resolution condemned the CR formula which sought to divide the Sikhs into two halves under the domination of Hindu and Muslim majorities.117 Giani Sher Singh made explicit that “If a common rule of all the communities was not possible in India, the Sikhs would also like to see their own flag flying somewhere in their own territory.” Santokh Singh, leader of Opposition in the Punjab Assembly added that “No one, not even ten Gandhis, had a right to barter away the Sikhs” while Ujjal Singh said that the Sikhs “did not want to live in perpetual slavery”. Giani Kartar Singh, the brain of the Akali Dal, stated that “The Sikhs were prepared to agree to the division only out of compulsion. If Pakistan was to come of compulsion because Mr. Jinnah’s demand could not be resisted, why not give an independent State to the Sikhs also.” He traced the present predicament of the Sikhs to their “always approaching Gandhi with folded hands.” Another resolution ‘ordered’ Master Tara Singh to come out of retirement and lead the Sikh community. Mangal Singh M.L.A. (Central) in another resolution “wanted the creation of a position wherein the Sikhs would remain neither under the domination of the Muslim majority nor the Hindu majority.” By an amendment, a demand was made for the creation of an independent Sikh state-the scheme to be worked out by a committee appointed by Master Tara Singh. Master Tara Singh said that the Sikhs wanted to avoid perpetual slavery of Hindus or Muslims and added, “The Sikhs also wanted political power”. The Sikhs “must now learn to stand on their own legs and look up to no one.” He asserted that the “Sikhs were a nation, and they wanted to live in their country as honourable people and if there was to be a division they must not be made slaves of a Pakistan and Hindustan.” Brave words, but not followed by deeds. Jinnah straightaway conceded the Sikh viewpoint. In a press conference in August 1944 he stated, “I don’t dispute that the Sikhs are a nation”, in sharp contrast to his earlier speech at the Lahore Chamber of Commerce in March 1944. Gandhi, however, was unmoved. From September 9, he conducted 18 days long parleys with Jinnah, leading to a deadlock. This virtually emphasised that there were two effective political parties, leaving the Sikhs in the cold. These parleys were otherwise termed as inopportune by leading Congressmen including Jawaharlal Nehru, and added to Jinnah’s stature. Now was the time for the Sikhs to formulate a clear cut strategy as both the Congress and the Muslim League were bent upon a bilateral solution to the problems facing India. The All India Akali Conference which met at Lahore on October 14-15, 1944, came as a great disappointment.118 It was obvious that the Sikhs could not fight on all fronts against the British, the Congress and the Muslim League, especially when the latter two were hell bent upon ignoring them as the third factor. The issues had been formulated at the August 1944 All Parties Sikh Conference. It was affirmed that the Sikhs would not accept Hindu or Muslim domination, and would prefer a Sikh state in case of division of India on religious basis. Tara Singh was entrusted to constitute a committee to work out the proposal. It was unfortunate it never got off the ground. Also, the Sikhs made no attempt to analyse their present predicament and discard their attitude of supra- nationalism. There was need for a more pragmatic approach. The Presidential Address of Pritam Singh Gojran on October 14, stated, “The Sikhs are opposed to the establishment of Pakistan and they cannot tolerate India’s vivisection. But if India is to be divided and cut into pieces, the Sikhs must have a state and they must be given homeland on the basis of the land now in their possession and their political importance.” Also, Gandhi had not kept his word given to the Sikhs in 1929, did not care for the Sikhs who, he thought, were non- existent, and wanted to sell them to Jinnah. This was expressive of both their supra-national ism, their concern for their place in the future set up, and bewilderment at what they regarded as betrayal by Gandhi and the Congress. Tara Singh continuing his war on all fronts said that while “The Sikhs were not prepared to suffer the British, who had denied them their freedom, they were equally unprepared to suffer the doings of tyrants like (Mahatma) Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah both of whom wanted to impose Hindu and Muslim majorities on the Sikhs by dividing India.” Then followed Giani Kartar Singh who in the words of N. N. Mitra “excelled Mr. Jinnah in his attempt to ridicule Gandhijee and throw mud on him and levelling charges on the Congress Ministers in some of the provinces and accusing them of ‘injustice’ done to the Sikhs. His speech looked like an impeachment of Gandhijee and he employed some of the strongest epithets to express resentment at what great sin Gandhijee had committed by what he described as going back from his word given to the Sikhs”, who, he said, “have never been treated with any such disrespect and discourtesy during the past one hundred years by any political leader.” He described Jinnah as the “political enemy of the Sikhs” out to ruin them, but paid him tribute for his political sagacity.119 The Akalis, however, did not show any sagacity in not proceeding with the resolution for an independent Sikh state the following day. That was a retrogressive move as it meant backtracking on the All Parties Sikh Conference of August last wherein the Akalis had played a predominant part. The main resolution moved by Tara Singh on October 15, 1944 stated that the demand for an independent Sikh state was not being pressed and was being held back in order to keep the door open for negotiations. Mangal Singh in support stated that the course was being followed to let the demand remain ‘flexible’. The ‘big guns’ of the Akali party speaking on the resolution said that “The Sikhs were prepared for any kind of settlement but they would in no case tolerate division of India or the establishment of Pakistan.”120 Tara Singh was obviously in a state of mental conflict. He described the plea of the Sikhs being smaller in number (5.7 million) as futile because an independent Ireland had been carved out, out of a smaller population of 4.3 million.121 He asserted that no communal settlement would be acceptable to the Sikhs unless it was approved by the Shiromani Akali Dal. The general tone of the second day was one of ‘annoyance’ at Gandhi’s breaking of the promise held out to the Sikhs in 1929 as if the Akalis wanted to keep the umbilical chord that tied them to the Congress apron strings. Tara Singh must have spoken through his hat (turban at that), when he said, “If the Congress would remove Mahatma Gandhi from all his positions in the Congress for having acted against the Congress resolution, he would bear no hesitation in jumping back into the Congress fold.”122 He also spoke of ‘Aurangzebi Raj” in the Punjab in spite of Baldev Singh, an Akali Minister, being in the Punjab Cabinet; he, however, termed Khizar Hayat Khan better than Sikander Hayat Khan as Chief Minister. The tilt against Muslims vis a vis Hindus, or in other words against Muslim League clouded the Akali judgement. It also prevented them from thinking of means of saving themselves from Hindu domination in case of the formation of Pakistan. Mention may now be made of two distracting influences. The first was that of Communists led by Baba Wasakha Singh and Baba Sohan Singh. They along with Sarmukh Singh Jhabal, a Sikh Congress leader, and other like minded groups including the Central Sikh Youth League, at a conference held at Amritsar on September 11, 1944, expressed their faith in Gandhi. Teja Singh Swatantra stated that, “Today, the League ideology has come to stay and there was hardly a Muslim who did not have faith in that.”123 The Conference welcomed Gandhi’s efforts “to end the political deadlock through Congress-League unity”, wanted acceptance of “the right of self determination of Sikhs and Muslims” and advocated “a Congress-League-Sikh agreement. . . to end the deadlock and advance towards National Government.” It reposed full faith in Gandhi’s “assurances to the Sikhs”, took note of his “accepting the principle of the right of self-determination for the Muslims”, and wanted him “to consult nationalist Sikh opinion before committing himself to any final settlement”.124 Their stand was critical of Tara Singh and the Shiromani Akali Dal. The Communists and their fellow travellers did not see any contradiction in their glib talk of the Sikh right of self-determination and the leadership of Gandhi or of nationalist Sikhs for that. It resulted in Durlabh Singh, Secretary, Sikh Youth League’s letter dated November 12, 1944, to Gandhi and his reply of two days later in which he said that in case of Jinnah’s acceptance of the CR formula, both Jinnah and he would have gone to the Sikhs and others to secure their acceptance. Or, impose the settlement on them? He averred that “the interests of nationalist Sikhs, as also all nationalists, are safe in my hands” and also of the Congress, “though as you know I have no authority to speak on behalf of the Congress.”125 This was Gandhi’s standard ploy to disclaim any responsibility for the Congress, though in actual practice his position was that of a dictator. The other was the Nagoke-Majhail group of Akali Dal which had been permitted to participate in the Quit India Movement, and had pronounced pro-Congress proclivities, as was discernible at the Akali Jubilee Conference at Jandiala on November 25, 1944. Ishar Singh Majhail in his Presidential address said that the “Shiromani Akali Dal will continue to stand by the Congress”. He termed the CR formula as a symptom of the sense of frustration in the Congress, which may accept it under Gandhi’s influence. He avowed that “our ideal is a free India where the Sikhs are also free like other communities.” The wholehearted support of the Akalis to Akhand Hindustan Conference in Delhi in October 1944, despite their reservations about Savarkar’s Hindudom, and equivocal memorandum presented to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru Committee shortly afterwards, is to be seen in this light - of lack of a precise objective and absence of a consolidated leadership. The Sapru Committee had been conceived of as a Conciliation Committee to devise ways and means for an agreed constitution. The Sapru Committee’s questionnaire helped to bring some refinement in the Akali thought process. The demand for a Sikh state with transfer and exchange of population and property was still hedged with ifs and buts relating to the partition of India, but was not put forth as an irrevocable demand. The Sikh leadership as an alternative showed its preference for the Swiss model of executive with suitable modifications - an irremovable composite executive in place of the Parliamentary system of government.126 It was significant that both Bhulabhai Desai-Liaquat Pact of January 11, 1945 which had the approval of Gandhi who later unceremoniously backed out,127 and the Sapru Committee Report envisaged a coalition government at the Centre with parity of representation for the Congress and the Muslim League, apart from representation of minorities like the Sikhs and backward classes. The concept of parity in representation, etc, between the Hindus and the Muslims was devised in recognition of the fact that “the fears of the Muslim community about its future in free and united India were genuine”, and it was necessary to alley them by enactment of effective constitutional provisions, to safeguard the unity of India. Pertinently, at the Simla Conference, for the formation of coalition government at the centre and for framing a constitution, called by Lord Wavell, June 25-July 14, 1945, both the Congress and the Muslim League accepted the concept of parity in representation between the caste Hindus and the Muslims. The conference failed because of Jinnah’s insistence that all Muslims should be nominees of the Muslim League. He not only denied the Congress any representation out of Muslim seats, but also the powerful Unionist party in the Punjab. At the Simla Conference, Master Tara Singh opposed the demand for Pakistan and contended that on similar principles he would claim a Sikh state in Central Punjab, on the analogy of Palestine which had been declared a Jewish homeland even though the Jews formed only 10 percent of population.128 Tara Singh did not realise that he could develop this idea only with British cooperation. Wavell perceived that “Jinnah’s attitude was based on a genuine fear of the Congress” while Sir Bertrand Glancy, Governor of Punjab, warned of “a very serious danger of elections being fought, so far as Muslims are concerned, on an entirely false issue.” Also, “if Pakistan becomes an imminent reality, we shall be heading straight for bloodshed on a wide scale” and that “especially Sikh are not bluffing, they will not submit peacefully to a government that is labelled Muhmmadan Raj”.129 He, therefore, suggested the desirability of defusing the idea of Pakistan by projecting a division of Punjab at Amritsar/Lahore in the form of a Question-Answer in British Parliament which he thought would give credence to the Unionists.129 The course was not followed. From the autumn of 1944, the British had started giving Master Tara Singh, the same degree of credence in Sikh politics as they were giving to Jinnah in Muslim politics. By the beginning of 1945, the Shiromani Akali Dal had clearly emerged as the “premier organisation of the Sikhs” and “their largest party”.130 As against this, the position of Jinnah in end 1944-early 1945, with the Unionist break with the Muslim League in the Punjab, the fall of Muslim League ministries in Bengal and NWFP, and the existence of Muslim League ministries in Assam and Sind at the sufferance of Congress, was certainly weak. But Jinnah’s clarity of vision and conviction of his policies together with alignment with the British stood him in good stead. Tara Singh at Simla asserted his independence from the Congress and was happy at the Akalis being acknowledged along with the Congress and the Muslim League as three parties for the settlement of the future constitutional setup. He, however, failed to conceptualise the emergent situation, especially when certain Congress leaders like Rajagopalachari were suggesting the convening of a homogenised constitution making body consisting of representatives of those provinces which would vote for forming an Indian Union, leaving others to join on special conditions, or form a separate union.131 In view of the willingness of Hindu nationalists to go in for a homegenised Indian Union, it was reprehensible that the Sikhs at the All India Akali Conference at Gujranwala on September 29-30, 1945, indulged in self deception instead of facing the issues squarely. The selection of Babu Labh Singh as new President of the Shiromani Akali Dal at this crucial hour, when India was heading towards a new political set-up, through the process of Constituent Assembly, was inept. The two day proceedings were a babble of tongues without a meaningful direction.132 Opposition to Pakistan movement and emphasis on the Indian unity, both of which were jinxed because of a tacit agreement between the Congress and the League to work out their own destinies, constituted the main emphasis of the speakers. Nagoke-Majhail group also emphasised the desirability of standing by the Congress, though they and some others wanted the Congress to leave the Sikh seats to Panthic candidates. A Sikh Election Board under Master Tara Singh to fight the forth coming elections was set up. Tara Singh was explicit in maintaining “the separate existence of the Sikh Panth” and rightly pointed out that the Communists, the Congress and the Muslim League “stood committed to the principle of Pakistan.” The only body against Pakistan was the Hindu Mahasabha, but its opposition had no value.133 He was for fighting the elections on the slogan Panth Azad te Desh Azad, freedom of the country through the freedom of Panth. Ujjal Singh spoke of the Congress betraying the Sikhs at RTC despite the 1929 resolution, and hinted at its doing so again. There were a number of speakers who spoke of the goal of united India while Giani Kartar Singh added that “the Sikhs in the Punjab should not be under the rule of any one community”.134 The main resolution spoke of the Communists and Pakistan movement constituting a grave menace to the Sikh community, but was silent on Congress softness on Pakistan. It further stated that “the Sikhs will give their hearty and full cooperation to all elements in the country, which are prepared to sincerely serve and promote the freedom, unity, integrity and welfare of our beloved motherland and those who are prepared to treat us equal partners in the government of the country and not as sub-national groups.”135 It kept mum on the need to safe-guard against Hindu domination in case Pakistan materialised. It was resolved to fight the forthcoming elections on Panthic ticket, but the resolution went on to add that the representatives of Shiromani Akali Dal “will always stand by the Congress in all political matters and fully cooperate with the Congress in its fight for the country’s freedom.”136 It was nothing but a juvenile affair. The Congress struck back at 14 Sikh members who in defiance of an earlier directive had attended the Akali Conference and were a party to the decision to fight elections on the Panthic ticket. Eleven of them recanted. Babu Labh Singh, Basant Singh Moga, Senior Vice President, and Waryam Singh of Rurka Kalan, Member of Punjab Congress Working Committee, were suspended. The Nagoke-Majhail group of the Akali Dal was not in favour of breaking with the Congress in the forthcoming elections. The negotiations produced a limited accord on sharing equally four seats, considered stronghold of Communists; the Akalis were willing to offer 9 of the residuary seats to Congress which was not acceptable to the Congressite Sikhs. In the January 1946 elections, the Akalis won 23 seats as compared to the Congress winning 10 Sikh seats. The Muslim League eroded the base of the Unionists, while the Congress consolidated its hold over Hindu seats. The overall party position in the 175 member Punjab Assembly was as follows: Muslim League 74, Unionists 21 (Muslims 12, Hindus 2, Harijans 3, Christian one); Congress 51 (Hindus 40 including 4 Harijans, Muslims one, Sikhs 10); Akalis 23; Anglo-Indian two; Independent Christian one; independent Labour two; and independent Harijan one.137 The Muslim League needed the support of 14 more members to form the government. They negotiated with the Akalis (led by Giani Kartar Singh) who were willing to join the ministry, but the demand for Pakistan proved a stumbling block. Then followed League’s negotiations with the Congress and (Baldev Singh led) Akalis combined; the differences between the three parties on future constitution were kept out and parity between League (74) and Congress-Akalis (51+23), agreed to. Other conditions were also sorted out. At Jinnah’s instance, League’s insistence that Congress would not nominate its only Muslim member to the Cabinet proved a stumbling block. Eventually, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, after a great deal of persuasion, agreed to form a coalition government consisting of Unionists (21), Congress (51), and Akalis (23) in preference to the Governor’s desire to bring Muslim League into the government to soften it up. What stood out from the goings on was that the Akalis were more concerned than the Congress with the demand for Pakistan, while Muslim League insisted on its being the exclusive representative of the Muslims to the exclusion of the Congress or the Unionists. Overall, the Muslim League had won resounding victories on Muslim seats all over India except in the NWFP where the Red Shirts-led Congress government took office. Similarly, the Congress consolidated its position on Hindu seats and emerged as an exclusive Hindu-nationalist organisation. The bipolarisation of Hindus and the Muslims or the Congress and the Muslim League all over India was complete. One fallout of the elections was the complete rout of nationalist- Muslims, who had become irrelevant and redundant. The Akalis could see that the situation was inexorably moving towards the formation of Pakistan. The British Prime Minister Attlee’s announcement of February 19, 1946, of his government’s resolve to send a special mission of Cabinet Ministers, known as the Cabinet Mission, consisting of Lord Pethic Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty, to finally solve the question of the transfer of power in India, reactivated the Indian political scene especially since the Mission’s arrival in Delhi on March 24. The scene among the Sikhs at this crucial hour was one of confusion, and in the words of Sarhadi, “The Sikh leadership was most indecisive as to how to proceed.”138 Some wanted Tara Singh to come to an understanding with Jinnah, while others wanted the Sikhs to play a second fiddle to the Congress. The All India Sikh Students Federation led by Sarup Singh and Amar Singh Ambalvi wanted him to play an independent role. Tara Singh on April 2, 1946, did meet Jinnah who was willing to treat the Sikhs as a sub-national group but the talks were inconclusive.139 The following day, he met Sardar Patel who wanted the Sikhs to toe the Congress line, and Congress agents in Sikh ranks were successful in having Harnam Singh, later Advocate General and Judge, Punjab High Court, to accompany Tara Singh in his interview with the Cabinet Mission.140 The Sikh position was surprisingly fluid and it was reflected in the Memorandum presented by Tara Singh to the Cabinet Mission. It, however, carried an anti-Muslim tinge as per designs of the Congress partisans.141 The Memorandum opposed “any partition of India as envisaged in the draft declaration” and avowed that “with the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy on the basis of Communal Award, they have been reduced to a state of complete helplessness” and it amounted to “coercion of Sikhs” under “the Muslim rule.” They wanted statutory Muslim majority in the Punjab to go and demanded increased representation for the Sikhs. Alternately, they wanted that “a new province may be carved out as an additional provincial unit in the United India of the future” so as to include “all the important Sikh Gurdwaras and shrines” and “a substantial majority of Sikh population in the existing province of the Punjab.” The Memorandum referred to the Muslim claim to be “a separate nation distinct from the Sikhs, the Hindus and others” and “entitled to Pakistan”, and added that “the Sikhs have as good a claim for the establishment of a separate State” contingent on the Mission conceding Pakistan. The very next sentence added that, “The Sikhs are in favour of a single constitution-making body” but in case the mission agreed to setting up of two constitution-making bodies there should be a separate constitution-making body also for the Sikh State.” By emphasising and re-emphasising their commitment to a united India and hedging their demand with so many its and buts they made a mockery of their claim for a separate Sikh state. Master Tara Singh accompanied by Giani Kartar Singh and Harnam Singh met the British delegation on April 5, 1946, while Baldev Singh met the Mission separately the same day. Their testimony showed that they had not done their home work, were a confused lot and were working at cross purposes with one another. It also reflected lack of centralised leadership and a settled command structure. The Cabinet Mission wanted the Sikh representatives to indicate (a) whether, if the choice were given, the Sikh Community would prefer the transfer of powers to a single body; (b) If powers were to be transferred to two bodies, which of them would the Sikhs community wish to join; and (c) If it were found to be practical and could be arranged, (and the Secretary of State had yet formed no opinion), would the Sikhs wish to have a separate autonomous State of their own.142 Master Tara Singh stood for a united India with some sort of a coalition government of all communities. He did not cherish Hindu or Muslim majority in case of partition, and preferred a separate independent Sikh state with the right to federate either with Hindustan or Pakistan. Giani Kartar Singh stated that the Sikhs would feel unsafe in either united India or Pakistan and wanted a province of their own where they would be in a dominant or almost dominant position. When asked by Sir Stafford Cripps to define the area of the proposed Sikh State, Kartar Singh suggested Jullundur and Lahore Divisions together with Montgomery and Lyallpur districts of Multan division, and Ambala Division minus Gurgaon district. Harnam Singh opposed the partition of India as a divided India would be a prey to foreign invasions. He wanted increased Sikh representation in the proposed Constitution-making body and pleaded for a separate one for the Sikhs if there were more than one Constitution-making body. Baldev Singh, a Minister in Punjab, who was interviewed separately was also for a united India with reduced representation for the Muslims and weightage for the Sikhs. He, however, wanted the formation of a Sikh state in case Pakistan was conceded. Sir Stafford Cripps moving his stick over the map from Panipat to Nankana Sahib including Sikh states asked him whether they should provide that to whomsoever that area goes, no constitution covering the area be framed unless that was acceptable to the Sikhs. Baldev Singh said they wanted Sikh rule upto Jhelum and would not be satisfied with that area. Giani Kartar Singh beat his forehead thrice when told of Baldev Singh’s moronic reply, but the Sikh leadership did nothing to pick up the proposal.143 In the words of Dr. Gopal Singh, “It is a pity that such an offer (the best in the circumstances which the Sikhs later took 20 years to fight for) was rejected out of hand, without even discussing its possibilities or making it a basis for further elaborations and discussions.”144 The Cabinet Mission especially Sir Stafford Cripps, who earlier in 1942 had also thrown a lot of suggestions at them, must have been amazed at the unintelligent, rather crazy, Sikh leaders - all four of them speaking at a tangent, oblivious of the times ahead. Cripps especially was driving them towards seeking an autonomous district or a Sikh State from Panipat to about Nankana/Ravi on the Soviet model, and it was only the craziness of the Sikh leadership that they could not pick up the hints or think in those terms. Had they studied the Soviet model, they could have asked for an autonomous unit with membership of the United Nations on the pattern of three of the Soviet Republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estoria getting it. The SGPC could have served as the fulcrum of the Sikh nation. The British, not unnaturally, ruled them out as serious partners or worthy of confidence because of their pedestrian leadership. The Intelligence Bureau in its note of June 14,1946, attributed the failure of the Sikhs to come together to perennial jealousies amongst their leaders.145 The same day when the Sikh leaders were fumbling before the Cabinet Mission, Jawaharlal Nehru at a press conference in Delhi, April 5, 1946, stated, “The brave Sikhs of Punjab are entitled to special consideration. I see nothing wrong, in an area and a set up in the North wherein the Sikhs can experience the glow of freedom.” Nehru, a wily politician, was speaking in a certain context and didnotnecessarilymeanwhathewassaying.146 TheSikhleaderstookhisstatementatitsfacevalue, and are ruing the day till today. Anyhow, the Cabinet Mission proposals put forth on May 16, 1946, envisioned an Indian Federation with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications with provisions to raise necessary finances as Central subjects. The residual powers lay with provinces which were clubbed in three groups. Group A consisted of six Hindu majority provinces, Group B, included Punjab, NWFP, and Sind, while Group Chad Bengal and Assam. The latter two had an overall Muslim majority though Hindus were a majority in Assam, and the Congress was in power in NWFP. The Groups could frame their own constitution, and provinces could opt out of the group after a period of 10 years. It also provided for parity in the Central executive between 6 Hindu majority and 5 Muslim majority provinces, with a population of 190 and 90 million respectively, which was highly objected to by the Congress leaders. Before the proposals were announced, the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy called a conference starting May 5, 1946, in Simla, of Congress and League leaders, to which Master Tara Singh as representative of the Sikhs, was also invited. Maulana Azad, President of the Congress, while objecting to parity between groups in the Executive and Legislature, was in favour of doing “everything possible to remove fears and suspicions from the mind of every group and community.”147 As against that, on May 8, Gandhi in a letter to Cripps, objecting to the provisions of parity between 6 Hindu majority provinces with population of 190 million and 5 Muslim majority provinces of 90 million, wrote, “This is really worse than Pakistan.” Instead, he wanted the composition of the Central Legislature and Executive on the basis of population.148 In the words of H. M. Seervai, “The Congress opposition to parity marks a watershed in the history of the Congress and its fight for the independence of a united India.”149 Gandhi had now decided to break the unity of India, for he was not willing to allay the genuine fears of 90 mn Muslims. Seervai avers that “after the 1945-46 elections, nationalist Muslims could play no effective part in the Congress”. Even more, a staunch Muslim like Maulana Azad became the mouth- piece for doctrines which he reported as “injurious to the unity of India.”150 Moreover, “How little Azad counted in shaping Congress policy even before he ceased to be the Congress President (emphasis in original) is demonstrated by the interview which Azad and Nehru had with the Mission and the Viceroy.”151 Gandhi, Nehru and Patel were now working at cross purposes with Azad who was still the President of the Congress. Gandhi also wanted to show Azad his place as a mere Muslim showboy when he wrote to him on August 16, “I did not infer from your letter that you are writing about my Hindus. Whatever you have in your heart has not appeared in your writing. . . . whatever you want to say about the communal problem should not be said without consulting me and the Working Committee.”152 Gandhi’s ploy. When it suited him he would say he is nobody in the Congress. Now he claims special prerogative for “my Hindus”. If Gandhi for the sake of ‘my Hindus’ would not offer the requisite assurances to 90 mn Muslims and consider Pakistan a better proposition than treat them equally, and brusquely shut up Maulana Azad, Congress President of six years standing, what fate could await the tiny 5-6 million Sikhs whom he never considered as a separate community? The Sikh leaders oblivious of the danger threatening them proceeded ahead non-challantly. Tara Singh pointedly asked Sir Pethick Lawrence on May 25, “What is the significance of recognising the Sikhs as one of main communities” and sought certain clarifications.153 He instead should have asserted his position, but lacked clear objectives. The All Parties Sikh Conference - 800 representatives of Akalis, Ramgarhia Sikhs, Namdharis, Nirmal Mahamandal, Nihang Sikhs, the Chief Khalsa Diwan, the All India Sikh Youth League, the Sikh Students Federation and numerous Singh Sabhas - met at Amritsar on June 9, 1946. Tara Singh spoke with verve “to stand united in the grave hour for the Sikh Panth”. The Conference instituted a Pratinidhi Panthic Board and set up a Council of Action with Colonel Niranjan Singh Gill of the Indian National Army (INA), a Trojan horse for the Congress, as dictator. Gill had been introduced by General Mohan Singh of INA, another Trojan horse. The Congress Sikhs, under a considered plan, participated in the second day’s proceedings to ensure Gill’s election. The difference of approach between Gill and Tara Singh became obvious the very first day. For instance, Niranjan Singh Gill said, “We shall explore all avenues before starting any direct action. This obviously means negotiations with the Congress and I have every hope that the Congress will stand by the Sikhs.” Master Tara Singh on the other hand said, “The Panthic Board will, before launching any struggle, negotiate with political parties. The Congress and the Muslim League are the two parties concerned.”154 Verily, India’s freedom had by now become a problem between Congress and Muslim League. The Akalis had marginalised themselves through their ineptness. The Cabinet Mission Plan was a composite whole, affirming the unity of India, the dreamchild of Viceroy Wavell on the one had, and offering the Muslims ironclad safeguards, besides an option to the provinces to get out of the groups after a period of time on the other. The League by foregoing the demand for Pakistan had nothing more to yield. The Congress being the majority party was now required to show goodwill and accommodation to the Muslim League and share power with it. In the scheme of things, the formation of the interim government, framing of the constitution, and independence were to follow in that order. Herein the Congress failed. The attitude of the Hindu Congress leaders - Banias and Brahmins the most clever sections of the Indian society - was one of imperiousness and arrogance towards the Muslims, whether of the Muslim League variety or those like Azad within the Congress. Gandhi’s hands off ‘my Hindus’ letter to Azad, quoted above, was typical of that imperious attitude. Nehru had nothing but contempt for Jinnah and the Muslim League, which was reciprocated in equal measure.155 His contempt for Tara Singh was slightly less than that for Jinnah. Gandhi, as stated earlier, from 1924 had lost interest in Hindu-Muslim amity; since 1937 he had been looking for divine light to provide him a direction to Hindu-Muslim unity, but either God failed him, or he failed God in refusing to listen to the light at least from Maulana Azad that came his way.156 The Congress right from the beginning was not interested in working the Cabinet Mission Plan in the spirit in which it was intended to be worked. The Congress opposition to parity, compulsory groupings, and a constricted Federal Government, and demand for a Dominion Cabinet yielding it the cherished objective of absolute power, struck at the roots of the plan. The Muslim League in its resolution on June 6, 1946, accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, and in the words of Seervai sought “to impress upon the Congress to let bygones be bygones, and show a genuine willingness to share power with Muslim community in a united India.”157 The Congress on the other hand accepted the plan on June 25, with reservations about group provisions which struck at the integrity of the Plan. Gandhi had gone to the extent of advising Bardoloi, Premier of Assam, to reject His Majesty’s Government (HMG)’s interpretation to strike the plan dead. Gandhi wrote, “Assam must not lose its soul,”158 because of its Hindu character; he did not mind all Muslim provinces losing theirs! If Gandhi had struck the nail on the coffin of the Cabinet Mission Plan, Nehru struck the hammer rather loudly. On July 10, 1946, at a press conference in Bombay, shortly after taking over as President of the Congress, he stated that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly “completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arose.” He elaborated that “the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan.” Patel, the following day, attributed Nehru’s outburst to “emotional insanity.” The damage could not be undone. Jinnah held that Nehru represented the real mind of the Congress, and K. M. Munshi concedes that that was that “in our hearts” but Nehru gave a handle to Jinnah.159 Jinnah rightly argued that if the Hindus could change their position many times when the British were still there and power had not yet come into their hands, what assurances could the minorities have, once the British left. The Muslim League adopted a resolution on July 27, 1946, revoking its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, and also drew up a plan for direct action. After adopting the resolution, Jinnah said, “This day we bid good bye to constitutional methods”. Referring to the other two parties, the British and the Congress holding pistols of authority and mass struggle respectively, he said, “Today, we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it.” August 16, was fixed as “Direct Action Day”. Nobody had any idea as to what the League really meant. Wavell sought to salvage the unity of India by asking Nehru two days later to give assurances to Jinnah on Groups, but nothing came out of the move as Nehru was only giving expression to guidelines laid by Gandhi. At the time when the Muslim League was forging a pistol to safeguard the Muslim position in response to Congress chicanery to achieve Hindu supremacy, the Sikhs were being betrayed down the lane. The Panthic Board presided over by Niranjan Singh Gill at its meeting on June 22, 1946, directed Baldev Singh not to accept the invitation from the Viceroy to join the interim government that was being set up pursuant to the Cabinet Mission Plan. Niranjan Singh Gill immediately started undermining the Sikh position. He worked upon Congress oriented Akalis led by Nagoke-Majhail and raked up old rivalries between the two groups to weaken the Akalis. On July 18, 1946, Gil] wrote to Nehru of his intentions, 1. To help Congress Sikhs openly against the Akalis. This would be correct in every way but there were no prospects of success over the main body of the Sikhs in the near future; and, 2. To unite the Sikhs and bring them all to the nationalist platform.160 Gill played the role of Judas. He operated through Nagoke to weaken the Akali resolve not to participate in the Constituent Assembly and interim government. In the words of Christine Effenbarg, Gill’s position was that of a “political broker and for his services he was amply rewarded by Nehru in the post independence period with Ambassadorial appointments.”161 Nehru’s statement that the “Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly undeterred by agreements” which came an eye opener to Muslim League, was mutatis mutandis applicable to the Sikhs in the context of past Congress resolutions or those that may be adopted in the near future. But the Sikh leadership- did not have an analytical mind like that of Jinnah, and Gill further compromised the Sikh position by saying that “The Sikhs consider the Congress as their representative in all national matters and in the fight for freedom of India.”162 Instead, adoption of a mere resolution by the Congress Working Committee on August 8, after the Muslim League had reneged its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan, appealing to the Sikhs to reconsider their decision to boycott the Constituent Assembly, without offering them any meaningful assurances, was considered sufficient by the Panthic Board on August 14, to cast their lot with the Congress and “give the Constituent Assembly a fair trial”.163 The Direct Action Day on August 16, led to a communal holocaust in Calcutta, when Muslim mobs went berserk. The following day, Hindu mobs led by Sikh taxi drivers of Calcutta turned the tables and drew even. The great Calcutta killing - 5,000 dead, 15,000 injured and about 100,000 homeless - added a new dimension to the ongoing political dialogue, and in Clausewitzian terminology was continuation of politics by other means. The involvement of Sikh Taxi Drivers on the side of the Hindus in the Hindu-Muslim rioting reflected lack of leadership and tended to establish an unnecessary linkage which clouded the real issue so far as the Sikhs were concerned. The failure of the Sikh leadership to dissociate the Sikhs from Hindu-Muslim conflict was reprehensible. Wavell could foresee that if political agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League could not be arrived at, the Calcutta pattern of killings would be repeated all over India with slight variations.164 But Gandhi, for reasons to which we shall revert later, was enthused at the developments. In a meeting with the Viceroy on August 27, “Gandhi” in the words of Wavell, “thumped the table and said If India wants a bloodbath, she shall have it”, and that “If a bloodbath was necessary, it would come about in spite of non-violence.”165 Wavell was dumb-founded at these words coming from the mouth of the ‘apostle’ of non-violence. Gandhi had by now graduated to fullfledged violence and bloodbath at that, all over India, though being a hypocrite he continued to wear sheep’s clothing. Gandhi now looked to a bloodbath as a surgical operation to emerge as the father of the nation - whatever that meant -an ambition he had nurtured now for over two decades. After initial wranglings, because of Nehru’s designs to seize absolute power shorn of the Viceroy’s veto, an interim government was formed on September 2, 1946, and included Baldev Singh as the Sikh representative, and Swaran Singh replaced him in the Punjab. Earlier in 1942, Baldev Singh had attached increasing importance to his appointment as Minister in the Sikander government, and now he regarded this appointment in the interim government as the ultimate, and an end in itself. Baldev Singh, thereafter, never looked back till his ouster in 1952 when he was seized with a feeling of remorse at the betrayal of the Sikh cause. He had a mind to pen down his memoirs spelling out the acts of treachery performed by various actors including himself, but died before he could do so. The Sikhs were atrophied, but Jinnah could foresee the harm that could be caused by leaving the central administration to the Congress. To wreck the interim government from within, the Muslim League joined it on October 26. Liaquat Ali Khan as Finance Member tightened financial control over the entire machinery of the government of India, bringing to a standstill the functioning of Congress Ministers. Patel was so frustrated at Liaquat’s financial control that he was the first among the Congress stalwarts, if you leave Gandhi aside, to be converted to the idea of partition in October itself. The convening on November 20, 1946, of the Constituent Assembly from December 9, at the instance of His Majesty’s Government over-ruling Wavell who had made it contingent on a categorical acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by the Congress, was termed by Jinnah as “one more blunder of very grave and serious character.” It was obvious that the Congress was not committed to the Cabinet Mission’s long term Plan which in the words of Liaquat Ali Khan meant that “the Muslims had been thrown to the wolves.”166 Seeing through the Congress strategy, as if through a prism, Wavell wrote, “Their aim is power and to get rid of British influence as soon as possible after which they think they can deal with both Muslims and Princes; the former by bribery, blackmail, propaganda, and if necessary force; the latter by stirring up their people with them, unless they do something quite outrageous. The aim is power amongst themselves as well as the other methods above”. Further that, “The Congress will not seriously negotiate with the Muslim League as long as they can get what they want by pressure on HMG.”167 In a last bid to preserve the unity of India, Attlee invited two representatives each of the Congress and the Muslim League and one of the Sikhs to London. As a result, Jawaharlal Nehru representing the Congress, Jinnah and Liaquat representing the Muslim League, and Baldev Singh representing the Sikhs met in London, December 3-6, 1946, when the British made earnest attempts to bridge the gap between the Congress and the League on the Statement of May 16, i.e. Cabinet Mission Plan. The attempt failed. Nonetheless, Attlee on December 6, read out the Statement which in the words of Seervai was “the last effective attempt to bring the Congress and the League together in framing a Constitution of a United India.”168 From Nehru’s intransigence, it was obvious that the Congress and the League were on the parting of ways, and Wavell’s dream of a united India would flounder. By the time, as we shall see, we Congress had decided to split India in case the Muslims still refused to be deceived into submission. Baldev Singh met Jinnah a couple of times, but with a closed mind. Churchill had a message conveyed in confidence to Baldev Singh to stay behind for a couple of days “so as to enable the Sikhs”, in the words of Kapur Singh, “to have political feet on their own on which they may walk into the current of World History.”169 According to George Abell, the British idea was to see how the Sikhs could be fitted in either of the two dominions with due safeguards,170 an idea spelled out by Cripps to Baldev Singh in the form of a question on April 5, last. Private Papers of Lord Wavell refer to a British plan to have three way partition of the Punjab - between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between Hindu and non-Hindu areas to cater to the Sikh interests in central Punjab including the Sikh states. Baldev Singh who was not worth his salt disclosed the message to Nehru who drafted a statement that the Sikhs had thrown their lot with the Congress and did not want anything from the British, and got it issued on behalf of Baldev Singh. He also assured Baldev Singh’s accompanying him back to India. The way Baldev Singh behaved as a camp follower of Nehru caused deep resentment among the Sikhs. Attlee told his Cabinet colleagues on December 10, that “Nehru’s present policy seemed to be to secure complete domination by Congress throughout the Government of India;. . . and that the ultimate result of Congress policy might be the establishment of that Pakistan which they so much dislike. (Attlee) warned the Cabinet that the situation might so develop as to result in civil war in India with all the bloodshed that would entail. There seemed little realisation in Indian leaders of the risk that ordered government might collapse.”171 A day earlier, the Constituent Assembly was inaugurated without participation of the Muslim League. This widened the schism. Moving the Objectives Resolution, Jawaharlal Nehru paid tributes to Gandhi and termed him “The Father of our Nation” (emphasis added). The cat was now out of the bag. Father of ‘our nation’ implied father of their nation, or fathers of their nations. Was Nehru conceding the two nation theory? What did he mean by the word nation? In his Discovery of India published in 1946, Nehru had mentioned of “the old patriarch of the Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji. . . as the Father of the country.” Now in the fall of 1946, he put forth “the father of our Nation.” Obviously, the country and nation were not conterminous. The country, India, was being divided into two states, but that was in the womb of the future. Partition could still be averted by effecting a compromise, or one or the other party yielding. Nonetheless, it reflected that the Congress had tentatively decided to break the Indian unity. If it is acknowledged that in the back of Nehru’s mind was his conceding the two nation theory, would it be preposterous to project Gandhi as father of the Hindu nation? Historically speaking, the word Hindu did not exist till the eighth century. It was only with the oncoming of Arabs that the terminology was coined and later found broad acceptance with chronologers who followed in the trail of Mahmud of Ghazni. Though Jawaharlal Nehru traced the cohesion of Hindu society to Adi Shankaracharya’s extermination of Buddhism,172 the process could not have gone much ahead. The origin of a cohesive Hindu social order can be traced to only 19th century. Till then, Hindus had no concept like Ummah in Islam, community in Christianity, or panth in Sikhism. To begin with, it was articulated by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee and Swami Vivekananda, and the threads were picked up by Gandhi, inheritor of both streams of thought.173 Gandhi repeatedly laid emphasis on the need for a cohesive Hindu social order and community comparable to corresponding concepts in other social systems. He went on fast unto death at first to prevent the Depressed Classes from asserting separate social identity and remain within the Hindu varnashram dharma, and again to have them classified as Hindus, though his life was not at stake. Nonetheless, he did a signal service for consolidation of the Hindu society. One can legitimately term Gandhi as builder of modern Hinduism with inbuilt inequalities and oppression of the depressed classes. Would not that entitle him to be termed father of ‘our’, meaning Brahminical-Hindu nation? Nehru’s ‘our nation’ and earlier Gandhi’s use of ‘my Hindus’ seem analogous. There was no need to consult the Sikhs, another party to join the Constituent Assembly, for Gandhi, and following him the Congress, never recognised Sikhism to be a religion distinct from Hinduism. May be, Nehru did not have Gandhi’s contributions to modern Hinduism in mind. The only rational answer available then would be that by nation, Nehru meant the Congress party, and he equated Congress with the nation: Gandhi, no doubt, was the father figure in the Congress; since 1923 he was signing ‘Bapu’ to his colleagues and co-workers in the Congress, of which he later emerged as the dictator or the supreme authority. Later, on April 1, 1947, at the Asian Relations Conference at Delhi when Sarojini Naidu mentioned of Gandhi as father of the nation, Shankar brought out a telling cartoon summing up the peoples mood to what later became a cliche. It showed Gandhi as the father and his son Devdas, then Managing Editor of Hindustan Times, as ‘the nation’. It is certain that, but for the partition of India, Gandhi could never have become father of ‘our’ nation, and the deliberate use of the terminology by Nehru signified the Congress resolve to go ahead with the partition, if Muslim League could not be contained to accept Hindu supremacy. And, Gandhi on attaining his life’s ambition, of being acclaimed father of ‘our’ nation, wanted the Constituent Assembly on December 15, 1946, to go ahead with framing the constitution, with others framing their own constitution.174 Speaking on the objective resolution, Nehru stated “Adequate safeguards would be provided for minorities. It was a deliberation, a pledge and an undertaking before the world, a contract with millions of India, and therefore in the nature of an oath, which we must keep.” These words were directed especially to the Muslims, and not to the Sikhs; hence not kept in view of what Nehru later said the change in circumstances. The Congress on January 6,1947, non-challantly accepted HMGs statement of December 6, hedged with conditions (also about position of the Sikhs), which Jinnah treated as repudiation of the Cabinet Mission Plan. It was also not acceptable to HMG. The resolution came as a rude shock to the Sikhs. Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh regarded it as a betrayal of the Sikhs, while Mangal Singh, close to Gandhi and the Congress, stated that the worst fears of the Sikhs that their interests would be sacrificed by the Congress had come true. He called for partition of Punjab into two parts with Ravi as the dividing line.175 India was now fast hurtling towards chaos, anarchy and partition. The great Calcutta killing was followed by communal carnage in Bihar, Bombay and Noakhali. The sins of the Sikh Taxi Drivers of Calcutta were visited upon their coreligionists in Hazard in NWFP in December 1946. By beginning of 1947, the atmosphere was surcharged with fear, and emotive violence all around. Lord Wavell who did his utmost to keep India united was being sacked, thanks to machinations of the Hindu-Congress leaders. And, Attlee on February 20, 1947, issued HMGs Policy Statement of demitting power in India not later than June 1948, to a duly representative body constituted by a fully representative Constituent Assembly in accordance with the Cabinet Mission Plan, or HMG would consider to whom powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over. Wavell was still for making another attempt at saving the unity of India. Of the Congress leaders, Gandhi was the only one to foresee that this meant partition. Shiromani Akali Dal on February 21, talked of formation of a Hindu-Sikh province while Tara Singh told New York Times correspondent of his fear of “civil war” and said, “We cannot trust the Muslims under any circumstances.”176 Tara Singh had obviously become panicky and was exploited by Hindu Congress leaders to their advantage. Tara Singh’s overreaction and Akali Dal’s talk of Hindu-Sikh province meant that they had lost sight of the objective of avoiding Hindu domination. It was now important for Jinnah that he should consolidate his position in a province like the Punjab where the League was not in power. The first victim of Attlee’s statement was the Ministry in Punjab headed by Khizar Hayat Khan. He resigned on March 2, 1947, in view of the entirely new situation created by Attlee’s statement of February 20. He also said that he fully supported the Muslim demand for self-determination.177 There have been fanciful but false stories of Master Tara Singh’s flourishing his sword and raising Pakistan-murdabad, Down with Pakistan, slogans on steps of the Punjab Assembly, of even cutting Muslim League flag on the Punjab Assembly, as signal for the communal rioting that started in the Punjab in the first week of March 1947. Nawab of Mamdot, leader of League, had been called by the Governor, and a meeting of the Congress and the Panthic Party was called in Punjab Assembly to take stock of the situation. The offer of the League for formation of an all parties government was considered. Lot of sloganeering was going on outside the Assembly by Muslim Leaguers. Tara Singh, in the words of (later Justice) G. D. Khosla stood on the stairs facing the hostile crowd and said cut ke denge apni jan. magar nahin denge Pakistan,” We shall give away our lives, but never concede Pakistan.”178 These were not provocative, but highly irresponsible. Rioting followed on March 4, in Lahore and Amritsar with heavy causalities. During the next week or so, savage communal riots with rape, rapine, murder and arson took place in central and western Punjab. Several towns were under curfew. All over the Punjab, people were uprooted from their homes. The Sikhs, who were thinly spread all over, were special target of the Muslim mobs. The Congress Working Committee on March 8, 1947, asked for partition of the Punjab on Muslim and non-Muslim basis. The Dawn, the mouthpiece of Muslim League, justifiably asked, “Why then not cut the gordian knot and divide the whole country.”179 Feroze Khan Noon, a member of the Muslim League High Command said that the Muslims would be agreeable to satisfy the legitimate Sikh aspirations. Tara Singh two days later spurned suggestions of Muslim League- Sikh understanding as an attempt to create a cleavage between the Hindus and Sikhs, and asserted “We are not going to betray the Hindus”. He ended up this phase of his life by betraying the Sikhs to Hindu entanglement because of sheer ineptness. Earlier, the Hindus of Punjab in a clever move hailed him as their leader. That went into his head and affected rational thinking. Muslim atrocities on the Sikhs in Rawalpindi Division, Hazara and other area constituted another factor. It will be seen that by the time, March 23, 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten took over as Viceroy of India, the decision to partition India had already been taken. Mountbatten known for his megalomania, forced the pace of events and aggravated the problem. He did not permit a rapprochement that was on the cards on a reappraisal by Gandhi and Nehru. In Nehru and Patel, he found power maniacs who fell a prey to his evils. Nehru also shared with Mountbatten in vanity, manipulation and chicanery, and sleight of hand - cunning with intention to deceive - apart from being taken into firm grasp by Lady Mountbatten. Mountbatten quickly went through his preliminary round of talks with the Indian leaders. Whereas Jinnah explained that the whole basis of Cabinet Mission Plan rested on its being worked “in a spirit of cooperation and mutual trust”, Patel was deadly opposed to parity and was for partition. H.M. Seervai, after a careful evaluation of the source material available came to the conclusion that “the relevant documents in the Transfer of Power relied upon by Ayesha Jalal, supports the paradoxical statement that ‘It was Congress that insisted on partition. It was Jinnah who was againstpartition’.”180 AccordingtoAyeshaJalal,“Mountbattenfailedtoperceivethattherealobject of Jinnah was to secure a united India with parity at the Centre.”181 That was the position in end April/early May 1947. Having come to the conclusion that the Cabinet Mission Plan was dead, Mountbatten hurried through the partition plan and advanced the date for transfer of power with catastrophic results.182 Power was to be transferred to two Dominions, and Congress ditched Lahore 1929 resolution of Puma Swaraj, Complete Independence, for pragmatic reasons. The events moved so fast and with such rapidity, that the Sikh leadership was found wanting in chartering a correct strategy to tackle crucial problems after due deliberations. The Sikh objective was clear, to avoid Hindu and Muslim domination. Ideas of various models, the Soviet, Swiss and others, were there, but needed instant consolidation. For instance, Swaran Singh and Bhim Sen Sachar on April 21, demanded division of the Punjab to two or three autonomous province183 the third meant separation of the Haryana area. The Sikh leadership should have come out decisively for a three-way division of Punjab, if nothing else. It was obvious to Jinnah that the Punjab would be partitioned at about Ravi and in case the Sikhs threw in their lot with Pakistan the borders would be around Panipat. He made overtures to the Sikhs and offered them special status in the area between Ravi-Panipat, a separate unit in East Punjab, with special privileges for Sikhs in Pakistan as a whole. He could not suggest them transfer of population straightaway, as it had wider implications. Penderal Moon who played a major role as a go-between thought that it was not impossible for the Sikhs to get the right to secede.184 What was needed was earnestness in negotiations. The Sikh leadership bereft of any knowledge of international affairs or world politics could not apply its mind to the Soviet model of ‘autonomous units’ with some of them even being members of the recently established United Nations Organisations. Tara Singh later candidly admitted: “The reason for our not pressing the demand for a Sikh State was our ignorance of history and world politics. None of us had known that a community can have a state of its own in spite of its being a minority in that area. Jewish State ‘Israel’ is one such recent example. I came to know about it in 1949 when I was in Almora prison. I was informed there by some one that Russian newspaper ‘Pravda’ had once commented that in this world there are two communities who possess all the ingredients of being a nation but have no homeland of their own. These communities are the Jews and the Sikhs. The Jews have got their homeland but the Sikhs have no homeland so far. When Israel came into existence, the Muslim population there was 600,000. Christians were 86,000 while Jews were only 46,000. But within a few years, the population of Jews has grown up to 6,000,000 due to migration of Jews from other countries. But for such ignorance, we might have obtained a Sikh State particularly when the Britishers sympathised with us.”185 The meeting between Jinnah and Tara Singh in early May in Lahore failed to fructify as the latter bolted from the place of meeting shortly before the appointed time. Jinnah met the Maharaja of Patiala on May 15, and spoke of a semi-autonomous Sikh State aligned with Pakistan, but the subject matter was reported to Congress leaders in Delhi, and Jinnah came to know of that.186 The Sikh leaders catered more to the interests of the Congress than their own, and there were a number of them who willy nilly served as Congress stooges and double crossers. Mangal Singh on April 24, warned the Sikhs against “tempting offers” being made by the Muslim League. Swaran Singh, on May 10, stated that the” Sikh were determined not to remain under Muslim subjugation” and Baldev Singh, on May 25, warned against “unnatural solicitude” of Jinnah for the Sikh, while a number of others spoke of, and were influenced by, general lack of credibility in Jinnah.187 None of them warned against Hindu subjugation and Gandhi’s wile. Congress leaders were fully aware of the predicament of the Sikh leadership, and took full advantage of that, to deny them any meaningful concessions. For instance, the Sikh demand for exclusion of Haryana area from East Punjab, to pave the way for Punjabi speaking state, Punjabi Suba, was negatived by Congress leaders in May 1947 itself when Mountbatten was hammering the partition plan down the throats of the Indian leaders. Baldev Singh’s seeing the Viceroy by end of May and telling him that “there was no sign of either party making any concessions to the Sikhs” marked the culmination of the failure of the Sikh leadership. Giani Kartar Singh in April 1947 had started serious negotiations with Jinnah for a possible understanding. He could have outwitted the Hindu Congress leaders to provide Sikhs ironclad guarantees or yield to Sikh interests as in the separation of Haryana from the Punjab, but was thwarted by Tara Singh and Baldev Singh.188 It may be mentioned that the demand for a separate Jat State including the whole or part of Meerut Division of U.P. and large parts of Ambala Division, was mooted in April 1947 as the partition line would have been near Panipat in case of the Sikhs throwing their lot with the Muslim League. Giani Kartar Singh, after he had entered into serious parleys with Jinnah told Sir R. Jenkins that the Sikhs could let the Hindu Jats have Rohtak, Gurgaon, half of Karnal and Hissar districts; in Ambala,theSikhsandMuslimswereinmajority.189 SinceGianiKartarSinghwasfrustratedbyTara Singh and Baldev Singh from outwitting the Hindu Congress leaders, the demand for a separate Jat state subsided, and the Sikhs were left to bite the dust. Sir Edward Penderal Moon, Secretary, Development Board, Government of India in a last ditch effort in his letter of June 27, 1947, to Chief of Viceroy’s Staff advocated exclusion of Gurgaon, Hissar, Rohtak and Karnal districts from East Punjab. He wrote, “The Sikhs have already put this demand to Congress who hesitate to accept it.” He suggested that “this Sikh demand should be taken out of Hindu cluches as they want to be - and put in a more or less independent position of their own”. He hinted at the creation of a Sikh buffer state between India and Pakistan by planned migration.190 Mountbatten wrote to Jinnah and Nehru. Jinnah sent no reply, while Nehru declined saying that the time was short.191 Mountbatten could not act on his own as he was angling to be independent India’s first Governor General. It only showed the uneasy flutterings of the Sikhs, now firmly in the grip of Hindu Congress leaders. They seemed to have lost their case for equality of opportunity in the new dispensation even before the British were out. By May 1947, both Gandhi and Nehru were seized of guilt complex. On May 28, they wanted Mountbatten to shelve the partition plan and enforce the Cabinet Mission Plan as an “award in letter and spirit”. After being badly mauled, they were now willing to accept what was available to them for about a year from May 16, 1946. Matters had gone far ahead, and it was not possible to reverse the trends. Even after partition, as V. P. Menon pleaded in the Statesman of October 21, 1947, the Hindu Congress leaders were asking for unity at the top in Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, between the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan, on the basis of sovereign equality.192 That gives an insight into the working of the Hindu mind. Mountbatten’s June 3 plan advancing the date of independence to August 15, only helped to precipitate matters. Both the Muslim League (June 10) and Congress (June 14) accepted the partition plan while Akali Dal rejected it. The division of Punjab because of the Sikh demand, and that of Bengal, was a foregone conclusion. The Muslim League quickly followed up with plan to denude West Punjab of the Sikhs. The Hindus followed them. The Sikh leaders accepted the idea of transfer of population in June when they should have done so a couple of months earlier. The deliberate delay by Mountbatten in announcing the Radcliffe Award, which was ready by August 13,193 only helped to create more anarchy and mayhem. It, however, helped Nehru to have certain changes effected in Ferozepur and Gurdaspur sectors which gave India Ferozepur canal head works besides linkage to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and paved the way for Kashmiris becoming ‘integral’ part of India. Because of the Sikhs throwing their lot with India, the whole of present Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir, parts of present Himachal Pradesh and Haryana could become part of India. But for that, the boundary line would have been somewhere near Panipat as Hindus were in majority only in Gurgaon and Rohtak and parts of Karnal and Hissar districts of undivided India.194 Were Hindu Congress leaders grateful to the Sikhs for bringing about this addition to the Union of India? No, not the least. Gandhi, Nehru and Patel were deeply imbued in Hindu Shastras and cultural mores. What did their study of Hindu Shastras teach them? Since Gandhi wanted to re-establish Ram Rajya, it would be fair to refer to Ramayana. In Ramayana, apart from Lord Rama’s killing of Bali in a dubious manner, the victory of Rama over Ravana would have been impossible but for the help rendered by Babhikhan, Ravana’s brother. He gave away family secrets for which he was dubbed by Ravana as traitor to the country and the family. Did Hindus have any better words for him? No, not at all. In every Indian language there is a saying for him; ‘ghar ka bhedi lanka dhae “one who betraying the secrets of the family, causes fall of Lanka - an impregnable fortress”. And, since the days of Ramayana down to the present times, no Hindu has named his child after Babhikhan.195 The attitude of Gandhi, Nehru and Patel to Sikh leaders could not be any different. To them, Tara Singh and the Sikhs meant a confused lot, who could be bought over or hoodwinked at will. On August 15, 1947, India was partitioned into two dominions - Hindus and Muslims establishing their rule, whereas the Sikhs, the third party with whom the British negotiated drew a blank. It was remarkable, that on August 15, Hinduism in India after a millennium of slavery came of its own. This was the first time since the violent extermination of Budhism under the auspices of Adi Shankaracharya, that a homogenised caste-Hindu state came into being from north to south, and east to west, thanks to the legacy of British imperialism. Cut into two, nay three, pieces and because of bloodshed of her innocent children, Bharat Mata was bleeding profusely, and they raised the hand of most cleverer from amongst themselves and said, lo, he is the father of the nation! Gandhi, conscious of the immorality of the declaration, spent the day in quietitude in Calcutta showing an apparent remorse at the bloodshed for which he was no less responsible. Verily, he was the father of Indian independence, with its concomitant partition and bloodshed. What is worse, this bloodshed between Hindus and Muslims in India has continued ever since on a regular basis, as part of that legacy. And of late, Sikhs too have also been the object of the Hindu’s vendetta. Leaving for what was to be Pakistan, on August 7, 1947, Jinnah wanted the Hindus and the Muslims to “bury the past”. The following day, Patel vituperated, “The poison has been removed from the body of India” while at the same time hoped that “It will not be long before they return to us.”196 Where did the poison lay? There were two people who till the last fought for Indian unity. One were the Pathans under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The other were the Sikhs led by Shiromani Akali Dal. Describing the state of his people, Abdul Ghaffar Khan said, “Tied hand and foot, we have been thrown to the wolves.”197 The position of the Sikhs was no different, except that they did not have the leadership to realise what havoc it had caused to the community. The Sikhs had been thrown to the wolves of Brahminical vintage. For the first time in their history, they came under the tutelage of Brahminical Hindus. They were at the mercy of Gandhiites, underpinned by ferocious Arya Samajists, who in alignment, aimed at their very identity. Before leaving for Pakistan, Jinnah paid a farewell call on his friend Sardar Bahadur Sir Sobha Singh and told him, that, “The Sikhs by not opting for self rule had committed a big blunder.” Sobha Singh said, “By fully trusting Hindus and linking our destiny with them, we have done well. The Hindus will never maltreat us or betray us. -” Jinnah quipped, “Sardar Bahadur you had the Hindus only as your co-slaves; now, you will know the real Hindu when he becomes your master and you become his slave.”198 Jinnah was not far wrong. The process had already started. To cite only two instances. One, Gandhi by June 1947 had already resumed his attack on the Sikh identity and made his intentions very clear as to the treatment awaiting the Sikhs in independent India. Instead of thanking Master Tara Singh for bringing half of Punjab into India, Gandhi adopted superciliary attitude and administered him a rebuke when Tara Singh called on him shortly after the Sikhs throwing in their lot with the Hindus under the June 3 plan. Gandhi took note of Sikhs assertion of being a separate religion and averred that “all the poison was spread by Macaulay (he meant Cunningham) who wrote the history of the Sikhs. Since Macaulay (sic) was a well known historian, everyone swallowed what he said.”199 He was for removal of that poison. This only showed that Gandhi’s malice and ignorance went hand in hand. Gandhi also averred that, “The Granth Sahib of the Sikhs was actually based on the Hindu scriptures”. Also in this age of Atom Bomb, “the sword was a rusty weapon.” Gandhi took a malicious note of the Sikhs living “in great material comfort”. Later on August 5, at Punja Sahib, he ridiculed the Sikh concept of one Sikh being equal to sawa lakh, a legion.200 Two, Chaudhri Lehri Singh, a Congressite Hindu leader on July 9, 1947, wrote to Sardar Patel, “As you are no doubt aware, now-a-days in the Punjab the Sikh movement (sponsored by Tara Singh) for the creation of a Punjabi speaking province comprising the whole of Jullundur Division, Amritsar and parts of Ambala Division is gaining ground. This will result in isolating the Haryana Prant, viz districts of Rohtak, Karnal, Gurgaon and some parts of Hissar. To propose further division of the truncated Punjab is definitely actuated by the sole desire of establishing Sikh hegemony in the Central Punjab. This move on the part of Sikh leaders cannot be justified in any way.” And, Patel wrote back on July 11, 1947, “I can assure you that at present there is no question of any division of the Eastern Punjab on the lines you have referred to.”201 Hindus had started marshalling themselves against the non-existing ‘Sikh hegemony’ in the central Punjab, even before the partition had been effected. Earlier in June, according to Dr. Gopal Singh, he approached Gandhi to seek his help in the formation of Punjabi speaking state in what was going to be East Punjab. Gandhi’s sharp reaction, when there was no talk about mass migration of minorities from the two dominions, was “But you are then asking for a Sikh State.” When told that no single community would be in a majority, Gandhi calmed down and said, “If this be so, bring me a blueprint. I shall speak to others.”202 The riots and mass migration that followed changed the demography of East Punjab. What stood out was the resolve of top Congress leadership including acclaimed father of ‘our’ nation not to let the Sikhs equality of treatment and opportunity in independent India. This obviously reflected the total failure of the Sikh leadership. What were the causes? Obviously, ineptness of the Sikh leadership. ability. The Congress and the Muslim League were fortunate to be led by men of extraordinary Gandhi and Jinnah were highly educated, Bar-at-Laws, and had well developed faculties of reasoning and logic. Both of them enjoyed unquestioned position at the top and provided unified command structure. Gandhi was an original thinker, who could think both with his brain and his skull.203 He could talk for hours on end, often leaving the listener confused, as to what he really meant. Inconsistency was the hallmark of his voluminous pronouncements and he brought to bear hypocrisy on a vast scale in public life. He was ably assisted by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru another Bar-at-Law, a pseudo socialist, well versed in international affairs, world politics, Indian culture and world history; and Sardar Vallabhai Patel, yet another Bar-at-Law who could surpass any fundamentalist Hindu in stance and mien. They constituted trinity, complementing each other with Gandhi at the apex. Then, they had a Working Committee to provide the second ring of leadership and a broader, democratic, framework. Jinnah was a leading lawyer who could change his arguments midway and argue his case both ways. He was the ‘sole spokesman’ and provided the solitary leadership. He was well versed both in national and international affairs. He was a man of dogged determination, and despite the weakness of his position following the 1937 elections, kept himself at the top by an adroit degree of maneuverability and pragmatism. He was ably assisted by his personal assistant and the typewriter! He had his High Command of Muslim League to provide second rather third ring of leadership to be used at command to put off or ratify a given decision. The Sikh leadership emerged splintered from the Gurdwara reform movement, thanks to Gandhi’s and later Hailey’s machinations. Shiromani Akali Dal, Central Akali Dal and pro-British elements kept themselves warring against each other, prevented emergence of a solid and unified leadership. The Sikhs did not have a leader of towering stature, of high standing, higher education, much less a Bar-at-Law or a statesman who could exert his primacy. The leadership which came up was fractured and inept. Tara Singh was an ordinary graduate and could not match the top Congress leadership’s sophistry or intellectual attainments. He struck to anti-imperialism as an article of faith and a fixed position, when a pragmatic approach dictated a compromise with the British and adoption of a rational outlook which could have put him at an advantageous position vis a vis the Hindus and the Muslims. He was handicapped by his deep commitment to the Congress and the perverse perception of Sikh history, which saw purport of emergence of Sikhism in protection of Hinduism. Giani Kartar Singh though less educated was the brain of the Akali party and showed traces of brilliance which were marred because he could not come up as the supreme leader. Baldev Singh was very mediocre whose only qualification was that he was moneyed and financed the Akali party. He was not fit for the job he was entrusted with. The Sikhs operated through All Parties Sikh Conference which provided for induction of all sorts of people, disparate in character, interests and alignments, even infiltrators like Niranjan Singh Gill, Gandhiites, and others. The Sikh leaders probably never did much reading on overall current Indian situation, much less on international affairs and world politics. Harnam Singh who assisted them, apart from being a Congress-pet, was a municipal lawyer, with not much width of understanding. In short, the Sikhs had a collegiate type of leadership, of conflicting interests and pulling apart which lost opportunities when they were knocking at the door, in the process, jeopardising the Sikh communal identity, and pushing it to untold sufferings. On the whole, the struggle for freedom threw up anti-British or anti-imperialist forces, but none of them truly national or secular in character. To wit, in the Punjab, there were the Akalis and other Sikh groups, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu National Party, and the Muslim League catering to sectoral interests, and Indian National Congress and the Unionists cutting across communal lines. For instance. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Mohammd Ali Jinnah came to the rescue of Akalis in securing the 1925 Gurdwara Act on terms favourable to them, and in post- 1937 era, one or the other group of the Sikhs and the Hindu National Party joined hands with the Unionists in forming the broad-based government in the Punjab, despite the latter having an absolute majority of its own. The Congress throughout the period, except for a short span of about a year following 1946 elections, remained on the sidelines and played a retrogressive role. From 1937, the Punjab Congress under Gopi Chand Bhargava was isolating itself to represent only urban Hindu interests - mainly bania and shopkeeper classes; and since the end of 19th century it provided an exclusive outlet to Arya Samaj to give vent to its sectarian political aspirations. The Congress in the Punjab, at micro level, was divided into two groups, one echoing Hindu chauvinistic ideals, and the other trying to carry the Sikhs alongwith it. The central Congress leadership, during the struggle, made certain promises to the Sikhs, not with a view to carry them out, but to absorb them within the framework of Hinduism, on which there was a broad unity in approach in the two wings of the Congress. Herein lay the seeds of the future conflict for the Sikhs in independent India. Footnotes: 1. During the freedom struggle, 73 of 121 persons executed were the Sikhs and 2147 of 2664 sentenced to life imprisonment in the Andamans were the Sikhs. In the Jallianwala Bagh massacre which brought to ahead the demand for freedom, out of 1302 men, women and children gunned down by General Dyer, 799 were the Sikhs. 2. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, (London, 1951), p. 404. 3. Ibid, p. 406. 4. Ibid, For instance the Hindu artisans employed for the construction of Qutab Minar in Delhi after the destruction of Hindu and Jain temples emitted their disgust in the form of abusive writings in nagri script on the Qutab walls. 5. Ibid, p. 407. 6. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee explicitly put forth in the introduction of his novel Anand Math and again in the introduction of the second edition, specifically owning up the critical estimate published in The Liberal of April 8, 1882, that his immediate object was putting an end to the Muslim tyranny and replacing it by Hindu rule. The ascetic, inspired by patriotism and directed by a mysterious preceptor, organises a religious order of rebels and revolutionaries and rises in revolt. He wins against the Muslims but is defeated by the troops of East Indian Company. Then the preceptor tries to persuade him to give up as the English were destined to rule till there was revival of Aryan faith and “Hinduism becomes great in knowledge, virtue and power.” The preceptor declares, “Who is the enemy? The English are friends, there is no one who can fight the English and win in the end.” The whole inspiration was anti-Muslim and yet Hindus wanted Muslims to join them shoulder to shoulder and sing Bande Matram to their destruction. Following partition of Bengal in 1905, Hindus built up a massive swadeshi movement based on Anand Math and its song Bande Matram. Paradoxically, the same people after getting the partition of Bengal as part of Indian rescinded in 1911, agreed to the same, with East Bengal emerging as apart of sovereign Pakistan. They yet again assisted in its emerging as a sovereign state of Bangladesh in 1971. So much for their wisdom and foresight. See, Ibid, pp. 418-20. 7. The Muslims objected to third, fourth and five stanzas of Bande Matram. 8. See, Ravinder Kumar, “The Secular Culture of India”(1984) in his The Making of a Nation, (Delhi, 1989), p. 89 9. Ibid, pp. 190-91. 10. Cf.H.M.SeervaiPartitionofIndia,LegendandReality,(Bombay,1989),pp.12-13;S.Gopal,S. Radhakrishnan, A Biography, (Delhi, 1989), p. 68. 11. Indulal K. Yajnik, Gandhi, As I Knew Him, (Delhi, 1943), p. 302. 12. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, n. 3, p. 432. 13. J.S. Dhanak, “Lala Lajpat Rai and Communal politics in India”, Panjab Past and Present, (hereinafter referred to as PP&P), Vol. XVI, October 1982, pp. 184-99. 14. Ibid, pp. 189-91. 15. Gandhiwrote,“Ihavenotreadamoredisappointingbookfromareformersogreat.”Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, (hereinafter referred to as CW), (Delhi, Publications Division), Vol 24, pp. 144-45. 16. Statement in April 1928, quoted in Dhanak, n. 13, p. 197. 17. JawaharlalNehru,GlimpsesofWorldHistory[1934-35](Delhi,1982reprint),p.720. 18. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, n. 3, p. 486. 19. Nirad C. Chudhuri, Thy Hand, Great Anarch! India, 1921-52, (London, 1987), p. 726. 20. Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, (Delhi, 1988), pp. 16-18. 21. Ibid, p. 134. 22. Ravinder Kumar, n. 8, p. 192. 23. Cf.V.B.Kulkarni,K.M.Munshi,(BuildersofModemIndia)(Delhi,1982)p.216. 24. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, n. 19, p. 774. 25. The Searchlight, January 21, 1927, CW, Vol. 32, p. 564. 26. Dhanak, n. 13, p. 194. 27. Tribune December 26, 1924 quoted in Ibid, p. 195. 28. K.L. Tuteja, Sikhs Politics, (Kurukshetra, 1984), pp. 146-47. 29. Kailash Chander Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, (Delhi, 1974), p. 44. 30. “PerilsofaCommunalSituation”,editorialinTribune,July12,1931. 31. He must have been seized of the spirit of his ancestor Gangadhar Kaul alias Gangu Brahmin. 32. CW Vol. 38, p. 315; Tuteja n. 28, p. 47. 33. CW, Vol. 39, p. 412. 34. CW, Vol. 41, p. 546. 35. Tribune, October 16 1929, quoted in Gulati, n. 29, p. 47. 36. Ibid. 37. CW, Vol. 42, p. 306. 38. Young India, January 7, 1930, in CW, Vol. 42, pp. 378-79. 39. Tribune, January 20, 1930. 39a. JawaharlalNehru,LetterstoChiefMinisters(Delhi,1986),Vol.2p.291. 40. M.S. Sahni, “Bhai Jodh Singh and Simon Commission”, PP&P, Vol. XVI, October 1986, p. 262. 41. Tribune, April 15, 1930, quoted in Tuteja, n. 28, p. 149. 42. Gulati, n. 29, p. 55. 43. Tuteja, n. 28, p. 150. 44. Text in Young India, March 5, 1931, in CW Vol. 45, pp. 231-33. 45. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, n. 19, p. 49. 46. CW, Vol. 45, p. 121. 47. Ibid. What sort of faith Gandhi was keeping with the Sikhs at the time? He had agreed to plead with the Viceroy to commute the death sentence of Bhagat Singh and others. But he backed out when he learnt that Bhagat Singh under the influence of Bhai Randhir Singh of Narnagwal, had taken a resolve to take baptism and lead a pucca Sikh life thereafter. Gandhi in a speech in Delhi on March 7, 1931, said that” history records numerous instances that they who use the sword perish by the sword”. However, on Bhagat Singh and his companions being hanged on March 23, Gandhi chose to flow with the popular acclaim for the heroes and said that they had become martyrs. What a thuggee! There was a lot of heart burning amongst revolutionaries, the members of Hindustan Republican Socialist Army, at Gandhi’s backtracking. Bhagat Singh’s last wish, that he be administered amrit, Sikh baptism, a by a group of five including Bhai Randhir Singh was not fulfilled by the British. Gandhi was not displeased. Though Bhagat Singh had grown a beard of about 4-5 cms, and tied a knot under his turban by the time of his martyrdom, Hindus till today continue to show him clean-shaven with a hat on his head. That is to give expression to their atavistic feelings. Bhagat Singh had correctly read the Hindu mind, when he told Bhai Randhir Singh that he was getting the acclaim of the Hindu’s only because he had shed his keshas. Once he re-keeps the keshas and becomes Guru’s Sikhs he would be disowned by the Hindus. Cf. Bhai Sahib Randhir Singh, Autobiography, (Tr: Dr. Trilochan Singh) (Ludhiana, 1992) p. 285. For photograph of Bhagat Singh taken a few hours before he was hanged, see. Ibid, opp. p. 286. 48. Gurmit Singh, Gandhi and the Sikhs, (Sirsa, 1969), p. 43. 49. G.D.Tendulkar,Mahatma;(LifeofMohandasKaramchandGandhi),volIII,p.195. 50. AICCResolutionofMarch7,1931,Ibid,p.1031;CWVol44,p.45. 51. FortextofSikhdemandsseeGulati,n.29,pp.238-39. 52. Emphasisadded, CW, Vol. 48 p. 98. 53. CW, Vol. 58, p. 192. 54. PyareLal’sTheEpicFast(1934),givesgraphicaccountoftheeventsleadingtothePoonaPact. 55. CW, Vol. 85, p. 20. 56. Shortly after the author joined the Indian Foreign Office in early 1960s, he asked one of his colleagues, a Brahmin, working in Kashmir Unit of the Ministry, as to what we mean when we say in the UN Security Council that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and how UP or Bihar, for that matter, are not. The colleague could only say that it (the phrase) was the invention of clever Hindu mind. Only after reading Gandhi’s description of the Untouchables as integral part of Hinduism, the meaning of the phrase Kashmir as integral part of Indian became clear. 57. KartarSingh&GurdialSinghDhillon,StonesfromSikhHistory,BookIX,(Delhi,1981),pp. 260-78, for full version. 58. Ibid. 59. CW,Vol63,p.174fn. 60. Ibid, pp. 185-86. 61. What was the origin of the word Harijan for the depressed classes in not known. However, the term Harijan for the dalits was used by Koer Singh in Gurbilas Patshahis 10, (1751). Also, CW, Vol. 63, pp. 233-35. 62. Ibid, p. 267. 63. Ibid, p. 294. 64. Kartar Singh & Dhillon, n. 57, p. 272. 65. Letter dated 14 November, 1936 to Amrit Kaur, CW, Vol. 64, p. 41. 66. The distribution of 175 seats in the Punjab Legislative Council was as follows: Muslims Hindus Sikhs Anglo-Indian Europeans Commerce & Industry Zamindars Labour University Christians Seats Percentage 86 49.14 43 24.57 32 18.29 1 0.57 1 0.57 1 0.57 5 2.86 3 1.71 1 0.57 2 1.14 67. Gulati, n. 29, p. 74. 68. Ibid, pp. 69-70. 69. Ibid, p. 75. 70. Tuteja, n. 28, pp. 178-79. 71. Tribune, November 20, 1936, quoted in Gulati, n. 29, p. 75. 72. Y.P. Bajaj, “The Sikhs and the First General Elections (1936-37) to Punjab Legislative Assembly: An Analysis,” PP&P, vol. XXI, April 1987, pp. 103-08. 73. Gulati, n. 29, p. 76. 74. For text see Gulati, n. 29, pp. 210-11; Tuteja, n. 28, pp. 181-82. 75. ThePactgreatlystrengthenedJinnahatthenationallevel.Cf,IanTalbot,PunjabandtheRaj. 1849-1947, (Delhi, 1988), p. 125. 76. Tuteja, n. 28, p. 183. 77. CW, Vol 68, pp. 1-2. 78. CW, Vol. 70, p. 259. 79. Gulati, n.29, p. 77. 80. Satya Pal to Dr. Rajendra Prasad dated January 24, 1940 in Tuteja n. 28, pp. 188-89. 81. Ibid, pp. 191-92. 82. ChristineEffenberg,ThePoliticalStatusoftheSikhsduringtheIndianNationalMovement,1935-1947, (Delhi, 1989), pp. 92-94, 113; Tuteja, n. 28, pp. 188-89. 83. TextEffenberg,n.82,pp.95-96. 84. Ibid, pp. 112-13; (also Gulati, n. 29, p. 80). 85. Ibid, p. 116. 86. N.N.Mitra,IndianAnnualRegister,(hereinafterIAR),1940,part1,p.337. 87. Tuteja, n. 28, p-206. 88. Ibid, p. 193. 89. Gandhi considered that an affront to his leadership and did not relent till he had hounded Subhash Chandra Bose out of India. 90. CW, Vol. 73, pp. 395-96. 91. Ibid, pp. 54-56. 92. Indu Banga, “Crisis in Punjab Politics, 1940-47” in Joseph T.O’ Connel, et, el(ed), Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century, (Toronto, 1988), pp. 238-39. 93. Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in Punjab, (Princeton, 1966), p. 80. 94. Effenberg,n.82,pp.129-30;InduBanga,n.92,p.239. 95. Fortext,seeGurmitSingh,HistoryofSikhStruggles.(Delhi,1989),pp.225-35. 96. The Congress Working Committee in its resolution of April 2, 1942, said that it could not think of “compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union, against their declared and established will.” 97. This was in sharp contrast to Gandhi’s analysis of Britain being worsted, and his decision to stab them in the back by resort to civil disobedience. 98. According to master Tara Singh, the Hindus like Raja Nerendra Nath, Sir Gokal Chand Narang, Mahashe Khushal Chand of daily Milap, Mahashe Krishan of daily Partap, Goswami Ganesh Das, and Bhai Parmanand played their due role in bringing about this pact. Effenberg, n. 82, p. 134. 99. AjitSinghSarhadi,PunjabiSuba,TheStoryofStruggles,(Delhi,1970),p.63. 100. This was despite the briefing on Guru Gobind Singh done by Kapur Singh, I.C.S., in March 1942. Kapur Singh, Saachi Sakhi, (Jalandhar, 1972), pp. 74-76. 100a.Gandhi was moved by his reading of Lord Krishna’s running away with the clothes of naked Gopis taking a bath in a pool of water, and dictating terms to them from an unequal position. He thought that the Japanese overrunning of South-East Asia had placed the British in dire circumstances, and placed him in an advantageous position to dictate terms. 101. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (1946), (Delhi, 1981), p. 488. 102. Effenberg, n. 82, p. 132. 103. Text, Gurmit Singh, n. 95, pp. 241-44. 104. Linlithgow to Amery, September 5, 1942, text. Ibid, pp. 24-48. 105. Glancy to Linlithgow, November 28, 1942, text. Ibid, p. 262. 106. Jaswant Singh (ed), Autobiography of Master Tara Singh, quoted in Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership, (Sirsa, 1981), p. 61. 107. Sarbadi, n. 99, p. 68. 108. Indu Banga, n. 92, p. 242. 109. Gulati, n. 29, p. 75. 110. Indu Banga, n. 92, p. 242. 111. Effenberg, n. 82. p. 120. 112. Sarhadi, n 99, pp. 72-73. 113. Ibid, p. 74. 114. V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, (Madras, 1968), p. 163. 115. Wavell to Amery, August 15, 1944, text, Gurmit Singh, n. 95, pp. 356-61. 116. N.N. Mitra, IAR, 1944, Vol 2, p. 210. 117. For proceedings, see Ibid, pp. 211-15. 118. For details. Ibid, pp. 218-21. 119. Ibid, p. 218. 120. Ibid, 219. 121. Ibid, p. 220. 122. Ibid, p. 221. 123. Ibid, pp. 215-17. 124. Ibid, p. 217. 125. For Text, Ibid, pp. 221-22. 126. Harnam Singh, Punjab, Homeland of the Sikhs (Lahore, 1945), pp. 77-80, quoted in Gulati, n. 29, p. 107. 127. M.C. Setalvad, Bhulabhai Desai (Builders of Modern India), (Delhi, 1968), quoted in H.M. Seervai. n. p. 112. 128. Gulati, n. 29, p. 107. 129. Effenberg, n. 82, pp. 153-55. 130. Indu Banga, n. 92, p. 249. 131. R.L. Khipple, The Simla Conference, (Lahore, 1945), p. 93. 132. For proceedings, see Mitra, IAR, 1945, Vol. 2, pp. 164-70. 133. Ibid, p. 166. 134. Ibid, p. 167. 135. Emphasis added. Ibid, pp. 165-66. 136. Ibid, p. 168. 137. Gulati, n. 29, p. 113. 138. Sarhadi, n. 99, pp. 86. 139. Jinnah told President and Secretary All India Sikh Students Federation that he treated Sikhs as a nation entitled to homeland. 140. Sarhadi, n. 99, pp. 87-88. 141. For text, see Mitra, IAR, 1946, pp. 200-01. 142. For record of discussions, see Nicholas Mansergh(ed), Transfer of Power, (hereinafter referred to as TP), Vol. 7, Doc 56, pp. 138-41. 143. Kapur Singh, n. 100, p. 94. This later led Kapur Singh to write a paper “The Stupid Sikhs”. 144. Gopal Singh, A History of the Sikh People, 1469-1988, (Delhi, 1988) p. 704. 145. Effenberg, n. 82, p. 163. 146. ‘For instance, Nehru said there would be no Pakistan even if the British or the United Nations Organisation agreed to create one. His real feelings towards the Sikhs were reflected when he said that Master Tara Singh had the unique distinction of sitting on about 15 stools and that he (Tara Singh) was free to align with the Muslim league, if he so liked. Nehru, like a spoilt child that he was, indulged in a lot of bravado and indiscrete talk. For official version, see Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Delhi, 1972) Vol. 15. pp. 120-25. 147. TP, Vol. VII, p. 434. 148. Ibid, pp. 465-66. 149. Seervai, n. 10, p. 45. 150. Ibid. 151. Ibid, p. 64. 152. Ibid, pp. 38-39. 153. Tara Singh to Pethic Lawrence and reply of June 1, Mitra, IAR, 1946, Vol 1, PP. 201-02. 154. Ibid, pp. 202-05. 155. Seervai, n. 10, p. 67. 156. Ibid, p. 65. 157. Ibid, p, 73. 158. Ibid, p. 70. 159. Ibid, pp. 75-76; Azad, n. 20, pp. 164-65. 160. Effenber, n. 82, p. 151. 161. Ibid, p. 162; Sarhadi, n. 99. p. 97 162. A. B. Rajput, Punjab Crisis and Cure, (Lahore, 1947), p. 58. 163. Sarhabi, n. 99. p. 97. 164. V.P. Menon, n. 114. p. 305. 165. Emphasis added Seervai, n. 10, p. 78. 166. TP, Vol IX, p. 153. 167. Emphasis added Ibid, pp. 240-42. 168. Seervai, n. 99., pp. 102-03. 169. Kapur Singh, n. 100, p. 97. 170. Sarhadi, n. 99 pp. 102-03. 171. TP, Vol. IX, p. 319. 172. Jawaharlal Nehru , Glimpses of World History, (Delhi 1982 reprint), pp. 128-29. 173. For a comprehensive analysis, see C.H. Heimasth, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform Bombay, 1964, and N.S. Bose, The Indian Awakening in Bengal, (Calcutta 1960). 174. Tendulkar, n. 48, vol. VII, pp. 298, 307. 175. Gulati, n. 29, p. 128. 176. Quoted in Rajput, n. 162, p. 73. 177. Ibid, p. 75. 178. G.D. Khosla, Stem Reckoning, (Delhi, 1949), quoted in Sarhadi, n. 99, p. 121. 179. Dawn, Delhi March 14, 1947, quoted in Rajput, n. 162, pp. 118-19. 180. Seervai, n. 10 pp. 123. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibid, p. 139. 183. Durga Das (Ed), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, Vol. V. (Ahmedabad, 1971-74) pp. 1292-93. 184. Penderal Moon, Divide and Quit, (London, 1961), p. 86. 185. Jaswant Singh (Ed), Autobiography of Master Tara Singh, p. 197 quoted in Gurmit Singh n. 106, pp. 64-65. 186. For details of Jinnah’s talks with the Sikh leaders including Maharaja of Patiala, Hardit Singh Malik, Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh at Delhi, See Satindra Singh, Khalistan, An Academic Analysis, (Delhi 1982), pp. 64-67. Satindra Singh places these talks in 1946 which is not correct. 187. GandaSingh,“ADiaryofPartitionDays”,PP&P,Vol.XII,October1978,p.448. 188. Sarhadi, n. 99, p. 128. 189. Note by Jenkins, TP Vol, Document 113, p. 183. 190. TP, Vol. XI, p. 692. 191. Ibid. 192. Emphasis added. V.P. Menon, n. 114, p. 449. 193. Seervai, n. 10 p. 148. 194. Paying his tributes, C. Rajagopalachari attributed accession of half of Punjab and half of Bengal to Master Tara Singh. Jaswant Singh, n. 185, p. 401. 195. As Gandhi was a great devotee of Lord Krishna, we may highlight the main deductions drawn by him from his life. A recent biography of Lord Krishna by Pavan K Verma(Delhi, 1992), tellingly points out that, 1. Lord Krishna in early childhood was caught stealing butter, but he chose to tell a lie; 2. Lord Krishna ran away with the clothes of naked Gopis (taking bath in a pool of water) who had complained to his mother against his butter - stealing campaigns, and dictated terms to them from an unequal position; 3. Lord Krishna could have come to the rescue of Daropti much earlier but did not, till the point of no return had been reached; and 4. Lord Krishna in Mahabharta War, made Arjuna to shoot arrows at Karan in violation of accepted principles of war, and kill him. Arjuna throughout his life did not forgive himself but Lord Krishna had no remorse at all. Verily, Satyamevajayate, truth lies in victory. 196. Seervai, n. 10, p. 134. 197. Quoted in the Spokesman weekly, December 25, 1972. 198. Kapur Singh, n. 10. p. 134 199. CW, Vo. 88, pp. 4-5. 200. Ibid. Vol. 89, p 284. 201. Durga Das, n. 183, Vol. V, pp. 302-03. 202. Gopal Singh, n. 144, p. 713. 203. Paying him tributes on his death, Jairam Das Daulatram said “woh kamal ki khopri thi” - that was a remarkable skull.